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Abstract 
Tackling the complexity of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) or voice-hearing 
phenomena in schizophrenia requires an interdisciplinary approach for their better 
understanding, and ultimately for their treatment. One initial, but far reaching obstacle on the 
way to an appropriate understanding of voice-hearing is that there is no consensus on how 
such phenomena are best conceptualised. Given the various dimensions in which voice-
hearing experiences can be described (e.g., audibility, personification, relationality) it is not 
obvious which of them constitute core features of voice-hearing. In the present thesis, it is 
proposed that the experience of a communication moment is a promising candidate for such a 
core feature. Moreover, studies from the areas of neuroscience, psychology, as well as clinical 
philosophy are systematically reviewed in order to examine how voice-hearing is 
conceptualised and studied in these disciplines. Methodological, as well as conceptual 
shortcomings of these approaches are critically discussed. Whereas neuroscientific accounts 
of voice-hearing have focused on self-monitoring accounts, clinical-philosophical accounts of 
voice-hearing in schizophrenia have focused on general alterations of experience as basis for 
the occurrence of voice-hearing. Psychological approaches to voice-hearing stress its 
relational nature. Such accounts have largely been developed separately and their 
compatibility is not obvious, also because of differing metaphysical assumptions of different 
disciplines. It is proposed that a phenomenological-ecological standpoint may be valuable for 
the contextualisation of results regarding voice-hearing from different disciplines, avoiding 
the pitfalls of reductionist conceptions of voice-hearing. Practical implications for an 
interdisciplinary research of AVHs are also derived. 
Keywords: Voice-hearing, Auditory Verbal Hallucinations, Conceptualisation, Neuroscience, Psychology, 
Clinical Philosophy
  
 
 
Resumo 
A complexidade dos fenómenos de ―alucinações auditivas verbais‖ (AAV) ou ―ouvir vozes‖ 
na esquizofrenia requer uma abordagem interdisciplinar para a sua melhor compreensão e, 
ultimamente, tratamento. Um obstáculo inicial, mas de grande relevância, no caminho para 
uma compreensão adequada de ―ouvir vozes‖ é não haver consenso sobre como tais 
fenómenos são melhor conceptualizados. Dadas as várias dimensões em que as experiências 
de ouvir vozes possam ser descritas (p.ex., audibilidade, personificação, relação), não é óbvio 
quais sejam as principais características de ―ouvir vozes‖. Na presente tese, é proposto que 
uma experiência de um momento comunicativo seja candidata promissora a para tal 
característica principal. Além disso, estudos das áreas de neurociência, psicologia, bem como 
da filosofia clínica são sistematicamente revistos para examinar como ―ouvir vozes‖ é 
conceptualizado e estudado nessas disciplinas. As deficiências metodológicas, bem como 
conceptuais destas abordagens são discutidas criticamente. Considerando que as abordagens 
neurocientíficas de ouvir vozes se concentraram em auto-monitorização, as abordagens 
clínico-filosóficas de ouvir vozes na esquizofrenia têm como foco as alterações gerais de 
experiência como base para a ocorrência de ouvir vozes. As abordagens psicológicas 
salientam que experiências de ouvir vozes são de natureza relacional. Tais abordagens foram 
amplamente desenvolvidas separadamente e a sua compatibilidade não é óbvia – devido 
também a diferentes hipóteses metafísicas de diferentes disciplinas. Propõe-se que um ponto 
de vista fenomenológico-ecológico possa ser valioso para a contextualização dos resultados 
em relação a ouvir vozes de diferentes disciplinas, evitando as armadilhas das concepções 
reducionistas de ―ouvir vozes‖. Implicações práticas para uma investigação interdisciplinar de 
AAVs também são deduzidas. 
Palavras-chave: ouvir vozes, alucinações auditivas verbais, conceptualização, neurociência, psicologia, filosofia 
clínica 
  
Resumo alargado em português 
A prevalência da esquizofrenia ao longo da vida é estimada em cerca de 0,5% (Simeone, 
Ward, Rotella, Collins e Windisch, 2015) da população geral, com uma prevalência estimada 
de 64% a 80% de alucinações auditivas em indivíduos com esquizofrenia diagnosticada 
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017). Seguindo os sistemas de classificação mais influentes de 
diagnóstico de transtornos mentais, o ICD (International Classification for Diseases) 
(Organização Mundial da Saúde, 1992) e o DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), a presença de certos tipos de 
AAVs, além de um outro sintoma, são suficientes para um diagnóstico de esquizofrenia. No 
entanto, não é claro em que medida os métodos de tratamento convencionais, como a 
medicação antipsicótica, são bem sucedidos no tratamento de AAVs (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). 
Estima-se que cerca de um quarto das AAVs sejam resistentes a medicamentos (Shergill, 
Murray e McGuire, 1998). Criticamente, a esquizofrenia constitui um tremendo fardo 
económico com custos anuais associados, que totalizam milhões e até billiões de dólares em 
diversos países (Chong et al., 2016). 
Resulta a necessidade de perceber melhor os fenómenos de ―ouvir vozes‖ para, 
ultimamente, fornecer um tratamento adequado às pessoas que sofrem com experiências 
negativas de ―ouvir vozes‖. Consideramos nesta tese que a complexidade destes fenómenos 
requer uma abordagem interdisciplinar para a sua melhor compreensão. Um obstáculo inicial, 
mas de grande relevância, no caminho para uma compreensão adequada de ―ouvir vozes‖ é 
não haver consenso sobre como tais fenómenos são melhor conceptualizados. 
Na presente tese, foram sistematicamente revistas publicações sobre AAV ou ―ouvir 
vozes‖ de diferentes àreas da Ciência Cognitiva (i.e., neurociência, psicologia e filosofia 
clínica) com o objetivo de identificar quais conceitos são usados em diferentes abordagens 
para conceptualizar tais fenómenos. No total, sessenta e dois estudos foram incluídos para a 
revisão sistemática. 
Em contraste com revisões anteriores, tais abordagens foram também examinadas 
relativamente a suposições metafísicas implícitas e explícitas para considerar essas 
abordagens num contexto mais amplo da Ciência Cognitiva. 
Experiências de ―ouvir vozes‖ são melhor conceptualizadas como um grupo de 
fenómenos. Não é claro se existe alguma característica essencial comum, que se aplique a 
  
todos os fenómenos designados como ―alucinação auditiva verbal‖ ou ―experiência de ouvir 
voz‖ no contexto clínico. Propusemos que alguma experiência comunicativa possa ser 
candidata a ser essa característica. 
As existentes concepções neurocientíficas de AAVs ignoram largamente os principais 
aspectos experienciais de AAVs, bem como a grande heterogeneidade desses fenómenos. Em 
vez disso, encontramos um ênfase em características que parecem ser relevantes apenas para 
um subgrupo de tais fenómenos, como a audibilidade.  
As concepções psicológicas revistas focam-se nas relações dos ouvintes de vozes, com 
as suas vozes, bem como no seu papel como reacção a eventos de vida stressantes. Existe 
evidência de que há paralelos entre relações sociais de ouvintes de vozes com as suas vozes e 
com pessoas próximas na vida social deles (Birchwood et al., 2004; Birchwood, Meaden, 
Trower, Gilbert, & Plaistow, 2000; Hayward, 2003).  
Concepções clínico-filosóficas, por outro lado, propõem que AAVs na esquizofrenia 
surjam no contexto duma alteração da estrutura da experiência. Uma corrente de abordagens 
recentes propõe que AAVs podem ser conceptualizadas no contexto da esquizofrenia como 
perturbação do ―Si básico‖ que assume que na esquizofrenia a experiência pré-reflectiva 
encontra-se alterada (e.g., Fuchs, 2005a, 2012b; Sass & Parnas, 2003; Stanghellini & Cutting, 
2003). 
Na literatura neurocientífica e psicológica cognitiva, as AAVs são largamente 
conceptualizados (implicitamente) seguindo a posição filosófica do ―dualismo interacionista‖. 
Ou seja, assume-se que processos neuronais possam causar eficientemente fenómenos 
mentais, como pensamentos e crenças e vice-versa. As abordagens clínico-fenomenológicas 
de AAVs, por outro lado, dependem em parte de conceitos que foram criticados por serem 
vagos (Mishara, 2010). 
Em resumo, uma série de conceitos diferentes, em grande parte não sobrepostos, tem 
sido usado para conceptualizar AAVs nas disciplinas da Ciência Cognitiva consideradas na 
presente tese. Esses conceitos variam de processos neuronais supostos (p.ex., descarga 
corolária) sobre construções psicológicas (p.ex., crença) para conceitos fenomenológicos 
(p.ex., ipseidade). Embora alguns temas comuns dessas abordagens possam ser identificados 
(p.ex., temporalidade, compensação, memória), estes temas são abordados de forma bastante 
diferente, por exemplo, no caso da neurociência e da filosofia fenomenológica clínica. 
Portanto, nenhum paralelo imediato pode ser estabelecido entre essas disciplinas em termos 
  
de homologia estrutural. No entanto, os conceitos de dualidade de aspecto e causalidade 
circular, como proposto por Fuchs (p.ex., 2013a), foram propostos como um primeiro passo 
para uma integração de resultados em AAVs de diferentes níveis epistémicos. Esses conceitos 
permitem integrar resultados de vários níveis epistémicos sem assumir uma posição 
reducionista.  
Pensamos que a consideração de tais quadros constitui uma base necessária para uma 
integração interdisciplinar frutuosa da investigação de AAVs. Tais considerações são valiosas 
também para refletir os pressupostos básicos implícitos de diferentes disciplinas em relação à 
existência humana e à experiência que possivelmente evitam uma conceptualização adequada 
de AAVs. Uma conceptualização adequada das AAVs, no entanto, é indispensável tanto para 
a investigação de tais fenómenos como, em última instância, será benéfica para quem sofra 
com tais experiências. 
Em relação aos resultados empíricos revistos, os desenhos dos estudos não permitem 
conclusões finais. A diversidade metodológica dificulta a comparação de estudos diferentes, 
mesmo quando o mesmo método de neuroimagem foi aplicado. 
No caminho para uma compreensão mais clara sobre AAVs, é crucial ouvir o que os 
ouvintes de vozes têm a dizer sobre suas experiências. Essas experiências variam 
substancialmente em várias dimensões, como, por exemplo, na complexidade linguística, 
conteúdo, ou sensações corporais que podem acompanhar as experiências de vozes ou o papel 
que uma voz tem na vida duma pessoa específica. Importantemente, a audilibidade nem 
sempre é uma característica essencial das experiências de vozes, havendo pessoas que, por 
exemplo, experienciam vozes silenciosas. 
Esperamos que o presente trabalho contribua para a discussão interdisciplinar dos 
limites metodológicos e conceptuais das abordagens existentes para ―ouvir vozes‖ e forneça 
uma contribuição sobre a integração de diferentes perspectivas, tendo em conta tais limites. 
Esse passo, propomos, é essencial para uma (re-)conceptualização interdisciplinar destes 
fenómenos intrigantes. 
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1 Introduction  
It‘s hard to describe how I could ‗hear‘ a voice that wasn‘t auditory; but the words the 
voices used and the emotions they contained (hatred and disgust) were completely 
clear, distinct, and unmistakable, maybe even more so than if I had heard them aurally. 
(Woods, Jones, Alderson-Day, Callard, & Fernyhough, 2015, p. 326) 
This is how a participant in a recent online survey describes her experience that in the clinical 
context most likely would be labelled as ―auditory verbal hallucination‖ (AVH). AVHs have 
been subject of research for centuries (Chaudhury, 2010) and the fascination for such 
intriguing phenomena has not been lost. Hundreds of papers including the term ―auditory 
verbal hallucination‖ have been published in the last decade, according to the search engine 
PubMed. Despite this long-standing interest, AVHs remain poorly understood (e.g., Horga, 
Peterson, et al., 2014) and there is no consensus regarding how those phenomena are best 
defined or conceptualised (David, 2004; Larøi & Woodward, 2007).  
According to a very prominent view of AVHs, one of its widely accepted defining 
characteristics is being a sensory experience lacking a corresponding external stimulus (e.g., 
Woods et al., 2014). A more detailed definition of hallucination was proposed by David 
(2004) who considers a hallucination ―a sensory experience which occurs in the absence of 
corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, has a sufficient sense of 
reality to resemble a veridical perception, over which the subject does not feel s/he has direct 
and voluntary control, and which occurs in the awake state‖ (p.110). However, the 
aforementioned quote challenges such definitions in posing questions such as: How can 
someone ―hear‖ a voice that is not heard aurally? What does a person who, from a clinician‘s 
perspective, fulfils the criteria for the presence of AVH actually experience? Are these 
experiences comparable to veridical perceptions? Are they sensory experiences?  
The term ―hallucination‖ refers to various phenomena occurring in clinical and healthy 
contexts (e.g., Larøi, 2012). We may, thus, note at the very beginning, that, when we talk of 
AVHs, we are dealing with a heterogeneous group of phenomena that may have multiple 
manifestations (Henriksen, Raballo, & Parnas, 2015). We shall, thus, talk of AVHs or voice-
hearing (VH) phenomena in the plural in order to indicate that not all of the phenomena 
termed ―AVH‖ in the current literature may be ―placed under the same umbrella‖. 
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Accordingly, one can find numerous different conceptualisations of AVHs in the literature.  
However, what are these phenomena designated as AVHs, or in patient jargon ―voice-
hearing‖1 experiences? And how are AVHs actually conceptualised in a Cognitive Science 
context? 
It has been argued that in hallucination research experiential characteristics ―have been 
largely ignored or neglected by philosophers and scientists alike […] giving rise to 
misconceptions and even plain myths about [hallucinations]‖ (González, 2010, p. 206). It is 
quite unanimously accepted in the clinical AVH-literature that the consideration of 
experiential characteristics of AVHs is crucial for providing sound conceptualisations of 
AVHs (e.g., Upthegrove et al., 2016). By contrast, it has been claimed that there have been, 
generally, few attempts to define VH and even fewer attempts to provide such a definition 
taking voice-hearer‘s first-person accounts as a starting point (Beavan, 2011). Similarly, it has 
been argued that ―in general, the conceptualizations [of hallucinations] encountered in the 
literature do not do justice to the richness and complexity that the psychological 
phenomenology actually exhibits‖ (Shanon, 2003, p.3). Is that the case? And if so, what do 
these conceptualisations lack? 
Hallucinations are experienced both in a variety of modalities and in other clinical 
conditions besides schizophrenia spectrum disorders
2
, as well as in healthy individuals 
(Chaudhury, 2010). Thereby, it is often assumed that AVHs reported by individuals with 
schizophrenia spectrum diagnoses and AVHs in healthy individuals lie on a continuum (Johns 
& van Os, 2001). However, there is evidence that suggests that one should be cautious to 
place voice-experiences of psychiatric and non-clinical voice-hearers under the same umbrella 
regarding their experiential features as well as underlying mechanisms (Chhabra, Badcock, & 
Maybery, 2013; de Leede-Smith & Barkus, 2013; Henriksen et al., 2015; Rojcewicz & 
Rojcewicz, 1997; Stanghellini, Langer, Ambrosini, & Cangas, 2012). For this reason, in the 
present work we focus particularly on AVHs in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. In the same 
line, although it seems that voices in this population share a range of features with AVHs 
                                                 
1 Note that the terms voice, voice-hearer and related terms are used in a metaphorical sense throughout the work, as it is clear 
that voice-hearers‘ experiences are not explainable as perceptions of voices in a standard perceptual sense. 
2 The usefulness of the term ―schizophrenia‖ itself has been questioned repeatedly (e.g., Bentall, Jackson, & Pilgrim, 1988; 
Guloksuz & van Os, 2017). The latter estimate that only the ―30% poor outcome fraction of a much broader 
multidimensional psychotic syndrome‖ (Guloksuz & van Os, 2017, p. 1) is covered by the schizophrenia-concept. 
Classically, psychotic disorders are considered to be associated with a disconnection of the psychotic individual from 
reality (Fujii & Ahmed, 2007). According to the DSM-V, psychotic disorders include symptoms from the five domains: 
delusion, hallucination, disorganised thinking, disorganised or abnormal motor behaviour and negative symptoms such as 
flattened affect (American Psychiatric Association, 2016). In the present work, as the included studies refer to the concept 
of schizophrenia, we may refer to schizophrenia spectrum disorders, having in mind that we most likely refer to 
multidimensional psychotic syndromes. 
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reported in other psychiatric conditions (Waters & Fernyhough, 2017), it is unclear if they can 
be considered different kinds of one type. For an overview of the range of diagnoses for 
which AVHs have been reported, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Overview over conditions in which AVHs can occur (as reported, e.g., by Chaudhury, 2010; Waters & 
Fernyhough, 2017). Note that this list does not claim to be exhaustive. Although there is evidence that AVHs 
experienced by different populations share a range of common features (Waters & Fernyhough, 2017) it is 
unclear in how far they are to be considered same or different phenomena. The present work focuses on AVHs in 
schizophrenia, as they are considered a core symptom of this disease that causes considerable suffering as well as 
economic burden.  
 
  In schizophrenia spectrum disorders, AVHs are characterised by a predominantly 
negative content (Larøi, 2012) and can go along with considerable suffering. Voices may 
disrupt individuals‘ daily lives (Upthegrove et al., 2016; Woods et al., 2015) and even seduce 
them to self-injury (Rosen et al., 2016). AVHs have also been associated with a heightened 
risk for suicidal attempts (Fujita et al., 2015; Kelleher et al., 2013, 2014). 
Life-time prevalence of schizophrenia is estimated to be around 0.5% in the general 
population (Simeone, Ward, Rotella, Collins, & Windisch, 2015), with an estimated life-time 
prevalence of 64%-80% of auditory hallucinations in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum 
diagnosis (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017). Following the most influential classification systems 
for diagnosing mental disorders, the ICD (International Classification for Diseases) (World 
Health Organization, 1992) and the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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Disorders) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the presence of certain types of AVHs 
in addition to one further symptom is sufficient for a schizophrenia diagnosis.  
In fact, a recent study including a sample of about nine hundred participants diagnosed 
with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder found that auditory hallucinations were way more 
frequent than visual, tactile or olfactory hallucinations in those individuals and the majority of 
the sample reported to have had only auditory hallucinations (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017). 
However, another recent study including a sample of seven hundred and fifty individuals 
carrying a diagnosis of a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder found that hallucinations in 
multiple sensory modalities were the most frequently reported among the participants, and 
those included the auditory modality (Lim et al., 2016). Nonetheless, it is unclear in how far 
conventional treatment methods, such as antipsychotic medication, are successful in the 
treatment of AVHs (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). It is often estimated that  about one quarter of 
AVHs are medication-resistant (Shergill, Murray, & McGuire, 1998). Critically, 
schizophrenia constitutes a tremendous economic burden with associated annual costs 
amounting to millions and even billions of US-Dollars for individual countries (Chong et al., 
2016).          
Figure 2 AVHs and schizophrenia diagnosis. It is estimated that around 60-80% of individuals with 
schizophrenia diagnosis experience voices (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017). Around a quarter of those AVHs are 
assumed to be treatment-resistant (Shergill et al., 1998). 
 
From this, it becomes obvious that there is a clear need for the investigation of AVHs, 
not least in order to provide adequate treatment for those suffering from such experiences. 
Here, conceptual issues become relevant. How specific phenomena are conceptualised 
has far reaching practical consequences (Strik & Dierks, 2008). For example, someone will 
choose different routes of research into treatment of AVHs depending on whether one 
conceptualises AVHs as results of a brain disease or rather as being triggered by psychosocial 
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factors. In that vein, how a specific researcher conceptualises AVHs may indicate  theoretical 
biases and influence how he/she will interpret obtained results (Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 
1997). In addition, it has been found that differing implicit models of schizophrenia stemming 
from different disciplines can hamper multi-disciplinary work (Colombo, Bendelow, Fulford, 
& Williams, 2002), a relevant point in the Cognitive Science context. Multi- and 
interdisciplinary3 research into AVHs in the context of Cognitive Science may be hampered 
due to implicitly, but also explicitly differing concepts used in order to conceptualise AVHs. 
There is an increasing body of literature regarding AVHs, dominated by the field of 
neuroscience (Upthegrove et al., 2016). Schizophrenia has classically been conceptualised as 
neurodevelopmental or neurodegenerative disease (de Haan & Bakker, 2004). It seems widely 
accepted that the aetiology of schizophrenia is associated with biological aspects (Liberman & 
Corrigan, 1992). That justifies the inclusion of a neuroscientific perspective for a holistic 
conceptualisation of AVHs. However, this perspective is limited. Neuroscientific studies 
about AVHs are largely restricted to third-person data about the brain. 
However, if one lastly aims at explaining and reaching an understanding of the 
subjective experience of voice-hearing, this experience has to be considered in its own right.  
Relatedly, the need for a phenomenological philosophical investigation of AVHs, for 
example, has recently been expressed by influential researchers of AVHs in the areas of 
psychology and neuroscience (McCarthy-Jones, Krueger, Larøi, Broome, & Fernyhough, 
2013). Clinical-philosophical approaches to AVHs goes beyond neuroscientific research in 
asking what the experience of voices is like from a first-person point of view. However, 
although the need for a phenomenological philosophical investigation of AVHs is explicitly 
expressed and welcomed, the authors anticipate conceptual difficulties (McCarthy-Jones et 
al., 2013). For example, they state that it is unclear how phenomenological philosophical 
concepts used for the investigation of AVHs map into psychological and neuroscientific 
constructs used in that context. In order to create a fruitful interdisciplinary research context 
for AVHs, they call for a clear operationalisation of phenomenological philosophical concepts 
in the language of neuroscientific and cognitive psychological disciplines ―through 
collaboration with colleagues in such areas‖ (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013, p. 6). 
                                                 
3 Here, it may be useful to distinguish ―multidisciplinarity‖ and ―interdisciplinarity‖. Based on a literature review, it has been 
proposed that ―multidisciplinarity draws on knowledge from different disciplines but stays within their boundaries, 
[whereas] interdisciplinarity analyzes, synthesizes and harmonizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and 
coherent whole‖ (Choi & Pak, 2006, p. 351). They propose to describe the former as additive and the latter as interactive. 
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 Moreover, psychological perspectives on AVHs may prove valuable for their 
contextualisation in a voice-hearer‘s life history. In that vein, it has been claimed that, 
amongst others, conceptual problems regarding hallucination phenomena ―call for a 
multilevel analysis and an interdisciplinary approach‖ (González, 2010, p. 193) towards such 
phenomena. Following this author, if such problems are disregarded, there is the risk of 
misconceptions that can prevent a proper understanding of AVHs. 
Here, the consideration of phenomenal features of voice-hearing becomes relevant for 
philosophy, psychology and neuroscience alike, because before investigating AVHs, both 
empirically and conceptually, we need to clarify what we actually want to investigate and 
conceptualise (David, 2004; Wu, 2012). Therefore, in order to probe the appropriateness of a 
conceptualisation of AVHs, we need to create a basis against which we can compare such 
conceptualisations. Such a basis may also serve for purposes of differentiating voice-hearing 
from somehow similar experiences, which may prove helpful in the context of diagnosis. 
Moreover, it has been proposed that the consideration of contemporary models of 
consciousness may be valuable in order to contextualise and further clarify existing models of 
AVHs (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014). 
Starting from this background, we can now specify the research questions and 
objectives of the present work. 
1.1 Research questions and objectives 
In order to obtain answers to the general question ―what are auditory verbal hallucinations?  4‖ 
this question was broken down into two basic research questions on which this work is based. 
First, ―how do voice-hearers describe their experiences?‖ This question is addressed by 
examining available first-person reports from different sources. Based on these sources it is 
elaborated in which dimensions AVHs are described and a tentative working 
conceptualisation of AVHs is derived. We will shortly consider how far AVHs are 
distinguishable from other mental phenomena. 
The second question we address is ―how are auditory verbal hallucinations 
conceptualised in the Cognitive Science disciplines of neuroscience, psychology and clinical 
philosophy?‖. In order to provide answers to this question a systematic review was conducted. 
The latter question, in turn, can be broken down into the question ―what (different) concepts 
                                                 
4 Throughout the whole work, we will focus particularly on AVHs in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. 
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are used in these disciplines in order to conceptualise AVHs and in how far do they overlap?‖. 
In discussing these conceptualisations, we will additionally probe on which (implicit) 
philosophical assumptions such conceptualisations are based. It will also be considered if the 
retrieved conceptualisations do justice to the phenomenological
5
 features of such experiences. 
Ultimately, a recent phenomenological-ecological conception of the brain (Fuchs, 
2013a) is suggested to provide a framework by means of which findings based on accounts of 
AVHs from different disciplines can be conceptualised. With this, the work aims at 
contributing to a process of (re-)conceptualising AVHs. Moreover, such a framework serves 
to clarify what role different disciplines may play in AVH-research and, thus, facilitate the 
needed interdisciplinary investigation of AVHs. This step is important, as misconceptions on 
that level may lead to the formulation of implausible hypotheses (Kotchoubey et al., 2016).  
This is, to the authors‘ knowledge, the first systematic review that attempts to map out 
the concepts used in clinical-philosophical, as well as psychological and neuroscientific 
conceptualisations of AVHs. Specifically, a comprehensive overview of available clinical-
philosophical approaches to AVHs is currently lacking. Also, in contrast to former reviews of 
the voice-hearing literature, (implicit) philosophical assumptions at the basis of the reviewed 
conceptualisations shall be examined in detail, as we have seen that such assumptions may 
differ between different cognitive disciplines and hamper fruitful interdisciplinary work. 
1.2 Structure of the work 
Based on these objectives, this work is structured as follows: first, we will examine how 
AVHs are described on a phenomenal level (chapter 2) and shortly consider how AVHs are 
different from other phenomena, such as thoughts, illusions or dreams. Thereafter, 
neuroscientific (chapter 4), psychological (chapter 5) and philosophically-informed 
perspectives (chapter 6) on AVHs will be systematically reviewed. Methodological issues 
specific for the different disciplines will be discussed in the respective chapters. In the general 
discussion (chapter 7), after a summary of the review‘s findings, conceptual issues will be 
discussed. Moreover, ideas regarding the integration of conceptualisation of different 
disciplines will be presented. The thesis ends by a short discussion of its limitations (section 
7.4), providing future directions derived from it (section 7.5), and the conclusion (chapter 8). 
                                                 
5 Note that the term ―phenomenological‖ is ambiguously in the literature: first, as synonym for experiential, and second, in 
order to refer to phenomenological philosophy. In order to disambiguate, when referring to experiential feature of VH, we 
will use the term ―phenomenal‖.    
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2 What is “hearing voices” like? 
The question of what the experience of ―hearing voices‖ is like is actually not an easy one. 
One might even object that for someone who does not experience voices, it is impossible to 
provide an answer to this question. We might, thus, reformulate and ask: how do voice-
hearers
6
 describe their voice-experiences? Answers to this question shall be provided by 
considering qualitative and quantitative studies focusing on verbatim and not-verbatim reports 
of voice-hearers about their subjective experience, as well as by considering first-person 
reports of voice-experiences extracted from the ―Hearing-Voices-Homepage‖7.  
2.1 Some preliminary considerations 
Studies that attempt to investigate voice-hearers‘ experiences without applying pre-defined 
experiential dimensions, for example in the form of semi-structured interviews, are rare. 
However, the use of pre-defined dimensions might bias results and may not coincide with the 
dimensions voice-hearers would choose to describe their voice-experiences. Consequently, 
there is the risk that studies using standard measures miss important aspects of AVHs 
(Upthegrove et al., 2016). 
Moreover, first-person reports of voice-experiences are necessarily based on language. 
This means that we only have access to such experiences through language – an indirect 
means. However, verbal descriptions of voice-experiences may not capture the experience‘s 
complexity (Kraus, 2007). A person with schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis in one study, for 
example, found ―that his native language is not sufficiently precise to express his 
experiences‖ (Henriksen, Raballo, & Parnas, 2015, p.170). Likewise, it has been proposed 
that ―hearing voices‖ for some individuals may ―represent […] an inappropriate term to 
express that their cognitions are not their own‖ (Moritz & Larøi, 2008, p. 104). We can, thus, 
regard both the terms ―voice‖ and ―hearing‖ as metaphors that individuals use in order to 
describe their experiences. Therefore, these terms are to be taken as metaphorical throughout 
the work.  
The difficult challenge of defining what a voice-experience is, is complicated by the 
fact that AVHs are a group of heterogeneous phenomena. However, it remains to be clarified 
what phenomena are to be subsumed under the notion of AVHs. 
                                                 
6 For more details regarding the term ―voice-hearer‖ please see (Woods, 2013). 
7 https://www.hearing-voices.org/voices-visions/personal-experiences/ 
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Figure 3 Features of voice-hearing as identified in surveys about voice-hearers‘ phenomenal experience. As can be seen, experiences of voices can be described regarding various 
aspects. They may be described as being literally heard, but also as being felt or intimately known. Voice-experiences may both be preceded or accompanied by bodily sensations, 
such as for example itching. Various types of content have been reported to be transmitted by voices. Content, thereby, may be repetitive either literally or semantically. Different 
voices may ―use‖ a great variety of speech acts: from negative (e.g., insulting) over ―neutral‖ (e.g., general statements) to positive (e.g., encouraging). Regarding the form, voices 
may transmit single words up to complex sentences. Voices can also be described in terms of ―physical‖ properties, such as volume, frequency, location or number of voices. 
Often voices are identified as being associated with specific speakers (e.g., mother, demon), but may also be incognito or experienced as one‘s own voice. Importantly, VH is 
often a relational experience, where voice-hearers establish relationships with their voices that may change over time. 
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There is no consensus regarding which AVH-subtypes are distinguishable and how 
they relate to each other, as the area of subtyping AVHs is ―still in its infancy‖ (McCarthy-
Jones, Thomas, et al., 2014, p. 281). In that sense, we can consider the notion of ―AVH‖ as a 
―placeholder for a notion yet to be clarified‖ (Walton, 1990, p. 21).  
2.2 Experiential features of voice-hearing 
After these preliminary considerations, let us now turn to what we know from voice-hearers‘ 
descriptions of the experiential dimensions of voice-hearing (see also Figure 3).  
2.2.1 “Physical” properties 
AVHs are classically described in terms of ―physical‖ properties. Voices experienced by 
voice-hearers vary in ―physical‖ properties, such as volume (Demjen & Semino, 2015; 
Hoffman, Varanko, Gilmore, & Mishara, 2008; Leudar, Thomas, McNally, & Glinski, 1997; 
Nayani & David, 1996; Upthegrove et al., 2016; Woods, Jones, Alderson-Day, Callard, & 
Fernyhough, 2015), intelligibility (Larkin, 1979; Leudar et al., 1997; Upthegrove et al., 2016), 
frequency and duration (Nayani & David, 1996; Rosen et al., 2015), and prosody and accent 
(Nayani & David, 1996). Although AVHs are usually considered to be intermittent, some 
patients report hearing voices ―[a]ll day, every day‖ (Upthegrove et al., 2016, p. 93). 
 Usually, voice-hearers experience multiple voices with different physical (and social) 
features, as the following quote illustrates: ―I hear distinct voices. Each voice has their own 
personality‖ (Woods et al., 2015, p. 325). Average numbers of reported voices are around 
three (Nayani & David, 1996) to around four voices (McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, et al., 2014). 
Perceived sources of voices may be located in space (e.g., internal/external) (Nayani & 
David, 1996). However, voice-hearers sometimes have difficulties in determining if they 
experience their voices as coming from inside or outside the body (e.g., Upthegrove & al., 
2016). In a recent interview study, 69% of the participants reported not to be able to determine 
whether their voices were external or internal (Jones & Luhrmann, 2016).  
Let us consider some examples that illustrate that voice-experiences may vary 
substantially regarding ―physical‖ parameters. Some individuals ascribe clear auditory 
qualities to their experiences: ―when it‘s loud it‘s a booming voice… it‘s like I struggle not to 
hear it, it‘s so loud‖ (Upthegrove et al., 2016, p. 91). However, there is a range of descriptions 
that suggest that experiencing voices is largely independent from perceptual experiences: ―I 
could be stone deaf and still hear the voices‖ (Bleuler, 1950, pp. 110-111, cited in Wiggins & 
Schwartz, 2007, p.123). A participant of a recent survey reports: ―I did not hear the voices 
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aurally. They were much more intimate than that, and inescapable […]‖ (Woods et al., 2015, 
p. 326). In line with that in a recent survey over 80% of the participants reported ―quasi-
auditory, mixed, thought-like or multisensory voice-hearing patterns‖ (Jones & Luhrmann, 
2016, p. 200) instead of literally auditory voices.  
What these reports have in common is that voices are experienced as inescapable: not 
even being deaf could prevent from experiencing them. They do not allow to close the door or 
tap the ears in order to stop them. Voices are rather described as being more powerful or 
potent as voices that exist in the intersubjective space where they are associated to physically 
present speakers. Most of the individuals experiencing voices seem to know when they are 
hearing voices and do not take the experience as cases of ―normal perception‖ (Leudar et al., 
1997). In a recent survey, about 20% of the participants even considered ―voices‖ an 
inappropriate term for their experiences (Woods et al., 2015). Some individuals, for example, 
describe their voices as being ―felt‖ (Demjen & Semino, 2015) or as ―pulsating messages in 
the blood stream‖ (Karlsson, 2008, p. 367). In an early study, the majority of the interviewed 
voice-hearers experienced their voices as private and not accessible through others 
(Aggernaes, 1967). However there are also other cases, as the following quote illustrates: ―I 
only found out that the voices weren‘t real when I asked people I knew, I said can you hear 
these and they said no we can‘t‖ (Upthegrove, Ives, et al., 2016, p. 91). 
2.2.2 Bodily sensations 
The experience of voices can be accompanied by bodily sensations (e.g., Cermolacce, Naudin, 
& Parnas, 2007). In a recent survey, 66% of the sample reported that their voice-experiences 
are accompanied by bodily feelings (Woods et al., 2015). Some voice-hearers describe bodily 
sensations preceding or accompanying voice-experiences (Nayani & David, 1996; Woods et 
al., 2015). Participants of recent surveys report: ―[i]t‘s not even just a voice um it‘s…I‘ve had 
like a push on my shoulder um… I‘ve smelt like things which like you wouldn‘t expect…‖ 
(Upthegrove et al., 2016, p. 94). The available studies, hence, suggest that AVHs can arguably 
not be reduced to linguistic experiences. Similarly, the authors of a recent survey conclude 
that ―[o]verall, there was a real sense that voices forced themselves on participants that in 
totality resulted in more than an auditory experience‖ (Upthegrove et al., 2016, p. 92). 
One might wonder here whether the term ―multisensory hallucination‖ may be more 
appropriate to designate these experiences in some of these cases. In fact, the existence of 
AVHs seems to increase the probability of the occurrence of hallucinations in further 
modalities (Lim et al., 2016).  
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2.2.3 Linguistic complexity 
In a recent study focusing on the linguistic content of AVHs, the authors found that the AVHs 
reported by their sample of individuals with psychosis typically consisted in ―little more than 
a noun, verb and object‖ (de Boer, Heringa, van Dellen, Wijnen, & Sommer, 2016, p. 13). 
However, utterances of voices can range in syntactic complexity from single words (e.g., de 
Boer, Heringa, van Dellen, Wijnen, & Sommer, 2016) to complex sentences (e.g., Upthegrove 
et al., 2016) and full conversations (e.g., de Boer, Heringa, van Dellen, Wijnen, & Sommer, 
2016).  
2.2.4 Form of address 
Voices are usually reported to most commonly ―direct themselves‖ towards the voice-hearer  
in the second (―you‖) or third (―he/she‖) person (e.g., Hinzen & Rossello, 2015). These 
authors believe that AVHs exhibit a specific ―linguistic profile […] without which the 
phenomenon would not be what it is‖ (Hinzen & Rossello, 2015, p. 5). According to a recent 
survey, the most common types of voices in first-episode psychosis are indeed demanding, 
commenting and threatening voices (Upthegrove et al., 2016). In another recent study, 
―second-person voices‖ (97%) have been reported to be the most frequent, followed by ―third-
person voices‖ (66%); 42% experienced voices ―speaking‖ in the first person, and the 
majority a mix (Corstens & Longden, 2013). 
A voice-hearer reports how she distinguishes between inner dialogue and her voices in 
the following way: ―I am doing the talking—that is me. The voices are outside me, the voices 
are directional‖ (Davies, Thomas, & Leudar, 1999, p. 183). We may hypothetically deduce 
from this, that voice-experiences include some experience of reference to the voice-hearer. 
Nonetheless, the role of a voice-hearer in relation to his/her voice may radically differ 
between different instances of such experiences. Whereas, in some cases, a person may be 
directly directed to by a voice, in other cases she may be passive in hearing voices talking 
about her or being ―communicated to‖ by technical means.  
However, even if in commenting voices the voices do not directly address the voice-
hearer in a second-person perspective, they still refer to the voice-hearer in that they comment 
his/her activities and only him/her can be meant.  
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2.2.5 Content 
Voice-experiences often differ from experiences of hearing ordinary speech regarding their 
content. The authors of a linguistic account of psychotic symptoms observe: ―voices do 
characteristically not develop a personal narrative or talk much about themselves in the 1st 
Person, nor about the world, using the 2nd or 3rd Persons near exclusively‖ (Hinzen & 
Rossello, 2015, p. 6).  
Different types of speech acts ―used by‖ voices have been identified. These vary from 
mostly negative content such as blaming (e.g., Upthegrove et al., 2016), abusing (e.g., Leudar 
et al., 1997), insulting (e.g., Nayani & David, 1996) and commanding (e.g., Demjen & 
Semino, 2015), to ―neutral‖ content such as general statements (e.g., Demjen & Semino, 
2015), or to positive content such as approving or encouraging (e.g., Leudar et al., 1997). The 
semantic content of voices tends to be consistent over time in the majority of voice-hearers 
(Hoffman, Oates, Hafner, Hustig, & McGlashan, 1994; McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, et al., 2014) 
but it may also change depending on the phase of the voice-hearing experience (McCarthy-
Jones, Trauer, et al., 2014). The valence of the voice‘s content has been reported to differ 
between phases of acute psychosis and psychosis in remission (Larkin, 1979). Whereas the 
content of voices in acute psychosis in Larkin‘s (1979) study was mostly negative, individuals 
in remission tended to report positive voice content. 
Negative voices in psychosis have been found to resemble self-critical thoughts as 
observed in depression (Gilbert et al., 2001). In a recent survey, 50% of the participants 
endorsed that their voices may reflect thoughts they have had, whereas 33% denied that 
(McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, et al., 2014). The majority of the participants in that study did not 
believe that the voices‘ content consisted of memory ―replays‖. Nonetheless, 39% of 
participants reported that their voices seemed to be memory ―replays‖. In the same study, 
56% of the participants considered it possible that their voices‘ content may be linked to what 
an influential person in their life could have said. A participant of a recent survey comments 
on a voice that says to her: 
‗You fat bitch, you‘re scarred up, don‘t nobody want you and you 50 and you ain‘t 
shit. How in the hell you think you looking attractive? Ain‘t nobody looking at you.‘ 
They‘re negative and not self-motivating. They are saying what I already feel about 
myself.‘ (Rosen et al., 2015, p. 3)  
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The same participant reports also positive voices saying things such as ―[g]irl you look good‖ 
(Rosen et al., 2015, p. 3). We can conclude that the content of voices seems to be generally 
meaningful for voice-hearers and might explicitly relate to individual personal characteristics 
of voice-hearers as the following quote shows:  
‗I was a sex addict and I would have very sexual voices in my head; very sensual, very 
seductive voices. I could be sitting in a room with a woman and the voices would be 
telling me what they wanted to do to the woman. […]‘ (Rosen et al., 2016, p. 167). 
2.2.6 Identification 
Many voices encountered in AVH are ascribed to clear identities (e.g., Stephane, Thuras, 
Nasrallah, & Georgopoulos, 2003) such as individuals present in the voice-hearers‘ social 
context (Holt & Tickle, 2014). In a recent study, a participant reports to hear her dead mother: 
―[m]y mother is constantly talking to me. Sometimes she yells at me and is quite abusive and 
at other times when she is quiet she says nice things‖ (Rosen et al., 2016, p. 167). Voices can 
also be incognito (Leudar et al., 1997) or ascribed to spiritual or stereotyped entities (Woods 
et al., 2015), as the following quote illustrates: ―[t]hey are angels. That‘s how I look at it. 
They are protecting me from like all of the horrible things that I have been through and stuff.‖ 
(Rosen et al., 2016, p. 167). Although voices are usually not experienced as one‘s own (e.g., 
Nayani & David, 1996), they might in some cases identified as one‘s own voice (e.g., Demjen 
& Semino, 2015). A participant of a recent study reports a ―[m]ale voice can use my own 
voice against me…‖ (Upthegrove et al., 2016, p. 93). In a sample of one hundred participants, 
almost 80% reported that their voices represented either a family member, past abusers, other 
perpetrators, disowned aspects of self, or acquaintances (Corstens & Longden, 2013).   
2.2.7 Relationality 
Voice-hearers use to engage with their voices in a dialogical relationship (e.g., Holt & Tickle, 
2014). This has been associated with voice-content becoming more positive over time (e.g., 
Fenekou & Georgaca, 2010). Control over voices can vary from complete passivity 
(Upthegrove, Ives, et al., 2016) to the capacity to at least sometimes stop the voices (e.g., 
Nayani & David, 1996; Rosen et al., 2015). A participant of a recent survey reports ―I got no 
power, no intention, I can‘t block it at all‖ (Upthegrove, Ives, et al., 2016, p. 93). In contrast, a 
participant of another recent survey reports: ―[...] I navigate between ones that I feel like 
hearing or suggestions that are going to work at that moment. I have to be the one in charge 
and in control. I listen and choose depending on my mood or my thoughts. [...]‖ (Rosen et al., 
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2015, p. 2). Although voices might be experienced as intrusive (Stanghellini et al., 2012) and 
be encountered with rejection (Holt & Tickle, 2014), voice-hearers might reach a personal 
understanding and acceptance of their experiences (Holt & Tickle, 2014). Time seems to be a 
crucial parameter when it comes to the relationship between a voice-hearer  and his/her voices 
(e.g., Fenekou & Georgaca, 2010; Rosen et al., 2015). Reaching an understanding or 
acceptance of the voices was described as a gradual process by most of the participants of the 
latter study. Active engagement, in turn, was associated with a heightened sense of control and 
influence over the voices (Rosen et al., 2015). Interestingly, participants in this study reported 
that it is easier to engage and disengage from voices, when they addressed the voices by 
name.  
It is worth noting that relationships to voices have to differ necessarily from 
relationships one maintains with other individuals. Voice-experiences are not encounters 
based on principles that characterise ordinary encounters. The voices a voice-hearer  deals 
with are disembodied in the sense that there is no speaker who is corporally present 
(Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 1997). There is no vis-à-vis for the voice-hearer. For this reason, 
voice-experiences have been described as ―pseudo-encounter[s]‖ (Naudin & Azorin, 1997, p. 
192). According to the authors, this reduces the quality of reciprocity characterising ordinary 
encounters. It is illustrated by the quote of a person experiencing voices in a first-episode 
psychosis: ―The way it would reply is no kind of open-ended questions, it‘ll always be in a 
statement manner‖ (Upthegrove, Ives, et al., 2016, p. 93). We might hypothesise that, by 
giving the voices a name, in the above cited study voice-hearers were able to give their voices 
a ―verbal face‖. This might help to render the experience more ―encounter-like‖ and to 
―externalise‖ the voices in order to engage with them. 
2.2.8 Context 
AVHs can be considered within the context of the life and culture of a voice-hearer. The 
occurrence of AVHs, for example, has been associated with traumatic life experiences, such 
as sexual abuse (McCarthy-Jones, 2011). Voice-hearers have been found to develop 
explanations for their voice-experiences that are culturally available (Fenekou & Georgaca, 
2010). Voices are both experienced in quiet and in noisy environments, as well as when 
attention is directed both towards the environment and inwardly (Garwood, Dodgson, Bruce, 
& McCarthy-Jones, 2015). Voice-content has been reported to be usually congruent with the 
current mood of the voice-hearer (Larøi, 2006). It has recently been hypothesised that states 
of anxiety may induce some types of voice-experiences (Ratcliffe & Wilkinson, 2016). 
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Voices can also be considered in the wider context of psychosis. The authors of several 
phenomenological studies on voice-hearing report:  
―One‘s entire experience,‖ explained one young woman, ―in other words, [one‘s 
experience] of the world and of how one is situated in it and of one‘s self changes. It‘s 
like one aspect of [these changes] can maybe get pulled out and described as a 
―voice,‖ but [such terms] are just explanations. They‘re just explanations or a way of 
articulating to other people this kind of fundamental breakdown in everything.  
(Jones & Shattell, 2016, p. 2, brackets in the original) 
This quote illustrates that voice-experiences may also be an expression of fundamental 
alterations of experience. 
2.2.9 Influence on life 
As noted in the introduction voice-experiences are often very disruptive and influence a 
person‘s life negatively. Participants of a recent survey reported: ―[w]hen they choose to talk 
to me, they choose to talk to me and they take over the whole situation as it is at the time‖ 
(Upthegrove et al., 2016, p. 93) or ―[t]he voices were so frightening and disruptive that much 
of the time I was unable to focus or concentrate on anything else‖ (Woods et al., 2015, p. 
326). We have already seen that what influence voices have over a person‘s life seems to 
depend also on the relationship he/she develops with his/her voice (Rosen et al., 2015).  
2.3 “Auditory verbal hallucination” - a misnomer? 
From what we have seen, we can conclude that AVH is actually a misnomer – or at least an 
incomplete designation – in many cases, as it does not capture a large part of what person‘s 
with ―AVHs‖ actually experience. That AVH constitutes a misnomer has also been proposed 
by others (e.g., Moritz & Larøi, 2008; Wilkinson & Bell, 2016). The term auditory verbal 
hallucination is probably only appropriate for a subgroup of the phenomena summarised 
under the term. How large this subgroup actually is remains to be defined. In order to provide 
appropriate treatment options for person‘s who report what is called ―hearing voices‖ we need 
to understand their experiences better
8
.  
We have seen that there is in many respects more to voice-hearing than the standard 
definition would suggest. By focusing on audibility it dismisses that voices are not just simple 
                                                 
8 At least if we do not assume a reductionist or eliminative materialist standpoint, which we do not do here. 
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sounds, if they are experienced as such at all, which is often not the case. It is not enough to 
cut or change words, but we also need to reconceptualise AVHs in order to create a basis for 
the empirical investigation and better understanding of such phenomena. 
Before trying to develop a working conceptualisation of voice-hearing experiences, let us 
shortly consider how we might differentiate AVHs from other mental phenomena, based on 
the reviewed results. 
2.4 Delimitating voice-hearing from other mental phenomena 
One may argue that ―hearing‖ someone speaking in the absence of a speaker is actually a very 
common experience, for example in dreams, ―earworms‖ or when we seem to hear our name 
spoken when nobody called our name. On the other hand, one may argue that if AVHs are so 
often not auditory in a literal sense, then they may simply be considered ―thoughts‖. 
 For that reason, a precise conceptualisation of AVHs should allow for delimitating 
them from those other (idiosyncratic, private) mental phenomena. In the following let us 
consider how we might distinguish between ―voices‖ and apparently similar phenomena. 
2.4.1 Thoughts 
It has been put forward that differences between voices-hearing and thought are rather 
dimensional than categorical (e.g., Humpston & Broome, 2016; Moritz & Larøi, 2008). 
Thereby, auditory features do not seem to be critical for voice-hearers to discriminate voice-
experiences from ordinary thought (Hoffman et al., 2008). In a phenomenological study, the 
relation between voices and thoughts was often discussed by voice-hearers (Fenekou & 
Georgaca, 2010). Consider the following example: 
―I was sitting, for example, in my room … and … I was thinking what I would tell my 
mum … and I heard the answers … it was my thought that simply took the form of my 
mum‘s voice […] there are also voices, you know, which are like thoughts that come 
into your mind … I am in this phase of my life … by now the voices have became 
something like … like thoughts‖ (Fenekou & Georgaca, 2010, p. 140). 
This person seems to clearly distinguish between voice-like thoughts and thought-like voices. 
Let us consider an example that illustrates how voice-hearers may distinguish between voices 
and thoughts: 
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―The voices don‘t talk to each other but they talk to me. Like I could be lying in bed 
and be looking in the sky and I hear a voice hovering above me, talking to me. It kind 
of shocks me because it would go with my thinking. I could be thinking about 
something and then all of a sudden I hear an interpretation of what I was thinking from 
the voice.‖ (Rosen et al., 2016, p. 167) 
This person describes that her voices are addressing her, an experience that is superimposed 
on her thoughts. A study including 46 participants with schizophrenia-spectrum disorder 
concluded that those individuals clearly differentiate between their voice-experiences from 
ordinary verbal thought (Hoffman et al., 2008). In this study, the following three features 
were reported to be the most important in distinguishing voices from thoughts: first, the 
specific verbal content of voices; second, having less control over voices; and third, a non-self 
―sound‖ of the voices. Interestingly, however, clarity and loudness of the voices were not 
rated as important in distinguishing voices from thoughts. However, there are also cases in 
which there seems to be dissolved boundaries between voices and thoughts: ―I get confused 
about what‘s a voice and what‘s a thought, what‘s my thought and others‘ thoughts‖ (Jones & 
Luhrmann, 2016, p. 199).  
  Summarising, although voices are frequently reported to be ―thought-like‖ (Jones & 
Luhrmann, 2016), individuals usually distinguish between voices and thoughts. Compared to 
thoughts, voices are experienced as less controllable (Hoffman et al., 2008). Thoughts, on the 
other hand, do usually not have the quality of directing themselves towards the person 
thinking them. 
2.4.2 Dreams 
First, of course, we may note that voice-hearing experiences occur in an awake state, whereas 
dreams occur while sleeping. However, there are other features that arguably distinguish 
dreams from voice-hearing. Referring to Sartre, it has been argued that whereas dreams 
―appear to us as a story‖ (Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 1997, p. 18), AVHs are characterised by a 
fragmented, intermittent character. Moreover, only a minority of voice-hearers seems to 
ascribe a ―dream-like‖ quality to their voice-experiences (Aggernaes, 1967). 
2.4.3 Illusions and earworms 
Let us come back to the example of seeming to hear someone say our name, when there is no 
corresponding stimulus in the environment. An illusion is usually defined as ―the 
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misperception of a stimulus that is present in the external environment‖ (Norton & Corbett, 
2000, p. 111). In a second step, hallucinations are then used to be distinguished from illusion 
by stating that hallucinations occur in the absence of corresponding external stimuli.  
However, psychotic voice-hearers also describe hearing voices that develop from 
environmental sounds such as traffic noise or blowing wind (Jones & Luhrmann, 2016). In 
hypervigilance hallucinations, for example, a person is proposed to be hypervigilant regarding 
the detection of certain stimuli in his/her environment, as for example ―hearing things that 
confirm current beliefs around fears of persecution‖ (Garwood et al., 2015, p. 53).  
One might argue that this leads to the conclusion that hypervigilance hallucinations 
actually are illusions. However, we argue that there are significant differences between 
ordinary illusions and what is called hypervigilance hallucinations. First, illusions are usually 
rapidly recognised as illusions and do not go along with the considerable suffering associated 
with hypervigilance hallucinations: we usually recognise rapidly that it was not us who were 
meant, when we, for example, have the illusion of hearing our name. However, 
hypervigilance hallucinations have a compelling character for the voice-hearer. Hence, 
whereas illusions might be described as ―auditory accidents‖, hypervigilance hallucinations 
carry a deeper meaning for the voice-hearer that might be deeply related to his/her life-history 
(Dodgson & Gordon, 2009). Hypervigilance hallucinations, thus, cannot be reduced to 
ordinary auditory illusions.  
Summarising, voice-hearers develop ways of clearly differentiating between their voices 
and thoughts or voices stemming from physically present speakers (Fenekou & Georgaca, 
2010). Over time, voice-experiences tend to be integrated in a voice-hearers‘ life with a 
relatively stable relationship between voice-hearer and his/her voice (Fenekou & Georgaca, 
2010). Thereby, voice-hearers usually elaborate sophisticated ways of making sense of their 
voice-experiences. All this does usually not apply to ordinary auditory illusions. 
2.5 Summing up – a working conceptualisation 
Before outlining a working conceptualisation let us, again, consider some preliminary 
questions. When many voice-hearers do not actually hear their voices literally, why would 
they then describe their experiences in terms of hearing voices? Coming back to the 
preliminary considerations, one possibility is that they term their experiences like that as they 
want to comply with what their psychiatrists want to hear. This possibility is reflected in the 
quote of the following patient: 
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―…it becomes incredibly tempting to resort to easier terms and terms that clinicians 
understand because [the inability to communicate] gets so frustrating...I often want 
to—in this kind of negative way—to [instead] resist interpretation, and [instead] say 
―that‘s not right‖ or ―that didn‘t capture it‖ without necessarily having a positive 
alternative; no ―this is what it‘s like.‖  
(Jones & Shattell, 2016, p. 2, brackets in the original) 
 
Another consideration is that meaning is usually conveyed to us by others through language. 
We may be texted or spoken to, but this meaning is always conveyed in terms of 
communicational means. So even if some individuals do not experience their voices in an 
auditory way, to describe their experiences in term of ―hearing voices‖ may allow them to 
express the sensation of being communicated to (for a similar argument, see Hinzen & 
Rossello, 2015). This might be illustrated by the following quote: ―They‘re clearly thoughts, 
but I don‘t generate them – someone else is communicating with me‖ (Jones & Luhrmann, 
2016, p. 194).  
However, in some descriptions it becomes apparent that the experiences are different 
from usual communications in important ways: ―I did not hear the voices aurally. They were 
much more intimate than that, and inescapable‖ (Woods et al., 2015, p. 326). Unlike voices of 
physically present speakers, the voices experienced by voice-hearers do not obey to physical 
laws of space and time: they may ―address‖ the voice-hearer anytime at any place. 
Based on these studies focusing on the subjective voice-experience, we can now 
outline a working conceptualisation. Coming back to the preliminary considerations, we first 
have to note that any proposal of a conceptualisation of AVHs has to be preliminary: at the 
present moment we simply do not have enough data about voice-experiences and its subtypes 
in order to propose any final, valid conceptualisation. Rather, the conceptualisation of AVHs 
has to be considered an ongoing research process. 
What is called ―AVHs‖ or ―voice-hearing‖ can be conceptualised as multidimensional 
experiences with each dimension varying both from person to person and over time. We 
might conceptualise such experiences as meaningful ―private/idiosyncratic experiences of 
communication‖ that make reference to the voice-hearer. The experience is idiosyncratic in 
the sense that the specific voices experienced by a voice-hearer are experienced by him/her 
alone. In the moment of the experience, there is no physically present speaker who would 
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mean to convey the ―received communication‖9. Nonetheless, the experiences are often 
aligned with a communicator that may be clearly identified and in that sense do not represent 
ordinary ―self-communication‖. The absence of a speaker renders the communicational 
situation ―unfair‖ in that there is no immediate possibility to interact with the ―voice‖ vis-á-
vis. Moreover, the experience of communication can be auditory to different degrees, but is 
not necessarily so. Rather, the communication may be experienced as silent or thought-like. 
The voice-experience may be associated with bodily feelings and be described in such terms. 
There are several possible forms of addressing a voice, whereby the second-person 
perspective is the most common (Corstens & Longden, 2013).  
Based on the voice‘s content and the context of the onset of the voice-experiences, we 
can further distinguish different types of voice-experiences. It has been, for example, 
proposed that subtypes of AVHs in schizophrenia, include hypervigilance, autobiographical 
memory, deafferentation and inner speech hallucinations (McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al., 
2014). The authors further distinguish between obsessional, novel and own thought inner 
speech hallucinations (Figure 4). Obsessional ―voices‖ may be associated with short, 
repetitive commands, novel inner speech hallucinations may occur in the form of running 
commentary, and own thought hallucinations may both be experienced as voices and be 
recognised as own thoughts (McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al., 2014).   
Generally, the voice‘s content is personally meaningful for the voice-hearer and most 
likely negative in the context of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (e.g., Larøi, 2012). Just to 
give some examples, we may hypothesise that, for example, insulting voices may be related to 
self-critical thoughts or anticipated critique through others. 
Commanding voices may correspond to suppressed unwanted impulses. 
Hypervigilance hallucinations may be related with the shameful fear of others knowing things 
about oneself that one does not want to know them: ―I have come to recognise the voices as 
expressions of anxiety, perhaps even a recognition of a fear I have about myself that I am not 
prepared to entertain as being part of my personality‖ (Ratcliffe & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 53).  
 
                                                 
9 That is also true for hypervigilance hallucinations. Although in those cases, there might be physically present speakers, 
those do not utter the messages meant for the voice-hearer. 
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Figure 4 AVH-subtypes proposed by McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al. (2014). 
 
There are innumerable possibilities of what exactly a specific voice means for whom 
and to answer the question of what it is. It has become clear until this point that voice-hearing 
is much more than ―hearing‖ a sound in the absence of a corresponding stimulus (and in the 
acoustic sense often less). This diversity and the complexity of voice-experiences have to be 
taken into account in AVH-research. Based on the individual experience there might be quite 
different possible best treatments. There is clearly more research needed into the experiential 
details of individual voice-experiences in order to disentangle different subtypes of voices that 
might be associated with different neurocognitive processes. 
Let us now turn to the second part of this work and see how AVHs are conceptualised 
in the disciplines of neuroscience, psychology and clinical philosophy and in how far these 
conceptualisations correspond to their complexity and diversity. Moreover, evidence from 
neuroscientific and psychological studies concerning AVHs will be examined. 
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3 Systematic review of neuroscientific, psychological and 
clinical-philosophical studies about voice-hearing 
 
3.1 Methods for the systematic literature review 
The method used for conducting the systematic literature review follows the PRISMA 
guidelines (Liberati et al., 2009; Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2009) originally 
developed for studies evaluating health care interventions. These guidelines provide a 
stepwise selection of relevant articles after a literature research in the relevant database for 
systematic literature reviews in general. 
3.1.1 Search procedure 
In order to investigate how AVHs are conceptualised in neuroscientific and cognitive 
psychological approaches to voice-hearing, PubMed and PubPsych was searched using three 
search strings10. The first referred to auditory verbal hallucinations carrying the following 
terms: ―auditory verbal hallucinat*―, ―auditory hallucinat*‖, ―verbal hallucinat*‖, ―hear* 
voice*‖, ―hallucinat* AND voice*‖. The second search string contained terms regarding 
neuroscience ―brain‖, ―cognition‖, ―neurobiolog*‖, ―neurophysiolog*‖, ―neuropsycholog*‖, 
―neurocognit*‖. The third search string contained terms aiming at obtaining studies 
concerning the conceptualisation of AVHs: ―model‖, ―account‖, ―approach‖, ―perspective‖, 
―definition‖, ―theory‖11. The search terms were connected with an OR-operator and the search 
sets with an AND-operator, respectively. Moreover, in PubMed the Mesh-Term ―Humans‖ 
was set in order to get back only studies concerning humans. Titles and abstracts of the 
resulting studies were scanned by the author, as well as her supervisor (A.P.P.) to extract 
relevant works. The shortlisted articles were then scanned in order to obtain the final list of 
included works. 
                                                 
10 These specific search strings were defined after testing various different combinations of search terms, as they turned out to 
devolve a great variety of relevant studies. 
11 At this point it may be useful to shortly consider the differences between the terms of this search string. A theory can be 
considered as a set of concepts that are interrelated and aiming at presenting a systematic view of certain phenomena that 
also may be explained and predicted by the respective theory (Kerlinger, 1986). Models may be derived from theories 
and are less general than theories and aim at explaining a specific phenomenon (Wilkinson, 2014). Thereby, models 
usually focus on certain features of a phenomenon and, thus, represent it in a simplified manner (Bailer-Jones, 2009). A 
definition can be roughly defined as ―a statement expressing the essential nature of something‖ (Merriam-Webster‘s 
online dictionary, 2017a). The terms approach, account, and perspective were intended in the most general way.   
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For the systematic search of relevant philosophical works an equivalent search was 
carried out using the database PhilPapers. For this search the ―fuzzy filter advanced‖ was 
applied. Moreover it was chosen that the search term ―hallucinat*‖ must appear, the search 
terms ―auditory‖, ―verbal‖, ―acoustico-verbal‖, and ―acoustic‖ are excellent indicators of 
relevance, and the search terms ―philosoph*‖, ―phenomen*‖ are good indicators of relevance. 
The search specified in that way resulted in n = 623 hits (18.03.17). The resulting studies were 
scanned equivalently to the aforementioned search. A large part of the works devolved by the 
PhilPapers-search did not belong to the area of philosophy. For that reason and because in the 
area of philosophy ―systematic review‖ is no common research strategy, a slightly different 
search strategy was adopted for the area of philosophy. In addition to the articles identified 
through the PhilPapers search, references of those were searched. Works of the authors of the 
selected studies that would help to clarify their position were also considered in the review. 
3.1.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Studies published in the form of journal articles in the English language from 2000 until 
inclusively 2016 (31.10.) were included based on the searches of PubMed and PubPsych. This 
decision was based on the fact that the majority of the studies about ―auditory verbal 
hallucination‖ devolved by PubMed and PubPsych were published after 2000. For this reason 
the results should not differ significant from the ones that would be obtained by including 
earlier work. Another reason for the inclusion of more recent studies is grounded on the aim 
of the present work, which is to analyse which (implicit) assumptions about AVHs are guiding 
its recent investigation. Studies not dealing (explicitly) with AVHs or not focusing on them, 
pure reviews, pure meta-analyses, pure case reports, as well as treatment studies and studies 
only probing healthy participants were excluded. Studies not belonging to the areas defined as 
relevant for the present work were excluded as well. 
For the area of philosophy, in addition to work published in the form of articles, 
chapters of books were included if relevant. According to Romdenh-Romluc (2009, see also 
González, 2010), hallucinations are studied in two domains of philosophy: first, in what could 
be called clinical philosophy or philosophy of psychiatry, and second in philosophy of 
perception. Whereas the first focuses on hallucinations as ―real experiences‖, the latter is 
more concerned about the ―hypothetical hallucination‖, that is, the possibility of having 
hallucinations in the sense of having perceptual experiences lacking external stimulation. To 
put it differently, the latter ―address[es] the topic of hallucination, not for its own sake, but 
only in the context of some wider issues‖ (Dorsch, 2010, p. 172). This approach, thus, is 
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usually not concerned with the question of what a hallucination is, but rather operates with the 
assumption that hallucinations are indistinguishable from veridical perceptions in order to 
further examine what that means for philosophy of perception. The studies of interest for the 
present work belong to the first category. As in the present work we are interested in AVHs 
how they really occur and that are experienced by individuals, articles that treat hallucinations 
in the area of philosophy of perception will be excluded. For details regarding the selection 
process, see Figure 5. 
3.2 Results for the literature review 
3.2.1 Search results  
The search described above resulted in n = 1002 studies. Of those studies n = 199 were 
identified by searching PubMed, n = 180 by searching PubPsych and n = 623 by searching 
PhilPapers. Based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, n = 62 studies were 
consentaneously classified as relevant for the review by the authors. For a complete list of the 
included studies please consult the appendix. 
3.2.2 Overall summary of selected studies 
The selected studies include neuroimaging, behavioural studies, internet surveys, as well as 
neuroscientific, psychological and philosophical theoretical studies. In the following, the 
research methods used to approach AVHs in the reviewed studies are briefly described.  
3.2.3 Research methods used in the reviewed studies 
Each discipline comes with different epistemic approaches, epistemic objects, concepts and 
methods to investigate them (Kotchoubey et al., 2016). Moreover, different disciplines are 
regularly, but not necessarily, associated with different (implicit) ontological and metaphysical 
assumptions (Kotchoubey et al., 2016). Accordingly, different disciplines allow us to 
investigate different features of AVHs.  
Following Northoff and Stanghellini (2016) we can thereby distinguish between a 
phenomenal, a trans-phenomenal and a pre-phenomenal level. ―Phenomenal‖ refers to the 
level of subjective experience. ―Trans-phenomenal‖ refers to ―those features that underlie and 
[…] constitute subjective experience‖ (p.3). Processes on the trans-phenomenal level are not 
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Figure 5 Flow diagram of the search procedure (following the PRISMA guidelines). In addition to the database 
search, 3 records were identified through the search of references. 
 
subject of direct experience. Nonetheless, one may deduce its characteristics from detailed 
investigation of phenomenal experience (Northoff & Stanghellini, 2016). Ultimately, the ―pre-
phenomenal‖ level refers to the neurobiological level. Just as trans-phenomenal processes, 
neuronal processes are not subject of direct experience.12 
                                                 
12 It is unclear how exactly those different levels relate to each other. Northoff and Stanghellini (2016) propose that ―[t]he 
‗‗trans-phenomenal‖ and the ‗‗pre-phenomenal‘‘ are not two distinct levels of the living organism. They are just 
methodologically distinct‖ (p.4, italics in the original). 
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Records after duplicates removed 
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Full-text articles 
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qualitative synthesis 
(n = 62) 
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According to this distinction, neuroscientific studies focus on epistemic objects on a 
pre-phenomenal level and phenomenological philosophical studies focus on the phenomenal 
as well as trans-phenomenal level. In psychological studies, we can distinguish between two 
types of epistemic objects: first-person phenomena and behavioural changes, observable from 
a third-person point of view (Kotchoubey et al., 2016). Here, the former is associated with the 
phenomenal level, whereas the latter is not concerned with experience, but behaviour. 
Different methods, thus, are useful for and at the same time limited to investigate 
different aspects of AVHs. First-person reports cannot provide us with information about 
neuronal processes or structure associated with AVHs and a neuroimaging study cannot 
provide us with information regarding the meaning of a voice-experience.  
In the following, we will look more closely on the different methods that are used in 
the reviewed neuroscientific, psychological and philosophically-informed studies in order to 
investigate AVHs (see also Figure 6). Thereby we focus on how they may tell us what about 
voice-hearing and also consider their limitations.  
3.2.3.1 What can we learn about voice-hearing with neuroscientific methods? 
In each of the reviewed neuroscientific studies we find a combination of two approaches: 
either first-person reports of voice-hearers or behavioural data are combined with either 
measures of brain activity or measures of brain structure.  
We can distinguish between three different approaches in the reviewed neuroscientific 
studies. First, in symptom capture studies brain activity during voice-hearing-episodes is 
recorded. These studies provide us with information about the ―neuronal side‖ of AVHs. 
Second, in some studies tasks are used that aim at triggering neuronal processes whose dis-
function is hypothesised to be related with voice-hearing (state studies). Third, in resting state 
studies both brain activity in the absence of any tasks and structural brain organisation are 
investigated – both of which are assumed to be altered in individuals with voice-hearers. 
 
Where can we find heightened brain activation in a voice-hearer’s brain? 
 
There are different possibilities for investigating which brain regions are activated during a 
Voice-experience or a specific task13. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
allow for the localisation of higher blood flow in specific brain regions suggesting higher 
neuronal activity at that sites (Heeger & Ress, 2002). FMRI, thus, provides indirect evidence 
                                                 
13 Please note that only because a heightened brain activation may be identified during a voice-experience in a specific part of 
the brain, that does not mean that it could be localised at there. Such an assumption would amount to a localisatory 
fallacy (lokalisatorischer Fehlschluss) (Fuchs, 2013a).  
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for the brain‘s activation which consists mainly in electrical conduction through neurons 
(Lodish et al., 2000).  
In Positron Emission Tomography (PET) studies, a radioactively labelled substance is 
injected intravenously into a individuals‘ body which allows to trace its distribution in the 
body (van Berckel, Lammertsma, & Boellaard, 2015). In the reviewed study, a form of 
glucose has been used (Horga, Fernández-Egea, et al., 2014). As glucose-uptake is increased 
at active brain sites, this technique provides indirect evidence for local heightened brain 
activity. 
 
What structural alterations can we find in voice-hearers’ brains? 
 
By means of structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), anatomical images of a voice-
hearer‘s brain can be produced. As water protons behave differently dependent on the 
characteristics of the tissue they are found in, different tissues may be distinguished with MRI 
(Berger, 2002). 
Diffusion Tensor imaging (DTI), a magnetic resonance imaging technique, can provide 
further insights into the architecture and connectivity of a voice-hearer‘s brain. It is based on 
measuring the distribution of water molecules in the brain as well as their movement rate and 
direction towards an applied magnetic field (Aung, Mar, & Benzinger, 2013). A widely used 
measure in DTI-studies is fractional anisotropy, a measure of the directionality of tracts 
(Alexander, Lee, Lazar, & Field, 2007). 
 
What are the electrophysiological temporal dynamics of a voice-hearer’s brain 
activity? 
 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) studies serve to investigate physiological cerebral processes 
going along with sensory and cognitive processes in voice-hearers‘ brains that are thought to 
be related with voice-experiences. 
By means of EEG one can measure both spontaneous and event-related brain 
oscillations (EROs) as well as event-related potentials (ERPs) within a temporal range of 
milliseconds. Whereas EROs refer to modulations of ongoing rhythmic neuronal activity,  
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Figure 6 Overview of the methods used in the reviewed neuroscientific, psychological and philosophically-
informed studies. Psychological methods are suited to investigate both first-person phenomena as well as 
behaviour. Questionnaires and interviews are used in order to find out about voice-experiences‘ contexts as well as 
beliefs about voices and their experiential features. Voice-hearers‘ behaviour is studied in order to draw 
conclusions regarding cognitive underpinnings of such experiences. Behavioural and neurobiological measures are 
often combined in neuro-behavioural studies about VH. Neurobiological methods allow for studying voice-
hearers‘ brain activation and structure in order to establish which brain regions are activated during Voice-
experiences (symptom capture), as well as to investigate trait alterations regarding brain structure and activity that 
are hypothesised to be related with VH. EEG and MEG are especially suited for investigating temporal dynamics 
in brain functioning; fMRI and PET for establishing the sites of brain activation; and MRI and DTI for 
investigating structural brain alterations in voice-hearers. Phenomenological philosophical methods investigate 
first-person descriptions of voice-experiences in order to identify altered structures of experience (pre-reflective 
and trans-phenomenal) that might underlie voice-experiences. Phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches aim at 
identify a voice‘s meaning within the voice-hearer‘s life and culture. Moreover, philosophical reflection and 
argumentation may prove valuable in critically examining the soundness of existing models of VH. 
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ERPs refer to initially non-existent event-driven neuronal activity in response to specific 
event or stimuli (Bastiaansen, Mazaheri, & Jensen, 2012)14. 
The EEG-signal relies on voltage fluctuations that are measured at the scalp of a 
person (e.g., Cohen, 2017). These voltage fluctuations are assumed to result from 
synchronous rhythmic summed neuronal activity, more specifically postsynaptic potentials 
(Başar, Başar-Eroglu, Karakaş, & Schürmann, 2000).  
ERPs are classified regarding their polarity, that is negative or positive, as well as the 
time at which they occur related to the stimulus they are associated with (Landa, Krpoun, 
Kolarova & Kasparek, 2014). 
Similarly, magnetoencephalography (MEG) is a technique that allows the 
measurement of magnetic fields resulting from electric activity of thousands of neurons 
(which is also the basis for the EEG signal) in a millisecond range (Hämäläinen, Hari, 
Ilmoniemi, Knuutila, & Lounasmaa, 1993). Analogous to EEG, it can be applied to the study 
of the resting state or of evoked fields.  
Taken together, these methods allow for investigating temporal dynamics of brain 
activation as well as functional coupling between brain regions in voice-hearers‘ brains. 
Of course, these neuroscientific methods have clear limits in the investigation of 
AVHs. Neuroimaging studies provide access only to sub-personal, pre-phenomenal aspects of 
AVHs. Consequently, neuroscientific studies alone are not sufficient for accounting for ―the 
total phenomenon of hallucinations‖ (Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 1997, p. 20). For example, 
they cannot provide information about or explain the specific content of a voice-experience. 
Put differently, what we can observe when studying the brain is brain structure, as well as 
neuroelectrical and neurochemical processes associated with VH, but no semantic aspects of 
AVHs. Also, as Fuchs (2012a) notes ―[n]o imaging of brain activities can provide a 
psychiatrist with an understanding of what it is like to […] hear voices‖ (p.335). Note, 
however, that when studying voice-hearers‘ brains we are not interested in neuronal processes 
and structure per se, but in if and how they relate to voice-experiences. Therefore the 
reviewed neuroscientific studies rely on first-person reports of at least the presence or absence 
                                                 
14 Note that the relationship between both phenomena is not unequivocal (e.g., Andrew & Fein, 2010), nor is it 
uncontroversial that they constitute completely independent phenomena (e.g., Lu, Doñamayor, Münte, & Bahlmann, 
2017). 
    Spontaneous, as well as event-related brain oscillations range from delta- (~0.5-3.5 Hz) to theta- (~3.5-7 Hz) to alpha- (~8-
13 Hz) to beta- (~18-25) to gamma-frequencies (~30-70 Hz) (e.g., Başar, 2013). These frequencies are associated 
differently with specific cognitive processes, and show varying topographical distributions as well as temporal patterns 
(Cohen, 2017). 
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of voice-experiences. Moreover, the reviewed neuroscientific studies often use some type of 
task and behavioural measures. We will consider these measures that are used in the reviewed 
neuroscientific in the context of psychological methods in the following section. 
3.2.3.2 What can we learn about voice-hearing with psychological research methods? 
In psychological studies, we can distinguish between two types of epistemic objects: first-
person phenomena and behavioural changes, observable from a third-person point of view 
(Kotchoubey et al., 2016). These different epistemic objects require different methods that 
allow for investigating different aspects of AVHs
15
. 
The mainly used measures for correlating reported voice-hearing experience to brain 
activity or structure in the reviewed neuroscientific studies are items taken from the Scale for 
the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) (Andreasen, 1984) and the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1987). 
In the SAPS scale (Andreasen, 1984) the voice-hearing experience is assessed with 
three items rated on a 5-point scale from none to severe (item auditory hallucinations: ―The 
patient reports voices, noise, or other sounds that no one else hears‖; item voices commenting: 
―The patient reports a voice which makes a running commentary on his behavior or 
thoughts‖; item voices conversing: ―The patient reports hearing two or more voices 
conversing‖). In the PANSS rating scale (Kay et al., 1987), voice-hearing is measured by the 
means of one item that is rated on a 7-point scale from absent to extreme (item hallucinatory 
behaviour ―Verbal report or behavior indicating perceptions which are not generated by 
external stimuli. These may occur in the auditory visual, olfactory, or somatic realms.‖). 
Another instrument frequently used in the reviewed studies to assess experiential 
features of voice-hearing are the psychotic symptom rating scales (PSYRATS) (Haddock, 
McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999). In this assessment instrument, voice-experiences are 
recorded regarding frequency, duration, location and loudness, as well as the voices‘ content 
and the distress caused by them. Moreover, beliefs about the origin of the voices are queried. 
Taken together, these scales on the aspect of what we have termed ―physical 
properties‖ of voice-experiences and do not include the aspect of a voice-hearer‘s relation to 
                                                 
15 You might wonder why behavioural measures might be relevant for AVH-research, as AVHs are experiential rather than 
behavioural phenomena. The relevance of behavioural studies for AVH-research is related to theoretical models of AVHs 
that postulate that AVHs are associated with more general impairments that are also observable on a behavioural level. 
Therefore, if voice-hearers in a behavioural study would behave systematically differently than non-voice-hearers that 
could be taken as indication that there might be a (impaired) mechanism underlying both AVHs as well as the observed 
behavioural differences between voice-hearers and non-voice-hearers. 
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his/her voices. With exception of the PSYRATS these scales are basically limited to the 
inquiry of the presence of AVHs and do not capture the fine-grained phenomenology of 
AVHs. It remains unclear how the response to one item can be mapped to the complex brain 
organisation (van Tol et al., 2014). These measures, moreover do not allow for the 
investigation of relational aspects of AVHs.  
In order to investigate relational aspects of AVHs and beliefs about voices, specific 
questionnaires have been developed (Birchwood et al., 2000; Hayward, 2003).  
 
In neuro- as well as psychological sciences, it is often assumed that qualitative 
experiences can be measured in a quantitative way using those measures (Giorgi, 2005). Apart 
from this assumption being questionable, it is unlikely that such measures can capture ―the 
essence of qualitative phenomena‖ (Giorgi, 2005, p. 80)16. It is therefore relevant to use 
methods in AVH-research that allow for the investigation of subjective voice-experience as 
such. That is where philosophical and especially phenomenological-philosophical methods 
become relevant. 
3.2.3.3 What can we learn about voice-hearing using philosophical methods? 
Regarding the methods used in the reviewed philosophical studies, we can roughly distinguish 
between phenomenological descriptions and analysis and philosophical argumentation. 
 
Phenomenological description and analysis 
 
To put it in the words of the author of some reviewed studies ―[p]henomenology helps to 
explore altered worlds of experience that cannot be elucidated by accumulating data from the 
3
rd
 person perspective, e.g., data on brain functions‖ (Fuchs, 2007, p. 425). In 
phenomenological philosophical approaches to AVHs in schizophrenia such phenomena 
assumed to not be understandable in terms of, for example, medical descriptions alone. 
Rather, referring to early theorists of psychopathology (e.g., Blankenburg, Minkowski), it is 
assumed that for in-depth descriptions of AVHs in schizophrenia, the inclusion of 
considerations of the very nature of existence, subjectivity, intersubjectivity is indispensable 
(Parnas, Bovet, & Zahavi, 2002).  
                                                 
16 There is, for example, evidence that the personal quality of hallucinatory experiences may differ substantially between 
individuals that endorse the same item in a questionnaire aiming at the investigation of hallucinatory experiences 
(Stanghellini, Langer, Ambrosini, & Cangas, 2012). 
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Phenomenological approaches to AVHs rest on the premise that the study of lived first-
person experience can provide us with an understanding of this experience itself (Upthegrove 
et al., 2016). One objective of phenomenological analysis is to reveal the ―essence‖ or 
structure of an experience (Upthegrove et al., 2016). Essence, thereby, might be broadly 
defined as ―what makes the phenomenon to be that very phenomenon. That is, the essence or 
structure illuminates the[…] essential characteristics of the phenomenon without which it 
would not be that phenomenon‖ (Dahlberg, 2006, p. 11). 
You may now wonder if all researchers who approach AVHs from a phenomenological 
point of view have first-person experiences of AVHs. Obviously that is not the case. Usually, 
researchers in this field do not have voice-experiences themselves. For their research of 
AVHs, instead, they refer to detailed first-person reports of individuals with schizophrenia-
spectrum diagnosis. Thus, their approaches are based on data that are obtained by in-depth 
interviews of individuals with schizophrenia diagnosis either by the respective authors 
themselves or by others. The so obtained descriptions of first-person experience are then 
examined in order to try to catch the ―essence‖ of the reported experiences and to reveal the 
altered structures of experience or the person‘s existence that might be at the basis of these 
experiences.  
In order to do so, the authors of the reviewed studies fall back on works of influential 
continental17 philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and many others. These philosophers 
themselves have used different methodologies to gain insight into the nature of human 
experience and existence. It goes beyond the scope of this work to delve into every one of 
them. However, the ―basic‖ phenomenological method, dating back to Husserl, shall be 
briefly presented in order to provide the reader with a general impression about the origin of 
phenomenology. 
According to Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), the four basic steps of the 
phenomenological method comprise the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, the eidetic 
variation, and the intersubjective corroboration. In the epoché, a person assumes a certain 
attitude by ―bracketing‖, that is, leaving aside, questions of the world‘s existence, without 
thereby negating its existence. This allows describing the phenomena that appear in one‘s 
consciousness as they are experienced (phenomenological reduction). The eidetic variation, a 
type of imaginative variation, then aims at identifying the phenomenon‘s essence, that is, the 
                                                 
17 These philosophers are associated with a variety of different phenomenological currents. It is not my concern here to 
provide a detailed distinction between the specific proposals of different continental philosophers, but to examine how 
they have been made fruitful conceptualisations of voice-hearing in schizophrenia provided in the reviewed studies. 
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characteristics of the phenomenon without which it would not be the same phenomenon. In 
intersubjective corroboration, one can compare one‘s obtained descriptions with those of 
others to examine in how far the obtained results are replicated and structures discovered in 
this process sharable. 
In the case of the authors of the reviewed studies that could mean that they put aside 
―etiological and diagnostic considerations and instead re-focuses on the character and 
meaning of the patient‘s experience from their perspective‖ (McCarthy-Jones, Krueger, Larøi, 
Broome, & Fernyhough, 2013, p. 3) and in the end check the ―appropriateness of [their] 
findings‖ (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013, p. 3) in the clinical context. 
There are some possible limitations of this method in the clinical context. Due to 
cognitive impairments some patients may not be in condition of reliably reporting their 
experiences, which may render their reports epistemologically unreliable. Moreover, the 
analyses of first-person reports remain interpretative and may, thus, be biased by the 
researcher‘s philosophical position (González, 2010). 
 
Philosophical argumentation 
 
Philosophical argumentation can be defined as a ―system of methods, devices, and means, by 
means of which philosophical systems are based [and] philosophical assertions are 
demonstrated‖ (Brutian & Wilson, 1979, p. 77). In a general way and argument can be said to 
be a ―claim-reason complex‖ which includes some type of conclusion based on certain 
premises (Hitchcock, 2007). As we will see in the reviewed studies based on philosophical 
arguments (Gregory, 2016), there are many different types of possible arguments.  
Philosophical reflection, moreover, can provide useful for evaluating the plausibility 
of existing models of AVHs.  
3.2.4 Data abstraction 
In order to extract conceptualisations of AVHs relevant for the present review the selected 
works were grouped regarding the constructs and concepts18 in context of which AVHs were 
conceptualised in the respective studies (for an overview of the identified concepts, see 
                                                 
18 At this point it may be useful to shortly consider the difference between the notions ―concept‖, ―construct‖ and ―models‖. 
The notions of ―concept‖ and ―construct‖ are often used interchangeably (Markus, 2008). They can be roughly defined as 
theoretical abstractions (Hox, 1997). Often, constructs are regarded as operationalised concepts (Watt & van den Berg, 
1995). Concepts and constructs in turn can be considered the ―building blocks‖ of theoretical models (Smith & Albaum, 
2005). A theory can be considered as a set of concepts that are interrelated (Kerlinger, 1986). 
 35 
 
Figures 12 and 14). Neuroscientific, psychological and clinical-philosophical approaches to 
voice-hearing have been designed and interpreted based on various constructs and concepts 
assumed to be related with or to explain AVHs. These include neurobiological concepts, such 
as (altered) neuronal connectivity, (altered) neuronal synchronisation, predictive processing 
and auditory processing, auditory cortex hyperactivity and self-monitoring. In other 
neurocognitive approaches AVHs have been conceptualised by means of the concept of 
memory. In the context of neuroscience as well as in philosophical accounts, AVHs have also 
been conceptualised as compensatory phenomena. In addition AVHs have been associated 
with a concept referring to motor action, namely subvocalisation. Moreover, concepts 
referring to cognitive dispositions, such as cognitive biases and beliefs about voices have been 
related to AVHs. The so far mentioned concepts focus on AVHs as auditory experiences that 
are experienced as not being produced by oneself. 
Psychological approaches to AVHs, in contrast, focused on the relational 
phenomenology of such experiences, as well as the context of their development. These 
concepts have also been taken into account in clinical-philosophical approaches to AVHs. 
Clinical-philosophical approaches towards voice-hearing included in the review 
phenomenological concepts such as ipseity, and passive synthesis amongst others that refer to 
the structure of experience.  
 
We will probe in how far the used concepts for approaching voice-hearing overlap and 
if and how those different approaches can be used fruitfully for an interdisciplinary 
conceptualisation of voice-hearing. 
 
Moreover, in a first step studies focusing directly on the brain‘s activity during voice-
experiences will be reviewed. 
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4 Neuroscientific and cognitive psychological approaches 
to voice-hearing  
4.1 What happens in the brain when someone “hears a voice”? – Symptom 
capture studies of voice-hearing 
Among the brain regions activated during voice-experiences, there are regions that have been 
found to be active during speech (e.g., Broca‘s area), memory (e.g., hippocampus), and 
emotion processing (e.g., insula). Most of the reviewed symptom capture studies focused on 
language brain areas in their analysis
19
. 
4.1.1 Brain regions associated with language processing 
The following brain regions associated with language processing were found to be activated 
during voice-experiences in individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and frequently 
experiencing voices in fMRI studies: bilateral inferior and middle frontal areas, as well as 
predominantly left-sided superior temporal gyrus (Looijestijn et al., 2013). In another fMRI 
study, higher activation of the left superior temporal sulcus, a part of the auditory cortex, was 
found during hallucinations as compared to blank trials in voice-hearers with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis (Horga, Peterson, et al., 2014). This area contains a voice-selective region, that is, a 
region that has been found to be selectively activated in response to vocal sounds (Belin, 
Zatorre, & Pike, 2000).  
Looijestijn et al. (2013) report a higher activity in the left planum temporale for 
individuals that reported hearing voices as coming from external space as compared to those 
that report experiencing their voices as coming from inside. The planum temporale is situated 
in the surface of the temporal lobe, coinciding partly with the Wernicke‘s area (Shapleske, 
Rossell, Simmons, David, & Woodruff, 2001). The authors propose that these structures are 
involved in mediating the externalisation of experienced voices in AVHs.  
In yet another fMRI study, in a sample of five participants diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and AVHs, uni- or bilateral activation of parts of the Heschl‘s gyrus was found 
during voice-experiences in some, but not all, participants (van de Ven et al., 2005). During 
acoustic stimulation, auditory cortex activation was found for all participants.
                                                 
19 Please note that the one brain region might be associated with a great range of different functions. Therefore 
the division into, for example, language and emotion brain regions must be regarded as simplifying.  
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Figure 7 Brain regions that have been related to voice-hearing in symptom capture and trait studies. Left side: overview of the brain‘s lobes (frontal, temporal, parietal, 
occipital) as seen on the left side of the brain (lateral view). Broca‘s area, Wernicke‘s area, the superior temporal gyrus (STG), insula, Heschl‘s gyrus, planum temporale, 
cerebellum have all been found to be active during the experience of voices. Right side (sagittal view of the right hemisphere): the anterior cingular cortex has also been found 
to be active during the experience of voices. Structural and functional alterations in voice-hearers have also been reported. A reduced gray matter concentration, for example, 
has been reported for the amygdala, hippocampus and putamen amongst others. 
 (brain images taken from free websites: http://www.clker.com/clipart-brain-sketch.html; http://humandiagram.info/blank-brain-diagram/). 
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The detection of an auditory component of interest was associated with the duration of 
the hallucination experience, which the authors interpret as an indication that only longer 
lasting hallucinations may be detectable using fMRI. Moreover, in this study, analysis of the 
temporal pattern of the hallucinations revealed a large variability of the BOLD responses of 
the components of interest within individual voice-hearing episodes. 
In an EEG-symptom capture study, an increased alpha-band coherence between the 
left and the right temporal cortices (Broca‘s area and Wernicke‘s area and their homologues) 
was observed in individuals with a schizophrenia diagnosis who were hallucinating as 
compared to when they were not (Sritharan et al., 2005). No changes in coherence between 
Broca‘s and Wernicke‘s area were observed intrahemispherically. Additionally, the authors 
found an increased alpha-band power in the left auditory cortex during AVHs, which is 
somewhat contradictory to the fMRI symptom capture studies, as increased alpha-band power 
is associated with decreased activity in a brain region (Klimesch, 2012). 
In a MEG symptom capture study, a decreased beta-band power in the left middle and 
superior temporal gyrus (where the Wernicke‘s area is located) was observed during voice-
hearing (van Lutterveld et al., 2012). Decreases in beta-band power have been associated with 
dis-inhibition (Neuper & Pfurtscheller, 2001) meaning that the superior temporal gyrus is 
activated in AVHs, which is in line with the fMRI symptom capture studies. 
4.1.2 Brain regions associated with emotion processing 
Besides brain regions associated with language processing, brain areas associated with 
emotion processing, amongst others, have been found to be active during the experience of 
voices. These include the bilateral insula, as well as the anterior cingulate gyrus (Looijestijn et 
al., 2013). The anterior cingulate cortex is connected with the frontal, temporal, as well as 
parietal cortex and its activity has been associated with anxiety, but also with movement 
(Grunwald, Kurthen, & Elger, 2008). As we have seen that AVHs in schizophrenia are 
predominantly of negative content, we could speculate that activity in this region might go 
along with anxiety elicited by this content. Moreover, the anterior cingulate cortex has been 
associated with speech processing (Wilson, Molnar-Szakacs, & Iacoboni, 2008). 
4.1.3 Brain regions involved in action 
In a fMRI symptom capture study the left motor cortex and right cerebellum have been found 
to be activated amongst other brain regions (Looijestijn et al., 2013). In the same study, a 
higher activation in the premotor cortex was reported for voice-hearers who reported to 
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experience their voices as coming from the external space (vs. internal). Looijestijn et al. 
(2013) propose that the activation of the motor cortex and the cerebellum observed in their 
study is due to the participants‘ motor act of pressing a balloon to indicate the onset of a 
voice-hearing experience.  
However, it has also been proposed that both voices that comment on the voice-
hearer‘s actions and voices that command to perform an action go along with activation in 
motor brain regions associated with the respective action (Badcock, 2010). The cerebellum 
has also been proposed to play a role in voice-hearing by monitoring if an action is self-
generated (e.g., Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004). Therefore, its activation may not be merely 
a confound of the action of pressing a button. Moreover, the premotor cortex has been found 
to be active during speech processing (Wilson et al., 2008). 
4.1.4 Brain regions associated with memory processing  
Looijestijn et al. (2013) also report higher activity in parts of the right prefrontal cortex for 
voice-hearers who reported to experience their voices as coming from the external space. 
Activity in the right prefrontal cortex has repeatedly been associated with episodic memory 
retrieval (Buckner & Petersen, 1996). This in line with studies indicating that a subgroup of 
voice-hearers reports that their voice‘s content resembles memories. 
A MEG symptom capture study revealed a decrease in alpha-band power in the right 
inferior frontal gyrus (where Broca‘s homologue is situated) during AVHs (van Lutterveld et 
al., 2012). As alpha-band synchronisation as expressed by increase in alpha-band power has 
been associated with inhibition of brain regions (Klimesch, 2012), the observed reduction in 
alpha-band power might indicate increased activity in this region associated with episodic 
memory processing. 
In a MEG study, a decrease in theta-band power (thought to be generated in the 
hippocampus) was found in the right hippocampus during AVH-onset, which the authors 
interpret as evidence for the role played by abnormal theta band activity in memory-related 
brain regions in AVHs (van Lutterveld et al., 2012). 
 
Taken together, the reviewed symptom capture studies indicate that during voice-
experiences a wide cluster of brain areas is activated. These area include the secondary 
auditory cortex, as well as the primary auditory cortex in some cases (van de Ven et al., 2005). 
However, brain activation patterns seem to be highly individual (van de Ven et al., 2005). It is 
also important to note that activation in speech processing areas during AVHs does not imply 
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that voices are experienced in an auditory way. It has, for example, been shown that voice-
selective brain regions are also activated when one reads direct speech (Yao, Belin, & 
Scheepers, 2011), which does not necessarily go along with an auditory experience. That van 
de Ven et al. (2005) found activation in the primary auditory cortex in some but not all voice-
hearers participating in their study fits with the fact that some but not all voice-hearers 
experience literally auditory voices. Given the often ―social‖ phenomenality of voice 
experiences that imply voices ―acting‖ on the voice-hearer by means of different speech acts 
(e.g. judging, commanding) future symptom capture studies could provide different brain 
activation patterns for different content or speech acts of voices.  
4.2 Voice-hearing as characterised by altered connectivity and synchronisation 
The construct of connectivity is crucial for recent conceptualisations of the brain‘s activity 
and its alterations related to pathology (Decker, Fillmore, & Roberts, 2017). The idea that dis-
connectivity in the brain is related to schizophrenia, and thus to voice-hearing, is as old as the 
term itself (Friston, 2002). The dis-connectivity theme is still widely present in neuroscientific 
studies concerning voice-hearing, whereby no consensus exits if there is a decreased or a 
heightened connectivity. One can distinguish between functional and structural connectivity, 
the relation between them not being fully understood (Damoiseaux & Greicius, 2009).  
Functional connectivity is assumed to exist between different neurons if they are 
activated in a temporal coherent pattern (e.g., Friston, Frith, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1993). If 
recorded oscillatory waveforms from different locations resemble each other, this is termed 
neuronal synchrony or coherence, and assumed to indicate interdependence between neuronal 
assemblies (Sritharan et al., 2005). This is usually interpreted to reflect functional 
connectivity between neuron populations (Bowyer, 2016). Synchronisation in this context can 
be defined as the phase-locking of neural oscillations (Rodriguez et al., 1999). The idea is that 
neuron populations in different places of the brain (―oscillators‖) synchronise during the 
execution of cognitive or sensory tasks (Cohen, 2017). 
Structural brain connectivity refers to the brain‘s anatomical connectivity, as for 
example connections of distant brain regions by white matter fiber tracts (Honey et al., 2009).  
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Table 1  
Overview over the brain regions found to be involved in the experience of voices in the reviewed symptom capture studies. 
 Authors (year) Participants Type of study Brain regions with increased activity in relation with AVHs/tasks                                         
(if not otherwise noted) 
Horga, Peterson, et 
al. (2014) 
N= 10 schizophrenia patients with 
AVHs (DSM-IV) 
 
N= 10 healthy controls 
 
most patients: antipsychotic 
medication  
 
fMRI 
Symptom capture/ 
task-related 
 
- superior temporal sulcus & middle temporal gyrus in right AC (voice-sensitive 
area)  
more active AVH vs. blank trials 
 
Looijestijn et al. 
(2013) 
N= 52 psychotic patients with AVHs 
(DSM-IV) 
 
schizophrenia (77%)  
schizoaffective disorder (4%)  
psychosis not otherwise specified 
(13%); personality disorder (6%)  
 
fMRI 
Symptom capture 
 
- bilateral inferior and middle frontal areas 
- bilateral insula 
- anterior cingulate gyrus 
- predominantly left-sided superior temporal gyrus 
- medial left-sided planum temporale 
- right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex & premotor cortex with a higher activity in 
these regions in the external AVH group 
- left motor cortex and right cerebellum  
 
van de Ven et al. 
(2005) 
N = 6 schizophrenia patients with 
AVHs (DSM-IV) 
 
all on antipsychotic medication 
fMRI 
Symptom-capture/ 
task-related 
 
for N=3 patients: 1 COI that encompassed primary and secondary AC 
- pat. A: COI comprised clusters in left Heschl‘s gyrus; 
- pat.D: bilateral Heschl‘s gyrus 
- pat.E: right anterior & lateral Heschl‘s gyrus & posterior superior temporal 
gyrus) 
 
Sritharan et al. 
(2005) 
N = 7 schizophrenia patients with 
AVHs  (DSM-III-R)  
 
all on antipsychotic medication 
EEG  
Symptom-capture 
 
- increased alpha-band coherence between the left and the right temporal cortices  
(Broca‘s area and Wernicke‘s area and their homologues) 
- increased relative alpha-band power in the left auditory cortex 
van Lutterveld et al. 
(2012) 
N =10 schizophrenia patients with 
AVHs  
N = 2 psychosis not otherwise 
specified with AVHs  (DSM-IV)  
 
all but 4 on antipsychotic medication 
MEG 
Symptom-capture 
 
- decrease in alpha-band power in the right inferior frontal gyrus  
(where Broca‘s homologue is situated) 
- decreased beta-band power in the left middle and superior temporal gyrus 
 (where Wernicke‘s area is situated) 
- decrease in theta-band power was found in the right hippocampus during AVH-
onset 
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4.2.1 Altered functional connectivity in voice-hearers 
Reduced connectivity between Wernicke‘s and Broca‘s area in schizophrenia patients with 
AVH compared to controls without a diagnosis has been found in a fMRI study using 
dynamical causal modelling (a method for investigating the strength of connectivity between 
populations of neurons) (Ćurčić-Blake et al., 2013). This reduced connectivity was found 
during a phonological task, assumed to require inner speech, in which participants had to 
decide if words were stressed on their first or their second syllable. Moreover, a reduced 
connectivity between Broca‘s and Wernicke‘s homologues in the right hemisphere and 
Broca‘s area was found during this task. However, the group of patients with voice-
experiences did not differ significantly from the patient group without voice-experiences in 
connectivity strength, which in turn did not differ significantly from the control group. The 
authors contextualise their study within the dis-connectivity hypothesis of AVHs which states 
a reduced connectivity between language-related brain areas in schizophrenia patients, 
especially those experiencing voices. 
In another fMRI study comparing schizophrenia patients, both with and without AVHs, 
and healthy controls, a reduction in functional connectivity strength in fronto-parietal-
temporal brain areas was observed for the patient group as a whole in a task that required 
listening passively to emotional words mirroring AVH content (Escartí et al., 2010). 
 
In EEG-studies, altered coherence between neuron populations has been reported for 
different frequency-bands in several studies focusing on voice-hearing. A reduced gamma-
band synchrony in schizophrenia patients between the left and the right primary auditory 
cortices as compared to healthy controls in response to periodic auditory stimuli has been 
reported (Mulert, Kirsch, Pascual-Marqui, McCarley, & Spencer, 2011). The sensory cortex, 
in this case, is assumed to act as a ―tuned oscillator‖, since a synchronisation of the oscillatory 
frequency-phase with the phase of the stimulus can be observed.  
Alterations in the synchrony of brain oscillations, hence, are not only observed during 
voice-experiences themselves but also related to sensory processing in individuals with AVHs 
per se. However, although a reduced gamma-band synchrony in individuals reporting voice-
experiences was observed as compared to individuals without psychiatric diagnoses, within 
the group of individuals with voice-hearing experience, those reporting more severe AVHs (as 
measured by the SAPS) showed a higher oscillatory synchrony between the primary auditory 
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cortices as individuals reporting less severe AVHs when presented with periodic auditory 
stimuli (Mulert et al., 2011). 
This result has been hypothesised to indicate that a certain preserved degree of 
synchronisation might be necessary for an activation of sensory cortices that, in turn, might 
give rise to AVHs (Cho & Wu, 2013). 
 
Even in resting state, oscillatory brain activity has been observed to be altered in voice-
hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis when compared to individuals with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis but without AVH. More precisely, heightened beta 1 and beta 2 frequency 
amplitudes in individuals with voice-hearing experiences were found, which were identified 
to be generated in left inferior parietal lobule and left medial frontal gyrus (Lee et al., 2006). 
Moreover, a significant correlation of gamma and beta (2 and 3) frequencies was observed in 
this group. The authors conclude that AVHs reflect altered beta oscillations that have 
generators in brain areas related to speech. Critically, the authors did not control for the 
occurrence of voice-experiences during EEG-recording. For that reason, it is unclear whether 
their study reflects rather trait or state-alterations in brain oscillations in individuals with 
voice-hearing experience. 
 
What can we learn from those studies? Neuronal oscillations in different frequency bands 
occur superimposed and it is unlikely that one specific frequency range is associated with one 
specific cognitive phenomenon in an exclusive manner (Engel & Fries, 2010). In a general 
way we might hypothesise that Mulert et al.‘s (2011) study hints at an altered (neuronal) 
responsivity to environmental stimuli. How this might correspond to AVHs specifically 
remains a speculation. 
In connection with Lee et al.‘s (2006) study, evidence from a study investigating 
predictive processing is interesting. In that study, it has been found that when an auditory 
stimulus did not correspond to the stimulus that would have been predicted after the 
presentation with a visual cue, a coupling of beta- and gamma oscillations was observed 
(Arnal, Wyart, & Giraud, 2011). Supposing that the participants in Lee et al.‘s (2006) study 
were really experiencing AVHs during recording, it could be that the observed correlation 
between beta- and gamma-oscillations might reflect that the AVHs were not anticipated by the 
participants. We will consider the idea that AVHs might be mental events that are faultily 
predicted later on in this work (section 4.8).  
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The concepts of synchrony and coherence have not only been used to conceptualise 
voice-hearing studies measuring neural oscillations. Van Lutterveld et al. (2012) transfer the 
concept of coherence from a neuronal level to the level of conscious experience: based on the 
assumption that theta-band waves coordinate gamma band waves that are, in turn, associated 
with the ―coherent line‖ of conscious experience, they hypothesise that the observed theta-
band aberrations during AVH-onset may disrupt the coherence of conscious experience and 
therefore result in an increased focus on memory representations during voice-hearing. 
4.2.2 Altered structural connectivity in voice-hearers 
In terms of brain anatomy, a lower gray matter volume of the left superior temporal gyrus in 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia as compared to healthy controls was found in a  
MRI study, irrespective of them reporting voice-experiences or not (van Tol et al., 2014). In 
the same study, individuals with AVHs showed a decreased gray matter volume in the 
following brain regions: left inferior frontal gyrus and right hippocampal gyrus (compared to 
the healthy controls) and left putamen (compared to the patients not reporting voices). 
Reduced gray matter concentration in voice-hearers in the left inferior frontal gyrus was also 
found in another study comparing voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis and healthy 
controls, along with a reduction in gray matter concentration in amygdala, insula, STG, and 
right postcentral gyrus (Aguilar et al., 2008). In line with these findings, a progressive 
decrease in gray matter volume in the left STG and right orbitofrontal cortex has also been 
observed in a longitudinal study in individuals with schizophrenia diagnosis as compared to 
healthy controls (Mané et al., 2009). 
As we have reviewed before, frontal cortices and the STG are implicated in speech 
processing and the hippocampus is related with memory processing. Regarding the putamen, 
a recent meta-analysis found that in tasks that require language processing the putamen is 
regularly co-activated with a range of other brain regions associated with speech processing, 
such as the inferior frontal and superior temporal gyrus (Viñas-Guasch & Wu, 2017). The 
putamen has also been proposed to be implicated in motor and emotional processing 
(Groenewegen, 2003) and working memory (Sefcsik et al., 2009). 
Regarding white matter volume, an increase was found in patients experiencing AVHs 
compared to those that do not in the postcentral gyrus (van Tol et al., 2014). In that vein, a 
higher directionality of the white matter in the lateral arcuate fasciculus, a white-matter fibre 
bundle connecting temporal and frontal cortical brain areas (Rilling et al., 2008), and the 
corpus callosum, a fibre bundle connecting the brain‘s left and right hemisphere (Hofer & 
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Frahm, 2006), in voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis as compared to individuals with 
the same diagnosis but without voice-hearing experience and healthy controls has been found 
(Hubl et al., 2004). However, Catani et al. (2011), using the same method (DTI), found the 
opposite effect: a reduced directionality in the lateral arcuate fasciculi, bilaterally in voice-
hearers with schizophrenia diagnoses. 
4.2.3 Alterations in structural and functional connectivity united 
Van Tol et al. (2014) speculate that reduced neuronal density goes along with lower inhibitory 
activity and thus leads to functional hyperconnectivity between the structures associated with 
voice processing and language production, increasing, together with abnormalities in 
memory-related structures, the probability of experiencing voices. Likewise, Hubl et al. 
(2004) propose that heightened white matter directionality in the arcuate fasciculus might give 
rise to abnormal activation in brain areas related to acoustic processing of external stimuli in 
individuals experiencing voices. More specifically, it has been hypothesised that a higher 
white matter directionality observed in the arcuate fasciclus in voice-hearers may enable the 
co-activation of the primary auditory cortex, for example, during the generation of inner 
verbal material and thus contribute to a voice‘s auditory quality (Strik & Dierks, 2008). They 
propose that a structural increase of connections between the frontal and the temporal lobe 
might goes along with a functional dis-regulation between frontal brain areas associated with 
the generation of speech and temporal brain regions associated with the perception of speech. 
Taken together, it is suggested that deficient coordination between different brain 
regions may be at the root of AVHs.  
However, given the phenomenal richness and individuality of voice-experiences, as well 
as the range of brain regions implicated in VH and their functions, it seems unlikely that one 
specific pattern of structural and functional alterations can be determined for all voice-hearers. 
4.3 Voice-hearing as symptom of a brain disease 
In neuroscientific literature, AVHs have also been conceptualised as a symptom of the ―brain 
disease‖ (p.434) that schizophrenia represents (Aguilar et al., 2008). In this sense, Strik and 
Dierks (2008) attempt to describe AVHs in terms of neurobiological events and argue that 
they should be redefined in a ―neurobiologically meaningful way‖ (p.66). In order to achieve 
that, they aim at translating the ―psychiatric symptom‖ of voice-hearing into brain dis-
functions. They base their argumentation of what they take as the foremost paradigm in 
psychiatry, namely that psychiatric symptoms are based on brain dis-regulation. 
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Table 2  
Overview over studies regarding brain connectivity and synchronisation in voice-hearers reviewed in the present work. 
Authors (year) Participants Type of study Brain regions with increased activity or structural changes in relation with AVHs/tasks                       
(if not otherwise noted) 
Mulert et al. 
(2011) 
N = 18 schizophrenia patients with AVHs 
(DSM-IV) 
(all on antipsychotic medication) 
 
N = 16 healthy subjects 
EEG 
task-related 
(auditory steady-
state paradigm) 
 
-  reduced interhemispheric phase-locking in the gamma-band frequency range 
- positive correlation between phase synchronisation between the primary auditory cortices and 
auditory hallucination symptom score and  
 
Lee et al. 
(2006) 
N = 25 schizophrenia patients with AVHs  
N = 23 schizophrenia patients without 
AVHs (DSM-IV) 
 
(all on antipsychotic medication) 
 
EEG 
Resting state/  
symptom capture (?) 
- significantly increased beta activity in left inferior parietal lobule (beta 1) &  
left medial frontal gyrus (beta 2) in AVH vs. non-AVH patients 
- greater beta activation in left anterior and posterior regions in AVH-patients as compared to 
non-AVH patients 
- significant correlations between gamma and beta powers in AVH-patients 
 
 
Ćurčić-Blake et 
al. (2013) 
N=30 schizophrenia patients with AVHs 
N=17 schizophrenia patients without 
AVHs 
 
N=31 healthy subjects 
 
fMRI 
task-related 
(phonological task 
assumed to require 
inner speech) 
- reduced connection Wernicke‘s and Broca‘s area 
- trend towards reduced connection Broca‘s area + its homologue, as well as Wernicke‘s area‘s 
homologue 
Escartí et al. 
(2010) 
 
N=27 schizophrenia patients with AVHs  
N=14 without AVHs (DSM-IV) 
(all on antipsychotic medication) 
 
N=31 healthy subjects 
 
fMRI 
task-related 
(emotional word 
paradigm) 
- reduction in functional connectivity strength in fronto-parietal-temporal brain areas for the 
patient group as a whole 
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Table 2  
continued. 
   
Aguilar et al. 
(2008) 
N = 11 schizophrenia patients with AVHs 
(DSM-IV) 
N = 10 healthy subjects 
 
 
N = 18 schizophrenia with AVHs  
(DSM-IV)  
N = 19 healthy subjects 
 
(all patients on antipsychotic medication) 
fMRI 
(emotional vs. 
neutral word 
paradigm) 
 
MRI  
(voxel-based 
morphometry) 
 
- enhanced activation of limbic and frontal brain areas patients  
(inclusive the frontal lobe, temporal cortex, insula, cingulate gyrus, amygdala) 
 
- reduced gray matter concentration in patients in left inferior frontal gyrus, amygdala, insula, 
STG, and right postcentral gyrus  
 
 
 
van Tol et al. 
(2014) 
N=31 schizophrenia patients AVHs  
N= 20 schizophrenia patients without 
AVHs (DSM-IV) 
(N = 41 on antipsychotic medication)  
 
N=51 healthy subjects 
MRI 
resting-state 
- patients: lower STG gray matter volume (independent of hallucination presence) 
- voice-hearers vs. healthy controls = lower gray matter volume of left IFG & right 
hippocampal gyrus 
- voice-hearers vs. non-voice-hearers: lower volume of left putamen 
- voice-hearers vs. non-voice-hearers: higher white matter volume in postcentral gyrus 
(extending into superior parietal lobule & medial precuneus) 
 
Hubl et al. 
(2004) 
N = 13 schizophrenia patients with AVHs  
N = 13 schizophrenia patients without 
AVHs (ICD-10) 
(all but 2 on antipsychotic medication) 
 
N = 13 healthy subjects 
DTI - AVH-patients: significantly higher white matter directionality in lateral parts of 
temporoparietal section of arcuate fasciculus and parts of anterior corpus callosum 
Catani et al. 
(2011) 
N = 17 schizophrenia patients with AVHs  
N = 11 schizophrenia patients without 
AVHs (DSM-IV) 
(all but 3 on antipsychotic medication) 
  
N = 59 healthy subjects 
DTI - schizophrenia patients: bilateral reduction of fractional anisotropy in the arcuate fasciculi  
(specific to connections between posterior temporal & anterior regions in inferior frontal and 
parietal lobe) 
- AVH patients: reduction in FA in these tracts = highest + bilateral 
patients without AVH: reduction only reported on the left 
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Aguilar et al. (2008) take into account genetic factors proposing that specific genetic 
polymorphisms, that is, different forms in which a gene may exist, may dispose some 
individuals genetically to hear voices. Specifically, a gene related to the neuronal language 
system is proposed to be linked to temporal lobe abnormalities, which are assumed to increase 
the likeliness to experience voices. In addition, abnormal functioning of serotonin, a 
neurotransmitter related to the modulation of emotional responses that acts in the limbic system 
and frontal lobe, is assumed to modulate the emotional responses of voice-hearers to their 
voices. This abnormal functioning, the authors suggest, is due to a polymorphism of the 
serotonin gene which predisposes an individual for abnormal emotional responses to such 
experiences. Without explaining further how, the authors propose that cultural factors, 
moreover, influence the content of a voice. Taken together, Aguilar et al. (2008) claim that 
certain genetic polymorphisms make humans vulnerable to language disorders and abnormal 
emotional responses. Those vulnerabilities together, according to the authors, may be at the 
basis of voice-experiences that are further shaped by cultural influences. 
Similarly, Strik and Dierks (2004, 2008) assume that AVHs result from pathological 
functioning of functional brain systems related to language. They assume that AVHs can 
directly be attributed to a language loop spanning frontal and temporal brain regions including 
Broca‘s area, Wernicke‘s area, Heschl‘s gyrus and the arcuate fasciculus, the fibre bundle 
connecting those regions. They propose that the conscious experience of voice-hearing results 
from an abnormal activation of the primary auditory cortex usually only occurring in response 
to ―external‖ auditory stimuli. More specifically, they propose that in voice-hearers, besides the 
activation of Broca‘s and Wernicke‘s area, the additional activation of the left Heschl‘s gyrus 
leads to the experience of inner speech as an external acoustic stimulus, for example. 
Remember, however, that the Heschl‘s gyrus is not activated in all voice-hearers when they 
experience voices (van de Ven et al., 2005). Moreover, this proposal relies on the 
conceptualisation of voice-hearing as being ―similar to a real perception and [having a] 
subjective sense of being externally generated‖ (Strik & Dierks, 2008, p. 68), which is not true 
for all voice-experiences. 
4.4 Voice-hearing as compensatory phenomenon 
Strik and Dierks (2004), amongst others, have also proposed to conceptualise AVHs based on 
the concept of compensation. They regard deficits of receptive speech caused by a ―structural 
weakness of the sensory speech area‖ (p.373) as the primary deficit in voice-hearing. They 
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assume that such a structural weakness of Wernicke‘s area is caused by either genetic, 
environmental or genetic factors. In the case of AVHs, Strik and Dierks (2004) postulate, 
structural and functional impairments of the Wernicke‘s area (an area of ―speech reception‖) are 
tentatively compensated for by an overstimulation of this area. This overstimulation, according 
to the authors, is realised by the activation of the Broca‘s area (an area of ―speech production‖) 
that is connected with the Wernicke‘s area. 
Referring to studies examining neural oscillations in voice-hearers with schizophrenia 
diagnosis, it has also been proposed to conceptualise voice-hearing as a compensation 
mechanism of the brain (Sperling, Bleich, Maihöfner, & Reulbach, 2009). This proposal is 
based on previous findings of a general slowing of delta-theta activity in the temporal lobe in 
individuals with schizophrenia diagnoses, but increase of beta-activity in the temporal lobe 
during auditory hallucinations. AVHs, according to these authors, would then be a consequence 
of a self-healing mechanism of the brain, and in that sense adaptive processes and actually no 
sign of illness, but secondary to it. 
However, both proposals lack a specific proposal of how the putative compensation 
mechanisms compensate for the ―primary‖ deficit and why they are appropriate for 
compensating for them. Moreover, the conceptualisation of voice-hearing as a result of a brain 
disease or compensatory neuronal activity does neglect the personal meaning voices have for 
voice-hearers. Therefore it must be critically assessed that AVHs are merely epiphenomena of 
brain activity. Structural brain alterations, for example, do not constitute a necessary condition 
for the occurrence of a voice carrying a specific meaning for a voice-hearer. 
4.5 Voice-hearing as associated with impaired auditory processing 
As AVHs are often taken as auditory experiences lacking corresponding external stimulation, it 
has been probed whether abnormal auditory processing could be associated with those 
experiences. In these studies AVHs are conceptualised as resulting from or at least being 
associated with altered auditory processing. 
The reviewed studies provide some evidence for altered auditory processing on a 
neuronal level. During sound processing, reduced gamma-band synchrony between the left and 
the right primary auditory cortices (Heschl‘s gyri) was observed in schizophrenia patients when 
compared to healthy controls (Mulert et al., 2011). In the same study, a positive correlation 
between participants‘ scores on a measure of auditory hallucinations and phase synchronisation 
between the primary auditory cortices is reported. Considering neuronal oscillatory synchrony 
as reflecting functional coupling of brain areas, these results indicate a weakened coupling of 
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the left and right primary auditory cortex in voice-hearers with a schizophrenia diagnosis as 
compared to healthy controls. Within the voice-hearers group, those reporting more severe 
voice-experiences showed higher gamma-band synchronisation (Mulert et al., 2011). 
Also, differences in neuronal auditory processing of emotional stimuli were found 
between individuals diagnosed with chronic schizophrenia (and AVHs vs. no AVHs) and 
healthy controls in fMRI- and PET studies when they were presented with emotional words 
(Aguilar et al., 2008; Escartí et al., 2010; Horga, Fernández-Egea, et al., 2014). In a fMRI 
study, increased activity in the amygdala and hippocampal gyrus was found in voice-hearers 
with schizophrenia diagnosis when listening to emotional words when compared to the two 
control groups (Escartí et al., 2010). Additionally, in this study voice-hearers with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis showed a lack of activation in the insula compared to the other two 
groups. In another fMRI study, voice-hearers listened to emotional words, mimicking their 
voices‘ content as well as non-emotional words (Aguilar et al., 2008). Heightened activation 
during listening to emotional as compared to non-emotional words was found predominantly in 
the middle and superior temporal gyri. 
Likewise, heightened cerebral activity in limbic and paralimbic brain areas including the 
amygdala, hippocampus and superior temporal gyrus was reported for voice-hearers who 
listened to personalised auditory stimuli mimicking their voices‘ content  (Horga, Fernández-
Egea, et al., 2014). Furthermore, they reported heightened interactions between the amygdala 
and auditory brain regions in this group (as compared to healthy controls), as well as weakened 
connectivity between amygdala and prefrontal regions. This, according to the authors, could 
indicate an impaired top-down regulation of the amygdala by prefrontal cortices in voice-
hearers, which in turn might lead to an abnormal amygdalar modulation of auditory brain 
regions. 
It remains to be clarified if these results really point to a general emotional auditory 
processing abnormality in voice-hearers, or if they simply mirror the heightened emotional 
impact that hallucination-related speech has for voice-hearers. One should also be careful with 
inferring that a heightened activity of the amygdala is responsible for the emotional 
significance a voice-like stimulus carries for a voice-hearer. This emotional significance, of 
course, must be due to a personal meaning that a voice-experience has for a voice-hearer – a 
meaning that cannot be found on a subpersonal level of analysis. It does not seem to be 
surprising that due to this personal significance voice-hearers differ from non-voice-hearers in 
their response to stimuli resembling their voices. 
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Altered auditory processing has also been integrated in theoretical models of AVHs. 
Badcock (2010) proposes a parallel auditory pathways framework of voice-hearing which is 
based on the assumption that AVHs represent cases of false perceptions. The base of this 
framework is a model of ―normal‖ auditory perception stating a ―what‖ (ventral) and a ―where‖ 
(dorsal) pathway for auditory perception in the brain. Whereas the former is thought to be 
relevant for identifying sounds (e.g., specific voices), the latter is thought to be implicated in 
their localisation. The author proposes that abnormal activity in those pathways may be related 
to specific phenomenological features of AVHs. First, an abnormal activation of the ―what‖ 
pathway is proposed to be at the origin of an experience of auditory perception when 
corresponding external stimulation is absent. Impaired basic auditory processing is further 
proposed to result from impaired processing of prosody and therefore resulting in the 
prevalence of male voices reported by voice-hearers, as they are assumed to be acoustically less 
complex than female voices. On the other hand, altered functioning of the ―where‖ pathway is 
proposed to be related with the perceived source of a voice.  
Taken together, the approaches reviewed in this section are based on the assumption that 
a deficit in auditory processing, concerning speech in particular and auditory stimuli in general, 
might be related to the occurrence of AVHs.  
However, attempts to conceptualise AVHs in terms of auditory processing deficits pose 
several problems. First, it is unclear how exactly such deficits might be related with AVHs. 
Second, given the rich experiential features of voice-experiences, it seems unlikely that AVHs 
are simply a problem of ―hearing‖. Such an account would neglect the personal ―message-like‖ 
meaning voices use to carry for voice-hearers. Not lastly, there is evidence that a large part of 
voice-hearers does not literally have experiences of ―hearing‖ when they experience voices 
(e.g., Jones & Luhrmann, 2016).  
Table 3  
Overview over the reviewed studies regarding speech processing in voice-hearers. 
Authors (year) Participants Type of study Main results 
Escartí et al. 
(2010) 
 
N=27 schizophrenia patients 
with AVHs  
N=14 without AVHs  
(DSM-IV) 
(all on antipsychotic medication) 
 
N=31 healthy controls 
 
fMRI 
task-related 
(emotional word 
paradigm) 
- increase of activity in the parahippocampal gyrus 
and the amygdala  
during passive listening of emotional words in voice 
hearers 
- controls & schizophrenia patients without AVHs:  
increased activation in insula 
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Table 3 
continued. 
   
Aguilar et al. 
(2008) 
N = 11 schizophrenia patients 
with AVHs (DSM-IV) 
 
(all on antipsychotic medication) 
 
N = 10 healthy subjects 
 
fMRI 
(emotional vs. 
neutral word 
paradigm) 
 
- enhanced activation of limbic and frontal brain areas 
in patients during listening to emotional words 
(inclusive the frontal lobe, temporal cortex, insula, 
cingulate gyrus, amygdala) 
 
 
Horga, 
Fernández-Egea, 
et al. (2014) 
N = 9 remitted schizophrenia 
patients with previous AVHs 
(DSM-IV)  
(all on antipsychotic medication) 
 
N = 8 healthy subjects 
 
PET 
(personalised 
auditory stimuli 
mimicking voice‘s 
content) 
- heightened cerebral activity in limbic and paralimbic 
brain areas including the amygdala, hippocampus and 
superior temporal gyrus in the voice-hearers 
- heightened interactions between amygdala and 
auditory brain regions in remitted patients  
-weakened connectivity between amygdala and 
prefrontal regions in remitted patients 
 
4.6 “Bottom-up”, “top-down” – when there is an imbalance a voice slips in? 
Voice-experiences have also been conceptualised as resulting from altered ―bottom-up‖ 
processes, ―top-down‖ processes or an interaction of both by various authors. The terms 
―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ are quite vague and although widely used in neuroscientific and 
psychological literature, a definition of these terms is rarely provided and they are not used in a 
unique sense (Rauss & Pourtois, 2013). 
The terms‘ proposed significance for AVHs is partly due to the widespread assumption 
in neurocognitive approaches to AVHs that they constitute cases of (abnormal) perception. It is 
assumed that usually a smooth interplay of ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ processes warrant 
―normal‖ perceptual experiences (Krishnan, Fivaz, Kraus, & Keefe, 2011; Nazimek, Hunter, & 
Woodruff, 2012; Waters et al., 2012).  
An overview of the ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ factors proposed to play a role in 
AVHs is provided in Table 4. We will look at them closer now. 
4.6.1 Biological dis-regulations as starting point for voice-hearing 
It has been proposed that auditory signals produced by specific brain areas including the 
auditory cortex are at the origin of and assumed to provide the ―raw material‖ for voice-
experiences (Hugdahl, 2009; Waters et al., 2012), rather than inner speech or memories 
(Hugdahl, 2009). Voice-experiences here are thus considered inner hearing experiences rather 
than misattributed inner speech experiences (Hugdahl, 2009). Some authors, however, assume 
that if the auditory signal takes the form of inner speech or intrusive memories, there is an 
increased probability of it becoming a voice-hearing experience (Waters et al., 2012). The latter 
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propose that emotions may act as a trigger for and contribute to the maintenance of voice-
experiences. 
Similarly, but yet differently, it has been proposed that voice-experiences – besides an 
impairment of primary sensory processing of irrelevant auditory stimuli – might emerge due to 
spontaneous activity of the primary auditory cortex that can also be found healthy individuals 
(Alba-Ferrara, Fernyhough, Weis, Mitchell, & Hausmann, 2012). In both cases, by means of 
the STG, auditory signals are proposed to be ―integrated into a common percept‖ (Alba-Ferrara 
et al., 2012, p. 248). Hyperactivity of the secondary auditory cortex has also been proposed to 
be related to voice-hearing (Allen, Larøi, & Mcguire, 2008). 
 
Alba-Ferrara et al. (2012) focus explicitly on emotional prosody processing, and 
proposed that a failure of regulation of the amygdala (a brain region associated with emotion 
processing) by the prefrontal cortex might contribute to the negative valence prevailing in the 
voice-hearing experience of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia by drawing attention to 
negative aspects of prosody. It has also been proposed by others that hyperactivity of brain 
regions involved in emotion regulation may account for the emotional features of the voice-
hearing experience (Allen et al., 2008). Hugdahl (2009) and Waters et al. (2012) attempt to 
propose more complete models of how (faulty) ―top-down‖ processing on the ―source‖ auditory 
signal might contribute to the development of voice-experiences. 
 
The supposed auditory signals are assumed to be failed to be controlled due to a faulty 
functioning of brain regions related to cognitive control processes – the prefrontal and anterior 
cingulate cortex (Hugdahl, 2009). A shift of attention towards the auditory signal or voice, 
mediated by the parietal cortex, is then assumed to lead to a self-perpetuating loop of 
rumination strengthening voice-experiences. Altered glutamate transmission is proposed as a 
possible mediator for the disturbance of ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ balance in processing 
(Hugdahl, 2009). Building on this amongst other proposed models, it was further proposed that 
a range of ―top-down‖ processes produce a voice-hearing experience‘s complexity regarding 
content, form and meaning. Waters et al. (2012) assume that the likelihood of detecting and 
accepting a signal as real is heightened in individuals with voice-hearing experience: the 
therefore detected signal is then failed to be inhibited by the voice-hearer, and assumed to 
become autonomous. 
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Table 4  
Overview of “bottom-up” and “top-down” factors proposed to play a role in voice-hearing. 
“Top-down” factors  
and processes 
Failure of inhibitory cognitive control due to altered functioning of prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex (Hugdahl, 2009; Waters et al., 2012) 
 
Attention shift (towards the voice) mediated by the parietal cortex (Hugdahl, 2009) 
 
Heightened perceptual sensitivity (Waters et al., 2012; Vercammen et al., 2008) 
 
Expectations (Seal et al., 2004):   Perceptual (Waters et al., 2012) 
 
Hypervigilance bias (Waters et al., 2012) 
 
Impaired emotional prosody processing due to a lack of prefrontal inhibitory control of the amygdala (Alba-Ferrara et al., 2012) 
 
Delusions/delusional beliefs (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007; Seal et al., 2004; van der Gaag, 2006; Waters et al., 2012) 
 
Response biases (Seal et al., 2004):  Positive / liberal acceptance (Moritz & Larøi, 2006; Vercammen et al., 2008) 
                                                      Externalising 
 
False metacognitive beliefs about the controllability of thoughts (Moritz & Larøi, 2006) 
 
Gain from illness and self-serving biases (Moritz & Larøi, 2006) 
 
“Bottom-up” and  
primary factors  
and processes 
 
Auditory cortex hyperactivity (Hugdahl, 2009; Waters et al., 2012):    ―Hyperactivation in functional networks involving the auditory cortex‖ (Waters et al., 
2012, p.688)                 
                                                                                                             Perception caused by activity in speech regions in the left hemisphere (Hugdahl, 2009) 
 
Spontaneous auditory cortex activity (Alba-Ferrara et al., 2012) 
Neurotransmitter dysregulation (van der Gaag, 2006) 
 
Neurophysiological defices (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007) 
 
Impaired verbal self-monitoring (Seal et al., 2004) 
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The authors additionally propose that the content of a voice is formed by factors such 
as perceptual expectations and knowledge. The meaning of the voice-experiences is further 
assumed to be determined by a complex system of delusional and other beliefs. Over time, 
expectations about such experiences and a hypervigilance bias are assumed to turn it more 
likely that such experiences will re-occur (Waters et al., 2012). 
The role of delusional beliefs in the formation of voice-experiences and their 
maintenance has also been put forward by others that propose different ―bottom-up‖ processes 
as the basis for voice-experiences (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007; van der Gaag, 2006). 
Whereas some claim that the interaction of delusional beliefs with abnormal 
neurophysiological (and associated cognitive) functioning ultimately leads to the 
misperception of inner experiences as stemming from external sources (Heinks-Maldonado et 
al., 2007), others argue that delusional beliefs go along with an ―overinvolvement‖ in voices 
and are in that sense secondary (van der Gaag, 2006). Van der Gaag (2006), furthermore, 
proposes that a ―bottom-up‖ biological dis-regulation leading to a hyperdopaminergic state in 
mesolimbic pathways is at the origin of voice-experiences. This is assumed to lead to a 
perception of (aspects of) the world as more ―salient‖ and personally significant and to trigger 
hallucinations. These aberrant experiences, according to the model, are then tried to be 
explained in a meaningful way by ―top-down‖ thinking processes. However, due to a range of 
cognitive biases, such as an externalisation bias – the tendency to ascribe events to external 
entities rather than to oneself – these attempts are assumed to be impaired. Then, these 
(impaired) thinking processes may ultimately make a voice-hearing experience a voice-
hearing experience. Although the author refers to the role of inner speech in AVHs, it remains 
open how this fits into the model. 
4.6.2 Empirical evidence for “bottom-up”-“top-down” models of voice-hearing 
In fact it has been found that voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis have a higher 
perceptual sensitivity to speech stimuli than individuals with schizophrenia diagnosis but 
without AVHs (Vercammen, de Haan, & Aleman, 2008). In this study, voice-hearers in a task, 
where they had to indicate if they heard a certain word that was presented in background 
noise so that it was hardly perceptible but still audible, indicated more often to have heard this 
word. Both groups with schizophrenia diagnosis in this study, however, showed lower 
perceptual sensitivity than healthy participants. Moreover, voice-hearers tended to state more 
often with a high degree of confidence that they had heard a certain word in the noise, when 
this specific word was not presented in the noise, which was interpreted as a positive response 
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bias or liberal acceptance of the presence of a stimulus (Vercammen et al., 2008). The authors 
propose that their results might be accounted for by an attentional bias in speech perception.  
In that vein, it has been proposed that an imbalance between ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-
down‖ factors in the sense of a prevalence of ―top-down‖ factors, such as perceptual 
expectations, leads to a reduction of influences from ―bottom-up‖ sensory information and 
consequently may trigger voice-hearing perceptual experiences, in which no one is speaking 
(Daalman, Verkooijen, Derks, Aleman, & Sommer, 2012). However, the authors found 
evidence for the influence of ―top-down‖ semantic expectations only in healthy voice-hearers, 
but not in voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis. As compared to healthy controls, non-
clinical voice-hearers indicated more often to have heard a (due to a sentence‘s context) 
predictable word, where an unpredictable word was presented or no word was presented at all 
in the sentence. That was not the case for voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis who did 
not differ from either of the groups in terms of such ―top-down‖ errors. Thus, this study 
indicated that abnormal ―top-down‖ processing might play a role in voice-hearing in non-
psychotic but not in psychotic individuals and there might be different cognitive mechanisms 
underlying voice-hearing in psychotic and nonpsychotic individuals (Daalman et al., 2012). 
Using a different methodology, others have also proposed that ―top-down‖ factors play 
a critical role in AVHs (Moritz & Larøi, 2008). By means of an online survey they compared 
sensory (e.g., loudness) and cognitive (e.g., control) features of thoughts, intrusions and 
voices. Interestingly, they found that only a minority of (self-reported) schizophrenia patients 
experience their voices as being as loud as external voices. Additionally, they report various 
similarities between reported sensory and cognitive features of thoughts, intrusions and 
voices. The authors therefore conclude that AVHs are unlikely a ―pure‖ disorder of input or 
―bottom-up‖ processes (e.g., auditory cortex hyperactivity), although voice-hearers in their 
study reported more vividness and loudness also of intrusions and ―normal‖ thoughts, which, 
they propose, might contribute to the vulnerability for AVHs. Moritz and Larøi (2008) 
propose that ―top-down‖ processes including ―false metacognitive beliefs about the 
controllability of thoughts, liberal acceptance, gain from illness and self-serving biases‖ 
(p.105) contribute to the experience of voices. Thus, voice-hearers may, in varying 
combinations, not take their thoughts as controllable, and more readily attribute internal 
events to external agents. To accept that their experience stems from an external agent, the 
authors hypothesise, might be a more appealing choice for a voice-hearer than to conclude to 
―suffer[…] from voice-hearing‖ (p.104). 
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Table 5 
Overview over the reviewed studies regarding “top-down”/“bottom-up” factors in voice-hearing. 
Authors (year) Participants Type of study Main results 
Vercammen et 
al. (2008) 
N = 15 schizophrenia patients 
with AVHs 
N = 15 schizophrenia patients  
without AVHs 
N = 17 healthy subjects 
(DSM-IV) 
Behavioural 
(speech 
discrimination task) 
- lower perceptual sensitivity in schizophrenia 
patients as a whole 
 
- patients with AVHs (vs. without AVHs) indicated 
more often to have heard a word in background noise  
 
- patients with AVHs tended to state more often with 
a high degree of confidence that they had heard a 
certain word in the noise, when this specific word 
was not presented in the noise  
 
Daalman et al. 
(2012) 
N = 40 psychotic patients with 
AVHs 
(most on antipsychotic 
medication) 
N = 40 non-psychotic individuals 
with AVHs  
(one on antipsychotic 
medication) 
N = 40 healthy subjects.  
 
(of patients: 62.5% paranoid 
schizophrenia, 15% 
schizoaffective disorder 22.5% 
with psychosis not otherwise 
specified) 
 
Behavioural 
(semantic expectation 
task) 
- evidence the influence of ―top-down‖ semantic 
expectations only in healthy voice-hearers  
 
- compared to healthy controls, non-clinical voice-
hearers indicated more often to have heard a (due to a 
sentence‘s context) predictable word, where an 
unpredictable one or no word was presented  
Moritz and 
Larøi (2008) 
N = 45 subjects with 
schizophrenia diagnosis,  
N = 55 subjects with obsessive–
compulsive disorder diagnosis 
N = 60 healthy subjects 
Online survey 
(comparison of 
sensory & cognitive 
features of thoughts, 
intrusions & voices) 
- minority of schizophrenia patients report their 
voices as being as loud as external voices 
- various similarities between reported sensory and 
cognitive features of thoughts, intrusions and voices 
- individuals with AVHs reported more vividness and 
loudness of intrusions and ―normal‖ thoughts  
 
Although the proposed ―bottom-up‖-―top-down‖ models go beyond conceptions of 
AVHs as a ―brain-disease‖ by including processes on a phenomenal level, such as delusional 
beliefs, they are unsatisfactory regarding several points. 
It is, for example, to be questioned if there is an ―auditory signal‖ on an experiential 
level that is first shaped and filled with content and attributed to someone else. We might 
argue that this is not the case, as the experience of a ―voice‖ can rather be assumed to be 
immediate and not a ―raw‖ auditory signal that is shaped until becoming a voice.  
One may argue that the misattribution process occurs on a subpersonal, unconscious 
level, and only when the sound is misattributed it is experienced as an ―alien‖ voice, but this 
explanation would bring with it other problems: on a subpersonal level, we will not find any 
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subject that could misattribute a ―signal‖. There arguably is no homunculus in a voice-
hearer‘s brain that interprets auditory signals and decides if they are self-generated or not.  
Also, why a voice‘s content is emotional for a specific voice-hearer can arguably not 
be explained in terms of amygdala activity, but only by taking into account his/her life events 
and the meaning he/she ascribes to them. 
Likewise, we might ask: where does this postulated hyper-activation of the auditory 
cortex come from? And if it is spontaneous, why are voice-experiences not random? 
4.7 Self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing 
Self-monitoring accounts are amongst the most popular attempts to explain voice-experiences. 
Seal, Aleman, and McGuire (2004) assign impaired self-monitoring to a type of ―bottom-up‖ 
role in the generation of voice-experiences in the sense of forming the basic deficit at the 
origin of voice-experiences20.  In contrast, Allen, Larøi, & Mcguire (2008) consider faulty 
monitoring as associated with abnormal functioning of anterior cingulate, premotor, prefrontal 
and cerebellar brain areas as a ―top-down‖ influence on hyper-activation of the secondary 
auditory cortex in voice-hearers.  
 
Self-monitoring refers to the ability to distinguish between sensations that result from 
self-generated actions and those that are not generated by oneself (e.g., Sapara, ffytche, 
Cooke, Williams, & Kumari, 2015). It is generally assumed to occur at a preconscious level, 
that is, usually we do not have to wonder reflectively about the origin of a sensation. The 
basic idea is that sensory feedback due to self-initiated acts is predictable and thus anticipated. 
Furthermore it is assumed that, as sensory feedback resulting from self-initiated acts is 
predicted, becomes irrelevant and is therefore attenuated. Put differently, predicted sensory 
feedback is proposed to be subtracted from received sensory feedback (e.g., Blakemore, 
Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 2000). Self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing are 
probably the most prominent approaches to voice-hearing in neuroscientific literature about 
AVHs. 
Applied to AVHs, the idea is that motor commands (e.g., during speech production) in 
the nervous system are accompanied by efference copies – ―messages‖ to sensory brain 
regions causing a corollary discharge signalling that a motor act is self-generated, and thus 
                                                 
20 Note that verbal self-monitoring itself as a kind of a predictive coding process can be conceptualised as a ―top-down‖ 
process on the monitored action. ―Bottom-up‖, thus, in this context is used in the sense of primary or at the basis of the 
formation of voice-experiences.  
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allowing to distinguish self-generated actions from actions that are not self-generated 
(Feinberg, 1978). In consequence, neural activity in sensory brain regions processing speech 
is assumed to be attenuated (Figure 8). Under the premise that thoughts can be considered 
motor acts (as first proposed by Frith & Done, 1988), in neuroscientific approaches to voice-
hearing, this explanation is widely transferred to the level of thought and used to explain how 
own thoughts or inner speech can be experienced as voices. Self-monitoring accounts of 
voice-hearing are usually centered around the impairment of the prediction of a specific type 
of mental phenomenon, namely inner speech (Figure 9). That is why self-monitoring accounts 
of voice-hearing are often referred to as ―inner-speech‖ models of voice-hearing.  
 
Before reviewing results from empirical studies about self-monitoring in voice-
hearers, we will examine some recently proposed variants of self-monitoring models of voice-
hearing. 
4.7.1 Variants of self-monitoring models of voice-hearing 
Seal et al. (2004) propose that faulty self-monitoring during inner speech production 
constitutes the primary neurocognitive deficit, accounting for the ―generation of AVHs, as 
opposed to the experience of AVHs‖ (p.64). More specifically, they propose that 
schizophrenia patients are predisposed to experience voices as a result of psychosocial factors, 
such as isolation or high levels of stress. ―Some trigger event‖ (p.66), they further assume, 
leads to AVH-generation and consequently to the issueing of motor commands and production 
of inner speech. While self-monitoring is assumed to be a preconscious process, it is 
suggested that it can be influenced by ―top-down‖ processes, such as a bias to attribute 
―unfamiliar or unrecognized material‖ (Seal et al., 2004, p. 60) to an external source, 
delusional beliefs and expectations. Voice-hearing is, hence, conceptualised as 
misinterpretation of a breakdown of the self-monitoring system. Seal et al. (2004) propose 
that voices are usually experienced as unintended as the ―feed forward information‖ (p.64) 
consisting of an efference copy about the issued motor command (of e.g., inner speech 
production) does not reach the comparator, which they assume to consist of a parietal-
cerebellar network. Consequently, the ―sensory information‖ (p.64) fails to be modulated so 
that the person ultimately perceives self-generated actions as not self-generated. When 
experienced, the voice if further assumed to be subject to the voice-hearer‘s appraisal. 
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Figure 8 Schematic illustration of a "normal" neuronal self-
monitoring of inner speech according to the proposed 
efference copy/corollary discharge mechanism of self-
monitoring. 
 
Figure 9 Schematic illustration of the proposed efference copy/corollary discharge mechanism of self-monitoring 
described in the text. In auditory verbal hallucinations, the efference copy/corollary discharge mechanism of self-
monitoring is assumed to go awry. There are various possibilities how this proposed mechanism could be 
malfunctioning: the efference copy could be absent or late (left picture) or the corollary discharge itself could be 
impaired (right picture). 
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Jones and Fernyhough (2007b) propose a different application of the comparator-
model to AVHs in which no feeling of unintendedness that needs to be resolved is required. 
They propose that, based on a motor command for inner speech, ―the brain either produces a 
degraded predicted state or fails to produce a predicted state at all‖ (p.394). They suppose that 
due to the lack of the predicted state and the resulting lack of contiguity between predicted 
action and actual action, no self-authorship emotion is felt. At the same time, this mismatch 
between predicted state and actual state, according to the proposed model, would lead to the 
experience of an emotion of other-authorship.  
The same authors propose a Vygotskian approach to inner speech in order to explain 
voice-hearing phenomena (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a). Following Vygotsky, they assume 
that inner speech and thought develop as a kind of verbal self-regulation that is derived from 
dialogues taking place in the social world. Before reconstructing dialogues as inner speech or 
thought on the ―intrapsychological plane‖ (p.147), in an intermediate step children in the form 
of private speech lead dialogical communications with themselves. However, it is assumed 
that characteristics of external dialogue are preserved in inner speech. The ability to use inner 
speech, thus, goes along with the ability to take the positions ―of others‖ towards themselves. 
Consequently, inner speech phenomena are not only assumed to have social origin but also to 
retain dialogical characteristics, allowing for the occurrence of AVHs.  
4.7.2 Empirical evidence for self-monitoring models of voice-hearing 
Self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing have been the target of both behavioural and 
neurophysiological research (Figure 11). In behavioural studies, participants usually listen to 
spoken language and have to decide whether they have heard their own or someone else‘s 
voice. In these tasks, participants listen to speech stimuli consisting either of their own or 
someone else‘s voice, whereby the voice‘s pitch is sometimes altered. The participants are 
instructed to identify their own voice as their own even when it is altered. 
Johns et al. (2001) instructed their participants to read adjectives aloud and at the same 
time played back either their own or someone else‘s (distorted or non-distorted) voice uttering 
the same adjective. In their study, they compared schizophrenia patients with delusions and 
AVHs, schizophrenia patients with delusions but without AVHs and healthy controls. They 
found that patients as a whole attributed their own distorted voice more often to someone else 
or were unsure about its source. Patients with AVHs, in particular, attributed their voice more 
 62 
 
often to someone else and did so more often when the heard adjective was of derogatory 
content. 
Similarly, Ilankovic et al. (2011) found that schizophrenia patients with delusions and 
AVHs mistook their own altered voice more often as produced by others than healthy 
controls. They did not include schizophrenia patients without AVHs. Also, in contrast to Johns 
et al. (2001), participants in Ilankovic et al.‘s (2011) study listened to recorded stimuli and 
were not actively speaking during the task. Note that due to these methodological differences 
it cannot be excluded that the two studies examine different forms of self-monitoring. In the 
first study (Johns et al., 2001), participants have to monitor sensations resulting from actions 
they are carrying out at the moment (speaking), whereas in the second study participants have 
to monitor sensations stemming from actions that they have carried out in the past (speech 
recordings) (Ilankovic et al., 2011). 
Table 6  
Overview over the reviewed studies regarding verbal self-monitoring in voice-hearers. 
Authors (year) Participants Type of study Main results 
Johns et al. 
(2001) 
N = 10 schizophrenia patients with 
AVHs & delusions 
N = 8 schizophrenia patients with 
delusions but no AVHs 
(DSM-IV)  
 
all on antipsychotic medication 
 
N = 20 healthy subjects 
Behavioural 
(participants 
actively 
speaking) 
- patients as a whole attributed their own distorted 
voice more often to someone else/were unsure 
about its source  
- patients with AVHs attributed their voice more 
often to someone else  
+ did so more often heard adjective of derogatory 
content 
Ilankovic et al. 
(2011) 
N = 23 schizophrenia with AVHs & 
delusions 
  
all on antipsychotic medication 
 
N = 23 healthy subjects 
Behavioural 
(recorded voice) 
- schizophrenia patients with delusions & attributed 
their own distorted voice more often to someone 
else 
Heinks-
Maldonado et 
al. (2007) 
N = 20 schizophrenia patients  
(DSM-IV) 
 
all on antipsychotic medication  
 
N = 17 healthy subjects 
EEG 
behavioural 
 
- schizophrenia patients and especially those with 
AVHs experience, made more errors (e.g. 
classifying an alien voice as one‘s own). 
Ford et al.  
(2007) 
N = 24 patients with schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder (DSM-IV) 
 
all on antipsychotic medication  
 
N = 25 healthy subjects 
EEG 
 
greater intertrial coherence preceding talking than 
listening (in both groups, but stronger in controls) 
 
Neurophysiological research regarding self-monitoring has focused on the N1-component of 
the auditory ERP. This component refers to the voltage observable approximately 100ms after 
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the occurrence of an auditory stimulus. Remember that ERPs have been assumed to go along 
with specific cognitive processes. In fact, ERPs have been shown to be altered in individuals 
with schizophrenia diagnosis reporting voice-hearing. Specifically, the N1-component has 
been proposed to reflect the effects of expectation, with its amplitude being enhanced (i.e., 
more negative) in response to an unexpected (compared to expected) stimulus (Sur & Sinha, 
2009). Thus, it should be dampened for self-generated stimuli such as self-produced speech, 
as they can be expected (Figure 10).  
In fact, the N1-component of the auditory ERP has been shown to be smaller during 
talking (and simultaneously listening) compared to passively listening to the own (recorded) 
voice feedback (uttering the syllable ―ah‖) as well as conditions in which an alien voice is 
played back or the own voice feedback is altered in healthy participants (Ford, Roach, 
Faustman, & Mathalon, 2007; Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007). Interestingly, although this 
effect was not absent in schizophrenia patients with AVHs, it was significantly smaller, that is, 
the N1-component of the auditory  ERP during talking was less dampened in that group and 
this effect was more pronounced in the left hemisphere (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007). 
These group differences were not observed when participants listened to their own or to an 
altered or non-altered alien voice, without speaking, that is, when the stimulus could not be 
expected due to concurrent speech production. Moreover, when judging if the heard voice was 
one‘s own or an alien voice, schizophrenia patients, especially those with AVHs, made more 
errors (e.g., classifying an alien voice as one‘s own). 
 
The authors interpret the N1-dampening observed during talking as compared to 
listening in individuals without psychiatric diagnoses as a sign of a well-functioning forward-
model system, and consequently voice-hearing as associated with a dis-function of the 
forward-model system. 
The concept of synchrony has also been discussed in the context of self-monitoring 
theories. It has been hypothesised that neural oscillatory synchrony preceding an action is 
related to sensory suppression going along with sensations resulting from self-generated 
actions, that are thought to be reflected by the N1 suppression effect (Ford et al., 2007). The 
reasoning behind this hypothesis is that the supposed forward-model system requires 
―communication‖ between motor and sensory brain regions and this ―communication‖ is 
proposed to be associated with synchronous oscillations between those regions. 
 64 
 
  
 
Ford et al. (2007) provided support for this hypothesis by showing that pre-speech synchrony 
in the lower frequency range (inter-trial oscillatory phase synchronisation before speech 
utterances) was associated with the dampening of the N1-component during talking as 
compared to listening to the own recorded voice in individuals without psychiatric diagnoses. 
Although voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis also showed pre-speech synchrony, this 
synchrony was reduced as compared to individuals without psychiatric diagnoses and not 
related to N1-suppression. 
In a recent proposal (Whitford, Ford, Mathalon, Kubicki, & Shenton, 2012), the 
aforementioned concept of synchrony is used in yet another sense, the authors referring to 
temporal synchrony of a corollary discharge and the event at its origin. The authors suggest 
that in individuals experiencing voices, corollary discharges occur asynchronously with the 
neuronal event being at their origin. They propose that this temporal dis-coordination occurs 
due to abnormal frontal myelination resulting in conduction delays. As a consequence 
(augmented) activity of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain are used to explain why 
insignificant events become salient and may give rise to hallucinations. 
Figure 10 (Taken from Ford & Mathalon, 2005). N1-component of the event-
related auditory potential while talking as compared to listening in healthy 
controls and schizophrenia patients. While healthy controls show a dampening 
of the N1-component during talking as compared to listening, no dampening of 
the N1- component during talking as compared to listening was observed for 
schizophrenic patients. 
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Figure 11 Investigation of self-monitoring in voice-hearers on different levels of analysis. On a 
neurophysiological level, faulty self-monitoring of self-produced (inner) speech is assumed to be indicated by a 
diminished dampening of the N1-component of the auditory ERP in response to hearing one‘s own voice. On a 
behavioural level, the self-monitoring hypothesis of AVHs has been tested by asking voice-hearers to classify 
heard speech as self-produced or produced by someone else. The (mis-)classification of own speech as produced 
by someone else is considered as an indicator for mal-functioning self-monitoring. Applied to AVHs it is 
proposed that voice-hearers due to an impaired neurophysiological self-monitoring mechanism experience their 
own inner speech as speech of, for example, an external agent.  
 
Summarising, the reviewed studies provide some evidence for altered verbal self-
monitoring in voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis at different levels of analysis (see 
Figure 11). In self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing, voice-hearing is conceptualised as 
being, at least partly, due to the absent or delayed prediction of self-generated stimuli.  
 Although such accounts offer interesting points of departure, they are certainly not 
sufficient for conceptualising AVHs. Also they raise a series of questions. Self-monitoring 
accounts of voice-hearing seem to implicitly suggest that if only the perceived voice would be 
recognised as one‘s own, if only the supposed corollary discharge would take place at the 
right time and inner speech would be predicted, the problem of voice-hearing would be 
solved. Is that the case?  
Arguably, it is not that easy. In fact, there is reason to assume that a substantial group 
of individuals experiencing voices actually do consider their experiences as generated by 
themselves, which is not contrary to them experiencing voices as coming from an external 
source (Leudar, & al., 1997). That leads us to the question: why should we, due to a lack of 
sensory attenuation resulting from an abnormal self-monitoring mechanism, experience inner 
speech as coming from an external entity? Moreover, if we adopt the controversial assumption 
that inner speech has acoustical properties and that these properties are similar to our own 
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voice, why do individuals experiencing voices usually report hearing other person‘s voices 
and not themselves speaking out loud?  
Moreover, it is now widely acknowledged that reducing distress caused by voice-
experiences is not so much a question of eliminating this experience per se, but of integrating 
it into the person‘s life in a meaningful way (e.g., Pérez-Álvarez, García-Montes, Perona-
Garcelán, & Vallina-Fernández, 2008), as illustrated by the quote of the following person: 
―The turning point, for me, came when I recognised that the voices carried messages about 
my past and present experiences […] I was actually finding ways of interacting with parts of 
myself that I had spent a lifetime blocking out and denying‖ (Waddingham, 2012). Therefore, 
it has to be questioned if postulated self-monitoring deficits per se should constitute a core 
role in a conception of voice-hearing or put differently, if such a conception implies practical 
consequences for individuals suffering from their voices.  
 
Whereas self-monitoring accounts focus on the prediction of stimuli that result from 
self-generated actions, other predictive coding accounts of voice-hearing assume predictive 
coding as a general operation principle of the brain, not restricted to self-generated stimuli. 
4.8 Predictive processing accounts of voice-hearing 
Nazimek, Hunter, and Woodruff (2012) attempt to explain voice-hearing within a hierarchical 
predictive-coding framework, in order to ―fill the gap‖ (p.804) between self-monitoring and 
auditory-perceptual models of voice-hearing. They propose that an exchange of information 
between the prefrontal cortex and the auditory cortex ultimately leads to a voice-hearing 
experience. More specifically, it is proposed that a preconscious vague ―prediction of an 
auditory object‖ (Nazimek, Hunter, & Woodruff, 2012, p.808) is generated by the prefrontal 
cortex which is then transmitted to the thalamus and auditory cortex, thus biasing their 
activity. In turn, the thalamus is thought to send information that matches the received 
prediction to the auditory cortex and prefrontal cortex. This would strengthen the initial 
prediction, which would again be sent back by the prefrontal cortex in a more concrete form 
to thalamus and auditory cortex. Random activation in the auditory cortex in addition to its 
anticipatory activity is further proposed to play a role in triggering a voice-hearing 
experience. More specifically, the activation of particular auditory cortex association areas is 
proposed to account for specific features of a voice-hearing experience, such as for example 
the perceived gender of a voice. Such processes, in turn, are proposed to contribute to the 
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concretisation of the prediction and, together with the anticipatory activation of the auditory 
cortices, might lead to a final percept, that is, the voice that is ultimately heard. 
Krishnan, Fivaz, Kraus, and Keefe (2011) propose a model of voice-hearing within 
their general theory of brain functioning. They attempt to account for AVHs in terms of a 
general deficit of neuronal hierarchical temporal processing in psychosis. The proposed 
hierarchical temporal processing deficit is assumed to manifest itself in disturbed 
communication between cortex layers.  This deficit is assumed to be a trait of individuals with 
psychosis. The disturbed neuronal communication, in turn, is assumed to hinder ―memory-
based prediction of perception‖ (p.136). More precisely, Krishnan et al. (2011) propose that in 
the course of perception the input is stepwise passed on to the next higher cortical layer 
comparing this input with stored memories, and, in turn passes back expectations about the 
subsequent experience until a match is achieved. Additionally, with new experiences new 
memory representations are assumed to be created and stored in higher cortical layers. This 
process is assumed to be deficient in AVHs: as the generation and storage of memory 
representations is deficient the interpretation of an incoming stimulus is faulty and that is 
what is assumed to open up the ―opportunity for arbitrary internally generated interpretations 
of reality to intrude on perception and thought‖ (p.136). Consequently, ―an accumulation of 
inaccurate but internally meaningful perceptions‖ (p.136) may occur, creating the foundation 
for voice-experiences. A range of biological processes that could be at the basis of these 
impairments is proposed by the authors. An explanation of how exactly, in the end, voice-
experiences come about, is not provided. 
Another author states that AVHs are explainable within a predictive processing 
framework (Wilkinson, 2014). In his opinion, the brain‘s principal task is to identify the 
source of incoming signals. It does so, he further proposes, based on a hypothesis about the 
incoming signal, its match with the incoming signal and the statistical likelihood of the 
hypothesis about the incoming signal being true. If a hypothesis is kept, in this framework 
depends on its utility of predicting incoming signals. Suppose that the brain‘s hypothesis does 
not match the actual input, that is, a prediction error occurs, then it will be discarded. Taken 
together, the brain‘s job is then to minimise prediction errors and the hypothesis minimising 
prediction error, is what constitutes conscious perception and experience in general. 
Applying this framework to AVHs, the ―voice heard‖ would be the conscious percept 
and thus a voice-hearer‘s brain best hypothesis, that is, the one best minimising prediction 
error, or to put it in the authors words: ―applied to AVHs, your experience will have auditory 
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phenomenology if your brain has had to adopt the hypothesis that you are hearing something 
in order to minimise prediction error‖ (Wilkinson, 2014, p.149). This account, as Wilkinson 
(2014) emphasises, does not necessitate the assumption of the transformation of a ―raw 
material‖ such as inner speech in order to account for AVHs. Within this framework, 
Wilkinson (2014) proposes to account for inner speech, memory and hypervigilance 
hallucinations. 
 Put simple, Wilkinson (2014) proposes that in the case of inner speech and memory 
AVHs due to errors in predictive processing the voice-hearer‘s brain follows an erroneous 
hypothesis. It is proposed that when actually neuronal activity associated with inner speech or 
episodic memory is going on, the voice-hearer‘s brain hypothesises that there is no inner 
speech or memory going on, but something different, namely hearing a voice, is going on 
(Wilkinson, 2014). As in the proposed framework it is exactly this hypothesis that constitutes 
conscious experience, the person will, then, hear a voice. In this framework, hypervigilance 
hallucinations that, in contrast to inner speech and memory hallucinations are assumed to 
result from misinterpretations of external events, are explained in terms of a biased selection 
of a hypothesis of the brain. The brain of a voice-hearer that is hypervigilant regarding insults, 
for example, might be biased to select the hypothesis of hearing an insult to account for 
incoming sensory input in a noisy environment even if there is no one who in fact insults the 
voice-hearer. Consequently, if the brain selects the (erroneous) hypothesis of hearing an 
insult, the individual will have the experience of hearing an insult.  
Horga, Peterson, et al. (2014) found hints for a deficient predictive coding related to 
voice-hearing in a fMRI study comparing voice-hearers with schizophrenia or related 
diagnoses and healthy controls. This conclusion was derived from the analysis of brain 
activity during a task designed to elicit differences in predictive coding mechanisms at a 
neuronal level. In this task, participants had to decide if they heard speech or not, whereby the 
probability and thus the predictability of hearing speech was manipulated. In order to interpret 
the obtained data, the authors applied a predictive-coding algorithm, which they compared to 
a feature detection model. As the predictive coding algorithm (based on the premise that 
neural activity results from a weighted activity of prediction and prediction error signals 
(Egner, Monti, & Summerfield, 2010) explained more variance as a feature detection model 
(based on the assumption that neuronal signals consist in passive reactions to stimuli), the 
authors conclude that deficient predictive coding may account for the observed (hyper-
)activity in the auditory cortex during voice-experiences in the participants with AVHs –  
observed in the same study – and that it may be this activity that leads to voice-hearing. The 
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predictive coding algorithm explained 27% of the variance in voice-hearing related brain 
activity, whereas the feature detection model explained 19% of it. 
Taken together, the reviewed predictive coding accounts of AVHs vary substantially in 
how they conceptualise such phenomena: whereas Nazimek et al. (2012) attempt to integrate 
self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing into their model, Wilkinson (2014) explicitly 
contrasts his account to self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing. Whereas Krishnan et al. 
(2011) assume that inaccurate internally stored perceptions might constitute the material for 
AVHs, Wilkinson‘s (2014) framework does not need the transformation of raw material, 
proposing that it is the brain‘s hypothesis about what is going on what constitutes a conscious 
experience.  
The reviewed predictive coding accounts, very much like self-monitoring accounts, 
rely on the assumption that AVHs are a consequence of a mal-functioning brain. So, is it the 
brain that produces voices? What do voice-hearers‘ brains predict and do they predict 
anything at all? We will come back to these questions in the general discussion. 
4.9 Memory-models of voice-hearing 
A different approach to AVHs conceptualises these experiences as consisting of 
unintentionally activated memories of speech (Waters, Badcock, Michie, & Maybery, 2006) 
or at least partly being due to impaired memory processes (Brébion, Bressan, Ohlsen, & 
David, 2013). Note, that memory hallucinations have also been attempted to be explained by 
other reviewed models (see, for example Wilkinson, 2014, last section). 
Based on the existing literature and their research, Waters et al. (2006) propose that 
AVHs are a consequence of a failure in intentional inhibition, which they regard as the 
deliberate suppression of activated cognitive contents that are decided to be irrelevant. Voices, 
they propose, are at least to some extent constituted by memories of speech that are failed to 
be inhibited. However, the authors suppose that at least one other factor is necessary for the 
formation of AVHs. More specifically, they propose that individuals with schizophrenia have 
difficulties to access context information of the memories and these difficulties are at the basis 
of their hallucinations. Taken together, AVHs are proposed to be unintentionally activated 
auditory memories that are not recognised as one‘s own due to an impaired context memory.  
In fact, it has been reported that voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis have an 
impaired context memory as compared both to healthy controls without voice-hearing 
experience (Brébion et al., 2013) as well as healthy controls prone to hallucinate (Chhabra et 
al., 2013). However, the latter study found impaired memory binding as not being specific of 
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voice-hearers, as this deficit was also present in individuals with schizophrenia diagnosis who 
did not hear voices. Chhabra et al. (2013) used a memory-binding task, in order to investigate 
memory binding and its relation to voice-hearing in both schizophrenic and non-clinical 
voice-hearers as compared to schizophrenic and healthy non-voice-hearers. They presented 
the participants with auditory stimuli, namely two different words spoken by two different 
voices. Later in the task, participants had to decide if a spoken word they were now presented 
with corresponded to one of the formerly presented. Thus, participants had to bind content 
(word) and context (voice) in memory in order to successfully solve the task. In this study 
schizophrenia patients in general (irrespective of the presence of voice-experiences) 
performed worse than healthy controls. This pattern was not found for healthy voice-hearers. 
In Brébion et al.‘s (2013) study voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis showed an 
impairment in binding contextual features of memorised items, both temporally and spatially 
(i.e.,  if a word had been presented in the first and the second list and at which site at a table a 
picture had been presented) when compared to healthy controls. In addition to abnormal 
context memory, Brébion et al. (2013) suggest that in schizophrenia patients there are more 
general impairments in source monitoring, which they define as remembering the origin of 
given information. In their studies, voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis ―remembered‖ 
more often items of a list that actually had not been presented. The authors interpret their 
results as indicating a reality-monitoring deficit in schizophrenia and corroborating self-
monitoring accounts of voice-hearing.  
 
In a neuroimaging study reported above, in which voice-hearers with schizophrenia-
spectrum diagnoses were actively experiencing voices during data collection, these 
experiences were found to be associated with oscillatory activity in the hippocampus, a 
memory-related structure (van Lutterveld et al., 2012). Specifically, an aberration in the theta-
band in the hippocampus was observed before hallucination-onset, which was interpreted by 
the authors as a trigger for voice-hearing. Unfortunately, the authors do not indicate if the 
participants reported predominantly memory-related voice content. 
Taken together, the reviewed studies provide some evidence for impaired memory 
processes in voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis. However, these impairments do not 
always seem to be specific of voice-hearers and are not evident in non-clinical voice-hearers. 
Moreover, there is tentative support for the implication of a memory-related brain region in 
voice-experiences.  
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Conceptualisations of AVHs in terms of memory seem to be plausible if one considers 
them as related with a voice-hearer‘s life history and, for example, stressful life events. 
However, only a subgroup of AVHs have ―memory-content‖ (McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al., 
2014). Moreover, it appears that we often do not know the exact ―source‖ of a memory. Why 
then are we not hallucinating in such cases? Therefore, it is implausible that memory-AVHs 
are simply memories of which the context is not remembered.  
The studies reviewed until now largely focus on neuronal and cognitive processes 
within a particular individual. Most of them, regarding the experiential features of VH 
elaborated in chapter 2, focus on ―physical‖ aspects of AVHs (i.t. consider them as perceptual 
phenomena). They constitute rather ―incomplete stories‖ of AVHs as they seem to fail to take 
into account what we have hypothesised to be a core feature of voice-experiences: the 
experience of being communicated to or about which constitutes a relational character of such 
experiences. These relational aspects have been taken into account by psychological 
approaches to AVHs, as we will shortly see. Before let us discuss some methodological issues 
of neuroscientific approaches to AVHs. 
4.10 Methodological discussion neuroscientific approaches to voice-hearing 
4.10.1 Sampling 
Nearly all participants in the reviewed studies were on antipsychotic medication but 
nevertheless experiencing voices. In that sense their AVHs can be described as medication-
resistant. From that follows that participants of the reviewed studies may not constitute a 
representative subgroup of schizophrenia patients with AVHs, if we consider the hypothesis 
that there might be differences between ―medication-resistant‖ voice-experiences and those 
that are treatable by medication. This does not seem to be critical, if we suppose that it is 
particularly important to understand medication-resistant voice-hearing in order to develop 
more effective treatments for it. What is maybe more worrying is that antipsychotic 
medication might have effects on how a specific task is carried out (Brébion et al., 2013). 
Therefore, it is desirable to include medication-naive voice-hearers in future studies to control 
for possible confounding effects of medication. 
Moreover, the considerable differences between individual AVHs, although widely 
acknowledged, are also widely neglected in sample selection. This may be one reason for the 
inconsistent results of the reviewed studies. Likewise, one voice is not like another and, thus, 
group means may not mirror the experience and associated cognitive and physiological 
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processes of every participant (Shallice, Burgess, & Frith, 1991). In one reviewed study, for 
example, the proposed effect of suppression of the N1-component of the auditory  ERPduring 
talking as compared to listening to one‘s own voice could not be found in ―many patients‖ 
(Ford et al., 2007, p. 462), although the group mean indicated such an effect. Therefore, it 
might be useful to inquire the features of the voice-hearing experience of potential 
participants of a study with more detail, which in turn would allow to collect more 
homogeneous samples, ultimately leading to more consistent results. Subtypes of AVHs 
(McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al., 2014) could serve as guide for the composition of study 
samples. Another point that might contribute to inconsistent results of the reviewed studies is 
that voice-hearers might be captured at different points in their voice-hearing history (Ćurčić-
Blake et al., 2017). For that, it is important to consider a voice‘s wider temporal context in 
future studies. Moreover, due to unequal sample sizes in the reviewed studies the detection of 
brain activity considered as significant may have varied between the studies, further 
hampering consistent results.  
4.10.2 Neuroimaging 
If one wants to investigate phenomena that supposedly involve hearing experiences in a 
scanner, one must consider the scanner noise, which constitutes an acoustic stimulus. The 
scanner noise may, for example, interfere with brain activity associated with a voice-hearing 
experience (van Lutterveld et al., 2012). One might argue that this factor is negligible, as 
controls are exposed to the same noise. However, voice-hearers and non-voice-hearers may 
react differently to it  
Another important point is that results regarding activation strength and localisation 
vary substantially depending on the method of data analysis chosen (Carp, 2012a), which 
hampers the comparability between the reviewed studies. This fits into the big picture of 
fMRI research – as Carp (2012b) showed, analysis methods reported in recent fMRI studies 
vary almost from study to study, which is also true for the above reviewed fMRI and 
neuroimaging studies in general.  
The most critical point here is that there is no a priori valid form of the interpretation 
of data obtained through neuroimaging methods (e.g., Logothetis, 2008). Neuroimaging 
studies cannot provide a direct window into the brain and even less into the mind, in the sense 
that the interpretation of obtained data through scanning always relies on theoretical 
assumptions and the same set of data can be analysed in an infinite number of ways (e.g., 
Garcia-Marques & Ferreira, 2011). Ultimately it is the researcher‘s choice which 
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interpretation he/she considers appropriate and this interpretation is most likely in line with 
the theoretical position the interpreter defends and one yielding significant results and 
therefore allowing to publish (see also Asendorpf et al., 2012). Horga, Peterson, et al.‘s (2014) 
interpretation of the data as reflecting predictive coding deficits serves as an example: they 
compare two different algorithms – chosen based on theoretical assumptions– in order to 
account for the obtained fMRI data. However, it is conceivable that there are ways to describe 
the data that explain more variance. It becomes apparent that problems related with 
neuroimaging studies are rather due to interpretational issues than due to technical issues 
(Logothetis, 2008). That is why conceptual issues are important not only for the sake of 
conception per se, but also for practical reasons.  
 
4.10.3 Subjective experience measurement 
AVHs are experientially rich and complex experiences – a fact that the reviewed 
neuroscientific studies widely neglect. It is impossible to capture their richness by using only 
one to a few items that are not adequately fine-grained to capture it. It is doubtful that the 
items used to measure voice-experiences in the reviewed studies can capture ―the essence of 
[such] qualitative phenomena‖ (Giorgi, 2005, p. 80). The only reviewed study differentiating 
between distinct experiential voice-hearing features (Looijestijn et al., 2013) categorises 
AVHs as internal and external concordant with their subjective source. However, individuals 
reporting voice-experiences find it sometimes difficult to determine where the voice comes 
from (Nayani & David, 1996; Upthegrove, Ives, et al., 2016). After all, can someone know 
how a voice sounds like that is heard from inside the body? It is only our own voice that we 
may hear from inside (and simultaneously from outside) of our body. In that line, it has been 
claimed that the distinction between internal and external voices is insignificant, for example, 
in the clinical context (Copolov, Trauer, & Mackinnon, 2004).  
One may get the impression that a voice-experience in the reviewed neuroscientific 
studies is reduced to a sensory experience in the absence of a corresponding external stimulus 
captured by the use of a single or few questionnaire items. Form, content and meaning of the 
messages conveyed by voices are widely neglected in the reviewed studies, although voice-
experiences and a voice‘s content are generally meaningful to voice-hearers (Corstens, 
Longden, McCarthy-Jones, Waddingham, & Thomas, 2014).  
However, taking into account precise descriptions of voice-experiences is 
indispensable in neuroscientific AVH-research as ―in order to reach real biological correlates 
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it is imperative that we go back to fundamental psychopathological symptoms and use them 
as a primary basis in all investigations‖ (Telles-Correia, Moreira, & Gonçalves, 2015, p. 8).  
4.10.4 Correlational study designs or: correlation is not causality 
Although most of the studies that have been reviewed are of correlative nature, the results are 
continuously interpreted as pointing towards causal relations in greater or lesser extent. In the 
reviewed studies, ―brain‖ correlates are usually interpreted causally, in the sense that they are 
responsible, or at least contribute to the pathogenesis of AVHs (e.g., Hubl et al., 2004). 
However, to interpret correlations as causal relations is rather a philosophical than a scientific 
claim (Kotchoubey et al., 2016). Also, measures correlated with AVHs are always possibly not 
specific of AVHs, as for example Ćurčić-Blake et al.‘s (2013) results indicate. The limits of 
correlational study designs for the understanding of AVHs have, thus, to be taken into 
account.  
Even if a causal explanation of AVHs could be provided, this would likely not be 
sufficient for understanding these phenomena as their understanding arguably also depends on 
―some kind of familiarity or experience with it‖ (Le Moal & Swendsen, 2015, p. 597).  
 
Let us now examine what more psychological accounts of AVHs can offer for a 
conceptualisation of such phenomena. 
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5 Psychological approaches to voice-hearing 
5.1 Voice-hearing as relational experience 
As experienced voices are often identified as being associated with specific individuals (e.g., 
Nayani & David, 1996), voice-experiences often imply a relational moment. These relational 
aspects of AVHs have been used in a range of psychological studies.  
For example, Bell (2013) – without going into greater detail – proposes that AVHs 
may be due to abnormal internalisation of other people‘s voices. He assumes that a voice-
hearing experience is constituted by misidentified imagined voices rather than misattributed 
thoughts. He conceptualises AVHs as primarily social and embedded in the voice-hearer‘s 
social world, which in turn is assumed to influence a voice‘s appearance. More specifically, he 
proposes that voices commonly act as ―internal models of social actors‖ (Bell, 2013, p.2). 
In fact, results of a range of questionnaire studies indicate that patterns of relationships 
to voices are closely linked to relationship patterns that individuals who experience them have 
in their shared social lives.  
Studies included in the present review have focused on the following relationship 
aspects: power (Birchwood et al., 2004, 2000; Hayward, 2003), social rank (Birchwood et al., 
2004, 2000), and proximity (Hayward, 2003). All participants in those studies had a 
schizophrenia or related diagnosis. 
The overall picture provided by the reviewed studies is that voices are experienced as 
powerful. In Birchwood et al.‘s studies (2000, 2004) voice-hearers in general reported 
experiencing their dominant voices as being more powerful than themselves. Applying a 
different measure of power, Hayward (2003) obtained somewhat contradictory results: voice-
hearers who related to their dominant voice from ―below‖ tended to experience more 
benevolent voices with less negative content, to relate with their voices from a position of 
closeness and to engage with their voices.  
This difference might be due to the use of different ―power‖ measures as well as due to 
different samples: a more powerful voice may have very different effects depending on the 
voice‘s content and the voice being perceived as malevolent or benevolent. It might be that in 
Birchwood et al.‘s (2000, 2004) samples powerful voices were experienced as rather 
persecutory and malevolent, and in Hayward‘s (2003) sample as rather benevolent 
supernatural powers, and thus participants related differently to powerful voices, for example. 
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In terms of coping strategies, voice-hearers that reported to experience their dominant 
voice as powerful and malevolent tended to ―resist‖ to their voices, that is, refuse to do what 
they say, whereas individuals describing their dominant voice as benevolent voices tended to 
engage with them, for example, try to make contact with their voices (Birchwood & al., 
2004). 
Table 7  
Overview over the reviewed studies focusing on relational aspects of AVHs. 
Authors 
(year) 
Participants Type of study Main results/thesis 
Bell (2013) - Theoretical - voice-hearing experiences as primarily social and embedded 
in the voice-hearer‘s social world,  
- voices commonly act as ―internal models of social actors‖ 
(Bell, 2013, p.2) 
Birchwood et 
al. (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Birchwood et 
al. (2004) 
N = 59 schizophrenia 
or schizo-affective 
disorder patients with 
AVHs  
(ICD-10)  
 
(all except one:  
neuroleptic 
medication) 
 
 
N = 125 schizophrenia 
patients with AVHs 
(ICD-10)  
 
(over 98% on 
neuroleptic 
medication) 
Questionnaire 
 
measures of power and  
social rank difference 
between voice &  
voice-hearer +  
social relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
- dominant voices experienced as being more powerful than 
voice-hearers  
- perception of powerlessness linked to degree of depression 
- patterns of relationships to voices linked to relationship 
patterns with significant others 
- reported voice frequency and volume higher, when high 
power and higher social rank ascribed to the dominant voice 
 
Hayward 
(2003) 
N = 26 schizophrenia 
patients with AVHs,  
N = 1 manic 
depressive psychosis 
patient with AVHs  
 
(all: on antipsychotic 
medication)  
Semi-structured 
interview: based 
(amongst others) on  
 
You to Voice (YTV);  
individuals relating to 
others questionnaire;  
revised beliefs about 
voices questionnaire 
- VH as ―relating to an interpersonal other‖ (p.369) 
- relating to voices from a dominant position associated with a 
low voice frequency 
- relating to dominant voice from ―below‖ associated with  
experiencing more benevolent voices with less negative 
content 
as well as relating with the voice from a position of closeness 
and engage with it 
 
 
The ―power relationship‖ between voice-hearer and voice was predicted by the 
perceived ―power relationship‖ to significant others in the voice-hearer‘s life (Birchwood et 
al., 2000; Hayward, 2003). That led Birchwood et al. (2004) to conceptualise the experiences 
of voice-hearers with their dominant voice as a mirror of their general social relationships in 
which they use to feel subordinate. However, there is reason to assume that not all aspects of 
relationship patterns with significant others can be generalised to the relationships with 
voices. Some relationship features seem to be unique to relationships to voices: Hayward 
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(2003) reports that voice-hearers generally related to their predominant voice in a distant 
manner, which was not true of their relationship to significant others.  
Taken together, in the just reviewed studies we find a shift away from the focus on 
audibility towards voice-hearing‘s social aspects. In the context of these studies AVHs are not 
simply conceptualised as auditory experiences without corresponding stimuli, but as 
―constructed as that of relating to an interpersonal other‖ (Hayward, 2003, p.369). 
There is evidence, that the voice-hearing experience may be shaped by social patterns 
occurring in a person‘s life and that voice-hearers employ similar interaction patterns when 
they relate to their voices and significant others in their lives.  
 
The just reviewed studies are based on the assumption that beliefs about voices are a 
crucial factor in how a voice is experienced. However, it can be questioned if the concept of 
belief is the right concept for describing voice-hearer‘s experiences of a voice‘s power or 
proximity. Put differently, we may ask: is it a matter of belief if a voice-hearer experiences 
his/her voices as malevolent, powerful, and so on. 
5.2 Voice-hearing as response to stressful life-events 
In other psychological studies, AVHs have also been conceptualised in the context of 
traumatic life events. That is, AVHs are assumed to be triggered or at least be influenced by, 
for example, sexual abuse in childhood or other traumatic life events. One study, including 
both schizophrenic and non-clinical voice-hearers, found heightened rates of reported 
traumatic events in both groups (Andrew, Gray, & Snowden, 2008). This was the case 
although both groups appraised their voices quite differently: whereas schizophrenic voice-
hearers experienced their voices as malevolent, the non-clinical voice-hearers in this study 
reported their voices to be benevolent. The voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis in this 
study specifically reported more often that they had experienced sexual abuse in childhood. 
5.2.1 Hypervigilance and voice-hearing 
Dodgson and Gordon (2009) propose a model for a specific type of AVHs which they 
designate as hypervigilance hallucinations. The authors embed their model in the context of 
the evolutionary theory which postulates that hypervigilance might be adaptive in threatening 
situations. 
In this model, it is proposed that an ―immediate precipitator‖ (p.331) evokes an 
emotional state of distress. Stressful live events could be such a precipitator. It is further 
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assumed, that unsuccessful coping strategies used to cope with the distressing emotional state 
is what ultimately leads to a state of hypervigilance. More specifically, the authors propose 
shame and fear to be emotions particularly likely to be associated with hypervigilance 
hallucinations. That reasoning is due to the assumption that shame and fear are emotions that 
are particularly likely to be coped with in an ineffective way. For example, an individual 
might avoid coping with those feelings by talking about them with others, as this would be 
shaming for the individual. Instead, ineffective coping strategies regarding emotional distress 
could be applied such as emotion suppression and avoidance, as well as social isolation. 
Taken together, emotional state and unsuccessful coping strategies may lead the individual to 
become hypervigilant to stimuli related to a distressing event. Once a person has become 
hypervigilant, cognitive biases, such as a heightened perceptual sensitivity, are further 
assumed to increase the probability of hallucinations of hypervigilance or the detection of 
―false positives‖ (p.332). Taken together, those hallucinations, distressing emotions, 
ineffective coping strategies and cognitive biases are assumed to constitute a self-reinforcing 
vicious circle. The authors present a case study in order to illustrate the proposed model 
(Dodgson & Gordon, 2009). 
In a similar vein, Behrendt and Whittingham (2005) propose that social problems or 
interpersonal conflicts might be triggers for AVHs. Such conflicts, according to the authors, 
may be responded to with anxiety, in turn, increasing the attention of an individual to social 
cues in his/her environment. 
5.2.2 Subvocalisation and voice-hearing 
The same authors discuss the role of subvocalisation in voice-hearing phenomena (Behrendt 
& Whittingham, 2005). They propose that this bias to direct attention to the social 
environment in combination with proprioceptive input from subvocal speech might lead to the 
experience of an AVH. This, according to the authors, is possible as neuronal processes that 
underlie perception become uncoupled from afferent sensory input. Through subvocal speech, 
Behrendt and Whittingham (2005) propose further, voice-hearers might unconsciously 
influence form and content of their voices. Summarising, they propose that AVHs may be 
conceptualised as unconscious subvocalisation that are experienced as stemming from others 
due to an enhanced focus on voices in a voice-hearer‘s environment. 
The role of subvocalisation for AVHs has also been proposed by Evans, Mcguire, and 
David (2000). More specifically, they focus on the concept of ―inner imagined speech‖ 
(p.137), postulating that voice-hearers might have difficulties in distinguishing between 
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imagined and external speech and therefore take imagined as external speech. They propose 
that inner speech is a variation of auditory-verbal imagery.  In that sense, inner imagined 
speech would not be self-monitored correctly in AVHs. In order to test if voice-hearers 
subvocalise and thereupon ―hear‖ speech images resulting from that subvocalisation they 
carried out a range of behavioural experiments. However, they found no impairments in 
schizophrenia patients with AVHs in tasks that are thought to require intact speech imagery as 
compared to schizophrenia patients without AVHs. The authors conclude that problems with 
the ―inner voice‖ are unlikely to be at the basis of AVHs. However, they rightly note that inner 
speech might be associated with AVHs even if voice-hearers use to experience ―normal‖ inner 
(imaginative) speech that is assumed to be acquired for the inner speech tasked used by their 
group. In that vein, support has been provided for the assumption that voice-experiences and 
experiences of auditory imagery are associated with the activation of similar brain regions at 
least in nonclinical voice-hearers (Linden et al., 2011).  
Therefore it is dubious if this study provides convincing evidence against the possible 
role of imagined speech and subvocalisation for AVHs. 
5.3 Methodological discussion psychological approaches to voice-hearing – is 
experiencing one’s voices as malevolent (merely) a question of belief? 
It seems unlikely that if a voice-hearer experiences his/her voices as, for example, malevolent 
or benevolent is reducible to or can be broken down in terms of beliefs about voices. Rather, 
one might assume that voice-hearers experience their voices as, for example, malevolent or 
powerful immediately, that is, prior to forming any beliefs about their voices. In analogy, it 
has been proposed that ―the concept of reality testing may not pertain to a modular and 
specific psychological function but rather to a general reflective capacity of a subject and her 
anchoring in the intersubjective world‖ (Škodlar, Henriksen, Sass, Nelson, & Parnas, 2013, p. 
251).  
Thus, we may wonder, what exactly the scales about beliefs about voices used in the 
reviewed studies measure? Do they really measure beliefs? Or rather more direct experiential 
features of AVHs? In order to tackle these questions, it seems necessary that qualitative 
studies precede the development of quantitative measures of beliefs about voices. This would 
allow to evaluate if what such scales measure are really beliefs. 
Before moving on to philosophical approaches towards AVHs, let us shortly 
summarise the approaches reviewed until this point in the form of a schema (Figure 12).
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Figure 12 Concepts in which context AVHs have been conceptualised in neuroscientific and psychological 
studies. Note that all connections have to be considered hypothetical. Different colours indicate different levels 
of analysis. (Note that, for example, emotions, besides on a self-report level (blue) could also be investigated on 
other levels of analysis (e.g., neuronal, dark green). Neuronal activation patterns on a pre-phenomenal level are 
accessible by means of 3rd-person neuroscientific methods (dark green). Similarly, subvocalisation might be 
investigated by means of electromyography. Memory and cognitive biases have been investigated in behavioural 
studies (light green). Beliefs about voices, e.g., regarding the relationship of voice-hearers with their voices, as 
well as the context have been investigated by means of first-person reports, e.g., in questionnaires. At the top of 
the figure neuroscientific concepts used to explain AVHs are pictured. Starting at the top left corner, it has been 
proposed that (hyper-)activity of the auditory cortex might lead to AVHs. We might call such approaches 
perception-based as they propose as they focus on the (auditory) ―perception‖ of AVHs. Auditory cortex 
hyperactivity has also been proposed to be influenced by ―top-down‖ factors, such as e.g., cognitive biases. On a 
pre-phenomenal level, it has been proposed that altered structural connectivity, going along with altered neuronal 
functional connectivity and synchronisation might disturb postulated self-monitoring or/and predictive processes, 
which in turn might contribute to the formation of AVHs. Self-monitoring and subvocalisation approaches to 
AVHs could be described as ―action-based‖ as they propose that self-initiated actions (e.g., inner speech, 
subvocalised speech) is attributed to a non-self source. Heightened oscillatory neuronal activity observed during 
AVHs has been interpreted as compensatory for slowed state-oscillatory activity in voice-hearers (e.g., Sperling, 
Bleich, Maihöfner, & Reulbach, 2009). On the bottom half of the figure, proposed ―top-down‖ factors increasing 
the probability of experiencing voices, as well as shaping the experience of a specific voice are displayed. These 
include a voice‘s context in a voice-hearer‘s life history and a voice-hearer‘s beliefs about voices (as related in 
self-reports). Cognitive biases, in the reviewed studies, have been investigated in behavioural studies with mixed 
results. It has also been proposed that ineffective coping of specific emotions (e.g., shame) in addition with a 
hypervigilance bias might increase the probability of experiencing voices. In another line of reasoning, some 
AVHs have been proposed to consist in unintentionally activated memories (Waters et al., 2006). ―Memory‖ 
AVHs have also been attempted to be explained in a predictive processing framework (Wilkinson, 2014). 
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6 Philosophically-informed approaches to voice-hearing 
We can divide the reviewed approaches towards AVHs from philosophical perspectives 
roughly in two different approaches. First, there are accounts that explicitly refer to previously 
reviewed models of AVHs, especially models based on erroneous monitoring of inner speech 
and either propose altered (Gregory, 2016) or alternative models of voice-hearing (Cho & 
Wu, 2013, 2014; Wu, 2012). Given the range of open questions that self-monitoring accounts 
of AVHs imply the critical examination and proposal of alternatives is to be welcomed. 
Second, there are approaches developed independently from the previously reviewed 
approaches. Some of them explicitly criticise the philosophical grounds on which, for 
example, self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing are built (Thomas, Bracken, & Leudar, 
2004). These approaches differ also in the applied methodology, although they may not be 
completely separable in these terms. For a short overview, please see Table 8, as well as 
Figure 14. 
 
Table 8 
Overview of the reviewed philosophically informed approaches to AVHs. 
Authors (year) Relevant concepts Main theses 
Wu (2012) 
Cho and Wu (2013, 2014) 
Spontaneous auditory cortex 
activity 
Passivity 
- AVHs are better conceptualised as resulting from 
spontaneous auditory cortex activity than inner 
speech that is faultily self-monitored 
Gregory (2016) Imagined speech 
Self-monitoring 
- AVHs as faultily self-monitored imagined speech 
Sass and Parnas (2003) Ipseity 
Self-affection 
Hyper-reflexivity 
- inner speech and other mental processes assumed 
to ―no longer [be] permeated with the sense of 
selfhood‖ (p. 432).  
- AVHs as ―normal‖ cognitive phenomena that are 
experienced in a transformed manner. 
Stanghellini and Cutting 
(2003) 
Disembodiment 
Ipseity 
- disturbance of ipseity ultimately leads to AVHs in 
the form of morbid objectification of inner dialogue 
Henriksen et al. (2015) Ipseity/primordial presence 
 
- AVHs as arising from ―inner speech dialogues 
between thoughts that have acquired quasi-acoustic 
qualities‖ (p. 175). 
Wiggins and Schwartz 
(2007) 
Passive synthesis  - AVHs as manifestation of impaired passive 
syntheses 
Fuchs (2005a, 2013b) Ipseity 
(Dis-)embodiment 
Temporality 
- AVHs as inner speech no longer pervaded by 
―mineness‖ 
- AVHs as experienced as alien due to micro-gaps in 
conscious experience (impaired passive synthesis of 
inner time consciousness) 
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Table 8 
Continued. 
  
Rojecwicz and Rojecwicz  
(1997) 
Being-in-the-world 
Intentional arc  
- AVHs as attempts to ―re-establish a connection 
with the outside world‖ (p. 33) that has been 
rejected 
Naudin and Azorin (1997) Intersubjectivity - AVHs as manifestation of an ―anticipation of 
others‘ intentional possibilities‖ (p. 190) 
 
6.1 Evaluation of existing models of AVHs 
6.1.1 Voice-hearing as automatic auditory experience – Wu’s (2012) account 
Wu (2012) proposes an ―automaticity account‖ of AVHs. He refers explicitly to hearing a 
voice as being in an auditory state. In his opinion, AVHs are perceptual states. Thereby, he 
excludes a range of phenomena that are reported by individuals under the name of ―hearing 
voices‖. Put it differently, he does not take voice-hearing as a metaphor for the description of 
patients‘ experiences, but literally. Besides the feature of having audible properties, the author 
argues, there are two other ―outstanding‖ features of AVHs in schizophrenia: they are 
involuntary and have an alien quality. This alien quality, the author proposes, is due to two 
circumstances. First, voice-hearers experience voices different from their own. Second, voice-
content is often incongruent with the voice-hearer‘s thoughts. 
He argues that inner speech and AVHs differ clearly regarding their experiential 
features, and self-monitoring accounts of AVHs fail to account for these differences. More 
specifically, he proposes that such accounts fail to account for the specific auditory 
phenomenology of AVHs. Alternatively to self-monitoring accounts, he proposes that AVHs 
are genuinely passive phenomena, that is, they are not subject of some kind of ―top-down‖-
modulation of the voice-hearer. AVHs are, thus, conceptualised as automatic auditory 
experiences instead of misattributed inner speech.  
In a subsequent paper, Cho and Wu (2013, 2014) argue for a ―spontaneous activation 
account‖ of AVHs, which they think should be the ―default account‖ of AVHs instead of self-
monitoring accounts of AVHs. Additionally, they argue, that if one wants to maintain a self-
monitoring account of AVHs it would be more reasonable to assume that what is faultily 
monitored in AVHs is imagined speech and not inner speech. This point, as we will shortly 
see, was taken up by another author (Gregory, 2016).  
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What the authors propose is, basically, that the spontaneous activation of auditory and 
memory brain networks constitutes a sufficient cause for the occurrence of AVHs. Through 
such activation of ―specific auditory representation[s] of voices‖ (Cho & Wu, 2013, p. 3), 
AVHs would result. They consider a neural stimulation study as a ―proof-of-concept‖ study 
for their account. However, at closer inspection, this study they mainly substantiate their 
argument with turns out to be no convincing evidence for their claim. In this study, the 
temporal cortex of epileptic patients was stimulated via an electrode while they were 
undergoing brain surgery. What the authors found was that, when asked, some of the patients 
reported hearing voices.  
If we look closer at this study, however, we note that ―all of these patients were 
subject to temporal lobe epilepsy which did, no doubt, make response from the cortex easier 
to elicit‖ (Penfield & Perot, 1963, p. 683). Moreover, the AVHs reported in this study were 
―reproductions of past experience‖ (Penfield & Perot, 1963, p. 686) which is not true of all 
AVHs in schizophrenia. Consequently, their argument is not convincing.  
6.1.2 Voice-hearing as faultily monitored imagined speech – Gregory’s (2016) account 
Gregory (2016) argues within a self-monitoring theoretical framework. Following Wu (2012; 
Cho & Wu, 2013), he argues that AVHs would be more appropriately conceptualised as 
instances of imagined speech that is faultily self-monitored than as instances of inner speech 
that is faultily self-monitored. In order to put his argument forward, he presents three 
arguments why inner speech should be considered a different phenomenon than imagined 
speech.  
These arguments are based on the assumption that inner speech, like external speech, 
is a type of actual speech, or as he puts it ―inner speech and external speech are similar in 
deep and important ways and should be considered different types of the same kind‖ 
(Gregory, 2016, p. 654). In his first argument he claims that inner speech and actual speech 
can be imagined. The same, however, he claims, is not true for imagining: one cannot imagine 
to imagine something and, at the same time, maintain the same point of view.  
In his second argument, he gives the example of a politician that is preparing a speech. 
In this process, the politician imagines giving the speech, interrupting herself to make an 
observation about the speech using inner speech. He argues that inner speech in this case can 
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be considered a case of actual speech in analogy with the actual speech of an actor that is 
performing a play and interrupts himself in order to make a comment about his performance. 
In his third argument, he provides various example phrases that follow the same 
pattern. These phrases all begin with ―Imagining saying something‖ (Gregory, 2016, p. 666) 
and end for example with ―to yourself‖ (Gregory, 2016, p. 666). He asks if any of these 
phrases would describe cases of inner speech. In line with his former arguments, he concludes 
that none of these examples would actually describe instances of inner speech. Having 
concluded that inner speech is not imagined speech, he now goes on to put forward that what 
is actually faultily monitored in AVHs is imagined speech. This view is based on the 
assumption that inner speech is produced in a person‘s own voice, whereas imagined speech 
may occur in other individuals‘ voices. 
It is certainly debatable if the alternatives to standard self-monitoring accounts of 
AVHs proposed by Cho and Wu (2013) and Gregory (2016) constitute better alternatives. 
Nonetheless we have seen that philosophical reflection of existing models of AVHs can be 
valuable for initiating critical analyses of the soundness of such models. 
We turn now to approaches to AVHs that use concepts rooted in continental 
philosophical tradition for the conceptualisation of such phenomena. They belong to the area 
of clinical philosophy or phenomenological psychopathology. 
6.2 Clinical-philosophical approaches to voice-hearing 
6.2.1 AVHs as “quasi-present” voices – a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach 
Thomas, Bracken, and Leudar (2004), in general, regard AVHs as meaningful and 
understandable in terms of a voice-hearer‘s life history and belief system. According to the 
authors, a voice‘s meaning cannot be revealed by neurological or psychological approaches 
alone. The account they present in the reviewed study is based on Merleau-Ponty‘s 
philosophy of embodied and situated experience. By means of a case example, they propose, 
that in some cases voices may be conceptualised as the ―quasi-presence‖ of a voice of a 
specific person that is actually not present. In this case example a woman reports hearing her 
dead husband. To put it in the authors‘ words, it is proposed that in this case ―his presence has 
lived on for her in such a way and with such a power that he now comments critically on 
event that in his life he had no knowledge of‖ (Thomas et al., 2004, p. 21). In that sense, the 
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authors propose that we might conceptualise her husband‘s as ―embodied, her past in her 
present‖ (p.21) and, thus, as ―quasi-present‖21. 
6.2.2 Voices as expressions of altered structures of experience 
The accounts we will examine in the following, refer specifically to AVHs in the context of 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders. To put it in the words of the authors of one of the reviewed 
study, they assume that ―schizophrenic hallucinations are their own specific kind of 
hallucination‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 126). 
AVHs in these accounts are regarded as secondary phenomena in that they emerge 
from altered structures of experience per se
22
. These alterations are assumed to manifest 
themselves in an altered self- and world-experience and are considered to occur gradually. 
What these approaches have in common is that they consider AVHs as ―embedded in a 
globally changed experiential framework‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 178). They assume that 
―hallucinations can only be understood as a function of the totality of the schizophrenic‘s 
personality‖ (Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 1997, p. 1) whereby ―the patient, in order not to be 
misconceived, must be comprehended as inseparably related to his or her world‖ (Wiggins & 
Schwartz, 2007, p. 114).  
Within continental philosophical approaches to voice-hearing in schizophrenia one can 
distinguish between approaches that focus on alterations on the level of pre-reflective 
experience and approaches that focus on alterations on a non-experiential level  (Mishara, 
2007). Put differently, we may say that the former asks ―what kind of generally altered pre-
reflective experience enables the occurrence of AVHs?‖, whereas the latter asks ―what 
generally altered a priori constituents of experience enable the occurrence of AVHs?‖ 
These approaches rely on different philosophical concepts, which shall be explained 
briefly where they become relevant. However, such accounts are neither mutually exclusive 
nor are they always clearly distinguishable as ―a-priori‖ processes can be considered as 
closely intertwined with pre-reflective experience (Fuchs, 2005a). 
                                                 
21 Quasi-presence can be understood in the sense that past experiences may have a role in structuring present experiences 
(Gutting, 2001). 
22 Note that schizophrenia has been subject of phenomenological philosophical investigations, since the emergence of the 
concept of schizophrenia (Škodlar et al., 2013). 
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6.2.3 Voice-hearing as symptom of a self-disorder 
Based on recent phenomenological, development-psychologically and neuroscientific 
concepts, proponents of an ―ipseity-disturbance‖ as the basis of AVHs distinguish between a 
basic and a personal self (Fuchs, 2012b). The basic (or minimal) self (ipseity) designates an 
implicit, pre-reflective sense of ―mineness‖ that is thought to be intrinsic to all (normal 
conscious) experience, remaining intact even in cases of loss of autobiographic memory, 
whereas the personal self is thought to constitute itself in the relation to others from the 
second year of life (Fuchs, 2012b). (We will examine Fuchs‘ (2005, 2013b) account in more 
detail shortly.) This sense of self is called ―pre-reflective‖ as it is assumed that it is not 
necessary to reflect upon your conscious experience being your experience, but that it is 
always already given as yours. In the reviewed studies, ―basic sense of self‖, ―basic self-
awareness‖ or ―ipseity‖ are interchangeable terms. Some of the authors propose that the basic 
self-awareness is dynamic and may be influenced by factors such as stress (Henriksen et al., 
2015). Let us consider the proposed accounts more indepth.  
6.2.3.1 Sass and Parnas’ (2003) account of schizophrenia as a self-disorder 
In a seminal paper, it was proposed that AVHs can be understood within the context of 
schizophrenic disorders as disorders of the basic self or ―ipseity disturbance‖ (Sass & Parnas, 
2003, p. 427). With ipseity, the authors denote the ―the experiential sense of being a vital and 
self-coinciding subject of experience or first person perspective on the world‖ (Sass & Parnas, 
2003, p. 428). Its disturbance, the authors argue, goes along with ―complementary distortions 
of the act of awareness‖ (p.428), namely with what they call ―hyper-reflexivity‖23 and 
diminished ―self-affection‖. This ―hyper-reflexivity‖ may manifest itself in becoming aware 
of aspects of one‘s actions that usually remain in the experiential background and is 
considered as a compensatory reaction to the postulated ipseity-disturbance. 
In order to illustrate that, they cite a patient of McGhie and Chapman (1961): ―[…] I 
take more time to do things because I am always conscious of what I am doing. If I could just 
stop noticing what I am doing, I would get things done a lot faster‖ (pp. 107-108, in Sass & 
Parnas, 2003, p.434). 
With diminished self-affection, the authors mean ―a weakened sense of existing as a 
vital and self-coinciding source of awareness and action‖ (Sass & Parnas, 2003, p. 427). Self-
affection or some kind of self-awareness, for the authors, constitutes a condition for an 
                                                 
23 Note, that one can distinguish operative hyper-reflexive processes that are assumed to be a rather automatic consequence of 
disturbed ipseity, and a reflective form of hyper-reflectivity. It is, however, unclear how they exactly be delineated. 
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experience to be conscious. ―Hyper-reflexivity‖ and ―diminished self-affection‖, the authors 
propose, constitute complementary facets of the proposed fundamental alterations in ipseity in 
schizophrenia. 
The authors propose that in the condition of schizophrenia one finds an ―increasing 
gap between the sense of self and the flow of consciousness‖ (Sass & Parnas, 2003, p. 432). 
Inner speech and other mental processes are assumed to ―no longer [be] permeated with the 
sense of selfhood‖ and instead to ―become more like introspected objects, with increasingly 
reified, spatialised, and externalised qualities‖ (Sass & Parnas, 2003, p. 432). AVHs, thus, in 
the proposed account are conceptualised as based on ―normal‖ cognitive phenomena that, due 
to a disturbed basic self-experience, are experienced in a transformed manner. The authors 
refer especially to commenting voices and conversing voices 
This transformed experience has been described in terms of an objectification of inner 
dialogue. 
6.2.3.2 AVHs as “objectified inner speech”: Stanghellini and Cutting’s (2003) account 
Stanghellini and Cutting (2003) argue that the proposed ―ipseity-disturbance‖ in 
schizophrenia ultimately may lead to an objectification of ―inner dialogue‖. They assume that 
inner dialogue which they define as ―talking to oneself‖ (Stanghellini & Cutting, 2003, p. 
126) is fundamental for self-conceptualisation and dominates one‘s experience of oneself. At 
the same time, the authors assume that the process of inner dialogue normally remains 
subconscious. The authors maintain that a defining feature of inner dialogue is that ―in it we 
experience at the same time a sense of unity and a sense of duality‖ (Stanghellini & Cutting, 
2003, p. 123). This inner dialogue is assumed to become conscious in AVHs, thereby 
becoming like an object. To put it in the authors‘ words, in the case of AVHs ―awareness no 
more focuses on the outcome of inner dialogue (i.e.,  self- conceptualisation), but on its very 
process (i.e.,  two characters arguing with each other)‖ (Stanghellini & Cutting, 2003, p. 126). 
The morbid objectification of inner dialogue that, according to the authors, occurs in AVHs is 
not assumed to be an additional process of the postulated ipseity-disturbance and the 
compensatory hyper-reflexivity in schizophrenia. Rather, the authors consider it as an 
―extreme manifestation of these two basic phenomena‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 124). In the 
case of AVHs, the sense of unity usually inhabiting inner dialogue is assumed to be lost.  
Summarising, Stanghellini and Cutting (2003) propose that a disturbance of ipseity 
goes along with a type of hyper-reflexivity that leads to a ―detachment from ‗myness‘ an 
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agency‖ (p.125) and finally to the proposed morbid objectification of inner dialogue and thus 
to the experience of AVHs. 
6.2.3.3 AVHs as “objectified inner speech”: Henriksen et al.’s (2015) account 
Henriksen, Raballo, and Parnas (2015) introduce the notion of ―primordial presence‖ to 
clarify the notion of ―pre-reflective self-awareness‖. In the words of the authors, the notion of 
―primordial presence‖ means that a person‘s ―pre-reflective immersion in the world‖ (p. 173) 
and her pre-reflective self-awareness are ―in fact, inseparable‖ (p.173). What is new here is 
that the proposed ―pre-reflective self-awareness‖ is coupled with a person‘s situatedness in the 
world. 
The authors argue that the formerly proposed alterations of ―pre-reflective self-
awareness‖ (or using the new notion: ―primordial presence‖) involve also changes in how 
space is experienced and an ―objectification‖ of inner speech, which may ultimately lead to 
AVHs. More precisely, they assume that the disturbance of ―primordial presence‖ allows that 
a ―sort of persistent, inner space‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 174) is construed in which, for 
example, thoughts are experienced as having spatial qualities.  
They then conceptualise AVHs as arising from ―inner speech dialogues between 
thoughts that have acquired quasi-acoustic qualities‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 175). It 
remains open how thoughts can dialogue and why and how they acquire these ―quasi-
acoustic‖ properties. Inner speech, thereby, in accordance with Stanghellini and Cutting 
(2003) is defined as ―implicit or silent medium for self-presentation‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, 
p. 175). 
Instead of taking AVH as abnormal perceptions, the authors regard them as cognitive 
phenomena, a proposal that is rooted in their observation that ―hallucinatory voices seem to be 
given to patients in a sort of direct inner intuition […] rather than in a sensory perception 
(…)‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 167). They acknowledge that with the mechanism they 
propose they cannot account for AVHs that ―occur quite suddenly or acutely‖ (p.176). 
The authors describe the gradual self-alienation referring to three case vignettes from 
which they derive their account of AVH development. They hypothesise that increased 
thought pressure24 combined with a reduced ability to distinguish auditory imagination from 
thoughts may lead to a state in which the patients do not know ―if they, so to say, thought their 
thoughts or listened to them‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 171). In a second step, the authors 
report, their patients began to hear their pressing thoughts as spoken in their own voice. In 
                                                 
24 Thought pressure can be defined as ―rapidly racing meaningless, unconnected thoughts‖ (Cermolacce et al., 2007, p. 706). 
 89 
 
terms of content those thoughts ranged from self-instructions and self-commands to self-
conversations. Finally, ―frank‖ AVH were characterised by ―a loss of feeling that the heard 
thoughts belonged to the listening subject‖ (Henriksen et al., 2015, p. 171). 
6.2.3.4 Voice-hearing in schizophrenia as disembodiment of the basic self – Fuchs’ 
(2005a) account 
Fuchs (2005a) has described the alterations of the basic self-experience in terms of 
disembodiment. This idea is based on the assumption of a strong interdependence between 
pre-reflective self-awareness and corporality (Leiblichkeit). The basic self, as the author 
understands it, is grounded on the body as ―lived medium‖ through which we direct ourselves 
to the world (perceive/act)
25
. Similarly, Sass and Parnas (2003) assume that a tacit awareness 
of proprioceptive and kinaesthetic sensations serves as the medium of pre-reflective self-
awareness
26
. The sense of agency is assumed to be based on such proprioceptive and 
kinaesthetic sensations as well as ―the bodily sensation of being able to move (one‘s own 
body)‖ (Fuchs, 2005a, p.96)27. The basic self is further assumed to include a basal temporal 
self-continuity (Fuchs, 2012b), an idea to which we will come back shortly. 
Fuchs (2012b) differentiates between three dimensions of a basic self: the primary 
bodily self, the ecological self, and the social self (see also Figure 13). This conception of the 
basic self indicates that already one‘s self-experience is not isolated but intertwined with 
one‘s ecological and social environment.  
In schizophrenia, the author proposes, a gradual alteration of the bodily self-experience 
occurs. More specifically, the author assumes that the basic self is weakened and a 
disembodiment in the sense of a loss of the natural corporal embedding in the body and the 
world occurs (Fuchs, 2012b). To put it in the author‘s words, what characterises the condition 
of schizophrenia is a ―divorce of the self from its body‖ (Fuchs, 2005a, p. 105). This 
disembodiment of the basic self, consequently, comes along with disturbances on all 
dimensions and levels of self-experience. Regarding the dimension of the ecological self, due 
to the postulated disembodiment the body, that in normal experience remains in the 
                                                 
25 At this point it is worth noting that in phenomenology distinguishes between the lived body (Leib) or body-subject and the 
physical body (Körper) or body-object. ―The first is the body experienced from within, my own direct experience of my 
body in the first-person perspective, myself as a spatiotemporal embodied agent in the world, the second is the body 
thematically investigated from without, as for example by natural sciences as anatomy and physiology, a third person 
perspective‖ (Northoff & Stanghellini, 2016, p. 8) 
26 This focus on the bodily (leiblichen) aspects of schizophrenia is what distinguishes Fuchs‘ account of schizophrenia from, 
for example, Sass and Parnas‘ account on which, amongst others, Fuchs builds. 
27 It has been proposed that an impairment of this sense of agency manifests itself in VH (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). 
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background or is transparent normal experience is assumed to be explicated (Fuchs, 2005a)
28
. 
This explication is further assumed to come along with an alienation of perception and action. 
Moreover, the ipseity-disturbance is assumed to affect the social dimension of the basic self 
(i.e., an impairment of the intersubjective constitution of the life-world) and ultimately also 
the level of the personal self, as it is based on the basic self (Fuchs, 2012b). 
       
Figure 13 Schematic illustration of the postulated dimensions of the basic self, as well as its relation with the 
personal self (Fuchs, 2012b). 
 
Within this theoretical framework, AVHs are considered to be due to the 
externalisation of self-generated activity that has become so alienated that is no longer 
experienced as such: the experience of inner speech is proposed to no longer pervaded by a 
sense of ―mineness‖ and thus experienced as externalised. 
6.2.4 Voice-hearing as expression of a disorder of “passive syntheses” 
The concept of passive synthesis traces back to Husserl and has been used for the 
conceptualisation of AVHs and more generally schizophrenia (e.g., Wiggins & Schwartz, 
2007). It is assumed that ―normal‖ experience is ensured by automatic ―multiple constantly 
occurring syntheses‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 117). These syntheses are assumed to 
                                                 
28 Northoff and Stanghellini (2016) describe this process in terms of a ―morbid objectivization, [in which] parts of one‘s body 
that are usually silently and implicitly present and at work become explicitly experienced‖ (p.10). 
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constitute ―the basic ontological components of the world, space, time, causality, and the 
object-property relationship‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 117) or, put together, our ―reality 
of the world‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 117). An example of such syntheses could be 
that features of objects are automatically synthesised so that we experience them as distinct 
objects. 
6.2.4.1 Wiggins and Schwartz’ (2007) account of voice-hearing as expression of 
impaired passive syntheses 
Wiggins and Schwartz (2007) base their analysis of AVHs on concepts borrowed from both 
Husserlian and Heideggerian philosophy. In that sense, they maintain that mental disorders 
are manifestations of specific modes of human ―being-in-the-world‖. 
They assume that passive syntheses serve to reduce the world‘s complexity. However, 
in the case of schizophrenia, the authors propose, the ontological components of reality are 
de-structured because of impaired automatic syntheses. An assumed consequence of this de-
structuring is that individuals with schizophrenia find themselves confronted with ―an 
overabundance of stimuli‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 119). Then, the person, according 
to the authors, has to organise these stimuli actively and new kinds of syntheses will appear. 
Crucially, however, these ―compensatory‖ syntheses will not have the same effects as the 
―normal‖ (impaired) syntheses would have. Rather, the reality of the person will be 
constituted in a new way. The authors think that it is ―ultimately un-understandable‖ (p.121) 
why the world of a person is re-structured exactly the way it is restructured. 
Where do the AVHs come in in this conceptualisation of schizophrenia? It is assumed 
that AVH serve for the person to reduce the complexity of the experience resulting from the 
assumed overabundance of stimuli. In the authors‘ view, they fulfil this function in 
―impart[ing] an organization to the patient‘s mental life that at least minimally stabilizes his or 
her world and self‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 121). This, however, has the price that the 
voice-hearer will be further distanced from the participation in social life.  
Now, what is the role of passive syntheses for AVHs? Whereas normally hearing a 
voice is automatically synthesised with the person speaking, the authors assume that this is 
not the case in AVHs. To put it in the authors‘ words, they assume that in AVHs ―the voice is 
intended without the synthetic co-intending of a person speaking; the voice alone is meant‖ 
(Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 123). This implies that the voices lack a precise spatial 
position. It is therefore assumed to be experienced as uncaused and unexpected, and thus, 
―given with a brute immediacy‖ (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2007, p. 122). The content of the 
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voice, thereby, is assumed to be personally relevant for the person. The authors, moreover, 
consider AVHs as quasi-acoustic and voice-like as they assume that the experience of a 
―voice‖ differs from the experience of hearing some other person speaking. 
6.2.4.2 The role of inner time consciousness for voice-hearing (Fuchs, 2013b) 
Within the context of AVHs as being due to a more basic ―ipseity-disturbance‖, Fuchs (2013b) 
has later examined the role of temporality in such phenomena. The author considers this 
approach as complementing conceptions of schizophrenia as ipseity-disturbance.  
He distinguishes between temporality as ―pre-reflectively lived time‖ and explicit 
temporality. The former, which he considers relevant for the genesis of AVHs in 
schizophrenia, is outlined in terms of Husserl‘s analysis of the ―transcendental synthesis of 
―inner time consciousness‖ (Fuchs, 2013b, p. 77). Basically, this serves to explain why we 
experience a ―flow‖ of time and not infinitely many separate moments. The idea is that 
consciousness has a retentional-protentional structure, which forms the basis of an experience 
of temporal continuity. Put simple, this means that the experience of a specific moment 
implies a sense of what was just experienced (retention) as well as an anticipatory moment 
towards the succeeding experience (protention) (Gallagher, 2012). This synthesis of 
succeeding moments in terms of retention and protention is not carried out actively by a 
subject, but is automatic. 
Fuchs (2013b) considers this synthesis as a prerequisite for the basic ―self-awareness‖ 
and takes into consideration the hypothesis that it might even be synonymous with the 
coherence of a basic ―self-awareness‖. In the condition of schizophrenia, the author proposes, 
the basic self-awareness is weakened and temporally fragmented. More specifically, he 
assumes that especially the protentional or anticipatory processes do not longer function 
properly. The postulated impairment in temporal synthesis, according to the author, will lead 
to ―micro-gaps of conscious experience‖ (Fuchs, 2013b, p. 86). In the proposed theoretical 
framework, AVHs are conceptualised as manifestations of this disturbance of the synthesis of 
inner time-consciousness. In the case of AVHs, thoughts are assumed to be ―no longer 
embedded in the continuity of basic self-experience‖ (Fuchs, 2013b, p. 87) and in extreme 
cases to be experienced as voices. The author hypothesises that the synthesis of inner time 
consciousness at a neurophysiological level may be associated with neural networks including 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex. 
The role of the constitution of time for AVHs has also been proposed by others 
(Naudin & Azorin, 1997). They consider the hypothesis that ―the other within the self of the 
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acoustico-verbal hallucination [is] linked to retentions which have become autonomous‖ 
(Naudin & Azorin, 1997, p. 187) as ―the ―voice‖ represents itself under the mode of the 
perfect tense, (always-already-there) […] ahead of the subjects‘ current experience‖ (Naudin 
& Azorin, 1997, p. 183).  
 
Figure 14 Schematic illustration of philosophical concepts used for conceptualisations of VH in conceptions of 
schizophrenia as a self-disorder and as disorder of passive syntheses. Note that all connections are to be viewed 
as hypothetical. Moreover, the schema is not thought to propose that conceptions of VH as manifestation of 
impaired passive syntheses implies their conception as manifestation of an ipseity-disturbance. That is not the 
case, as explained in the text. As it becomes clear there, conceptions of schizophrenia as self-disorder and as 
disorder of passive syntheses have often been developed independently. Nonetheless, there are authors that 
consider the role of passive syntheses within conceptions of schizophrenia as a self-disorder (e.g., Fuchs, 2013b). 
 
6.2.5 Voice-hearing as compensatory for a disturbed relation between subject and 
world – Rojcewicz and Rojcewicz’ (1997) account 
Rojcewicz and Rojcewicz (1997) suggest that AVHs occur for ―human reasons‖ (p.1), namely 
when the relation between subject and (interpersonal) world is disturbed. It is based on the 
assumption that humans‘ experience, characterised by directedness towards and situatedness 
in the inhabited world (Rojcewicz & Lutgens, 1996), is subtended by an ―intentional arc‖. The 
world is assumed to provide solicitations that are assumed to be preconditions to establish an 
intentional arc and thus a relation with the world. In the case of schizophrenia, the authors 
assume, this world of solicitations is rejected, especially in the realm of interpersonal life and 
the intentional arc is slackened. However, it is assumed that every person has an inherent 
drive to establish an intentional arc with the (interpersonal) world. AVHs are then considered 
to be attempts to ―re-establish a connection with the outside world‖ (Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 
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1997, p. 33) by providing new solicitations, a kind of interpersonal field in which the voice-
hearer  can engage.  
Regarding the content of AVHs, the authors hypothesise that this content is 
interpersonal as they postulate that AVHs occur because of interpersonal reasons. That AVH-
episodes tend to be brief, according to the authors, may be because ―the slackening of the 
intentional arc does not allow prolonged dialogue‖ (Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 1997, p. 31). 
Moreover, they hypothesise that voices are often identified as stemming from a source 
different from the self, in analogy to the ―original‖ (rejected) solicitations. 
6.2.6 Voice-hearing as manifestation of the anticipation of an other – Naudin and 
Azorin’s (1997) account 
Naudin and Azorin (1997), as many authors of the reviewed studies, regard AVHs as 
modifications of the own inner voice of the hallucinating person. According to the authors, we 
might describe an AVH as the explication of the pre-reflective knowledge that another person 
might anticipate one‘s interiority. In that sense, the authors write of an ―anticipation of others‘ 
intentional possibilities‖ (Naudin & Azorin, 1997, p. 190) that manifests itself in the form of a 
―voice‖. What is special in the case of AVHs is that the voice‘s ―intentionality‖ and that of the 
voice-hearing person ―constitute one and the same movement‖ (Naudin & Azorin, 1997, p. 
183)‖. However, for some reason, in AVHs the person ―grasps himself or herself as if he or 
she were an other‖29 (Naudin & Azorin, 1997, p. 183). Further, the authors put forward that 
the essence of an AVH is its non-perspectival quality. That means that it is impossible for 
someone else to share the same reality. Based on that, the authors further propose that AVHs 
might be understood as a ―dialogical crisis‖ (Naudin & Azorin, 1997, p. 175), because AVHs, 
they think, lack an encounter‘s dialogical character. The relation between voice-hearer and 
voice is an ―unfair‖ relationship as the voice-hearer is exposed to the voice. In that sense a 
voice-hearer ‗s body becomes ―an object-body that is simply subjected to voices‖ (Naudin & 
Azorin, 1997, p. 183). As the hallucinatory voice is ―disembodied‖, that is, comes without a 
physically present speaker, it is impossible for the voice-hearer to engage with it in the way he 
could engage with a physically present person talking to him/her. 
Summarising, in the phenomenological philosophical approaches to AVHs that we 
reviewed, AVHs are conceptualised as arising as secondary phenomena due to a 
                                                 
29 We might compare this approach with the Vygotskian approach to inner speech put forward by Jones and Fernyhough in a 
study reviewed above (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a). There they assume that the development of inner speech in children 
includes the internalisation of the perspectives of others.  
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fundamentally altered structure of experiencing oneself, one‘s ―mental life‖ and the world one 
lives in. In their approaches to AVHs, the authors of the reviewed studies employ concepts of 
different philosophers in order to analyse the altered way of experience of a person with 
schizophrenia, which they assume is at the basis of AVHs.  
We have already seen that the argument Wu (2012) adduced in order to substantiate his 
account of AVHs is not really convincing. However, the other accounts we have reviewed also 
draw only incomplete pictures of AVHs. A range of complex concepts has been used for the 
conception of AVHs within schizophrenia. However, it remains unclear, how exactly the 
concept of ipseity is related with the concepts of self-affection and temporality or what 
exactly the relation between diminished ipseity, dis-embodiment and objectification of mental 
processes is. Nonetheless, these approaches go beyond the neuroscientific studies reviewed 
above in that they include and focus on first-person experience and its descriptions. In this the 
voice-hearer as a person and his/her experience are considered as indispensable for the 
understanding of voice-hearing. 
6.2.7 Methodological discussion clinical-philosophical approaches to voice-hearing – 
how pre-reflective is pre-reflective experience? 
Mishara (2010) has rather harshly criticised the concept of ipseity stating that ―the concept of 
ipseity, and its […] appropriation as passive self-affection (or so-called pre-reflective self-
awareness) is ultimately a matter of faith‖ (p.16). Consequently, he ascribes this concept 
―limited usefulness in the diagnosis, treatment and/or research of schizophrenia‖ (Mishara, 
2010, p. 18) . In that sense, it has been doubted that one can reflectively acquire knowledge of 
one‘s pre-reflective experience (Schlimme, Bonnemann, & Mishara, 2010). For this reason, 
pre-reflective experience is considered as inaccessible to scientific experimentation (Mishara, 
2010).  
However, one does not have to be so pessimistic: it seems well possible to deduce 
what a pre-reflective experience is like usually, from when it is altered. Also, an instrument 
has been developed in order to investigate abnormal self-experience (Parnas, Møller, Kircher, 
& Al, 2005).  This Examination of anomalous Self-experience (EASE) scale has been shown 
to discriminate between patients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and patients with 
other mental diseases (Parnas & Henriksen, 2014). It remains to be shown, if such a measure 
is, for example, systematically associated with AVHs, or different types of it.  
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7 General Discussion 
In this chapter, after shortly summarising the reviewed results, they will be critically 
discussed regarding conceptual issues. Based on this critical examination, a tentative to 
describe obtained results in an alternative way is presented. 
7.1  Summary 
In a first step, we have seen that voice-experiences can be described regarding multiple 
dimensions and are experientially complex and heterogeneous phenomena. 
Afterwards, literature regarding AVHs/VH from different fields of Cognitive Science 
was systematically reviewed with the aim of examining how AVHs are conceptualised in 
different Cognitive Science disciplines. We have seen that different Cognitive Science 
disciplines have focused on different aspects of AVHs. A great variety of concepts has been 
used in order to conceptualise AVHs in neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical 
approaches towards such phenomena. These concepts range from supposed neuronal 
processes (e.g., corollary discharge) over psychological constructs (e.g., belief) to 
phenomenological concepts (e.g., ipseity), and hint at different metaphysical assumptions, 
epistemic objects and epistemic approaches of the contributing disciplines. 
The diversity of possible conceptualisations may be partly due to the diversity of 
AVHs themselves. Given the phenomenal heterogeneity of voice-hearing, it seems unlikely 
that, for example, one cognitive mechanism may suffice for a sound conceptualisation of all 
AVHs. Certain concepts may be more appropriate to conceptualise certain types of AVHs and 
other concepts to conceptualise others.  
In that vein, several different subtypes have been proposed, such as hypervigilance 
(Dodgson & Gordon, 2009), inner speech (McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al., 2014), 
autobiographical memory (McCarthy-Jones, Thomas, et al., 2014) hallucinations. Regarding 
neurocognitive models of voice-hearing, a recent review identified similar concepts 
(Upthegrove, Broome, et al., 2016). 
Coming back to the experiential features of AVHs, studies from different disciplines 
have largely focused on different aspects of AVHs. The reviewed neuroscientific studies have 
largely compared voice-hearers with non-voice-hearers, not much further focusing on 
experiential details. One study took into account more ―physical‖ properties, such as 
perceived location of the voice (Looijestijn et al., 2013). Neurocognitive models have focused 
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on the question why AVHs are experienced as stemming from non-self sources as well as on 
their audibility. The reviewed psychological accounts have rather focused on voice-hearers‘ 
relationship to their voices as well as their context in terms of stressful life-events. 
Phenomenological philosophical approaches focused on the description of altered structures 
of experience in schizophrenia per se, in which context AVHs are assumed to emerge.  
 
In the studies reviewed in the present work, structural as well as functional brain 
alterations in voice-hearers with schizophrenia diagnosis in specific brain regions have been 
reported. Such alterations have been reported to occur both during voice-experiences 
themselves, as well as during resting state or the execution of tasks thought to be related with 
processes postulated to be altered in individuals with voice-hearing experiences.  
In some of the reviewed neuroscientific studies, VH was explicitly conceptualised as 
resulting from a ―brain disease‖ (Aguilar et al., 2008, p. 434). In that vein, it has been 
proposed that altered neuronal activation patterns in voice-hearers may trigger compensation 
mechanism on a neuronal level ―trying‖ to compensate for these alterations and that such 
compensatory mechanisms may go along with the experience of hearing a voice (Sperling et 
al., 2009).  
Other studies have focused on voice-hearing conceptualised as being due to auditory-
processing deficits. In the reviewed studies it has been proposed that voice-hearers show 
altered functional coupling between brain regions associated with speech processing, as 
expressed in altered oscillatory synchrony between those regions (Mulert et al., 2011; 
Sritharan et al., 2005).  
Emotional word paradigms, in which voice-hearers listen to emotional words 
resembling their ―voices‘‖ content, suggest that brain regions associated with emotion 
processing, speech processing and memory processing are activated to a greater extent in 
voice-hearers compared to healthy controls (Aguilar et al., 2008; Escartí et al., 2010; Horga, 
Fernández-Egea, et al., 2014). In that vein, it has been proposed to conceptualise AVHs within 
a framework of ―normal‖ auditory processing (Badcock, 2010). In those approaches, it is 
assumed that voice-hearers ―process‖ speech in an abnormal manner and that such alterations 
are related with the occurrence of voice-experiences. It remains, however, unclear how they 
are related exactly. 
In the reviewed studies, AVHs have also been conceptualised as unintentionally 
activated auditory memories (Waters et al., 2006) or as being related to memory deficits 
(Brébion et al., 2013). However, the most popular ways of conceptualising AVHs in the 
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neuroscientific literature are conceptualising them as being due to altered ―top-down‖ and 
―bottom-up‖ processing in the widest sense. Such models propose, for example,  ―bottom-up‖ 
factors consisting in auditory cortex hyperactivity or neurotransmitter dis-regulations and 
―top-down‖ factors such as cognitive biases, such as a hypervigilance bias.  
Most results of the reviewed neuroscientific studies have been interpreted in terms of 
pointing at impaired (verbal) self-monitoring or predictive processing in voice-hearers, which 
may be due to the fact that many of them were designed on the basis of models that 
conceptualise AVHs as being due to or implying such impairments. This is a nice example that 
third-person observations in science are not made from an independent objective standpoint, 
but are theory-laden and possibly biased conclusions (Cytowic, 2003).  
Verbal self-monitoring has been investigated in both behavioural and 
electrophysiological studies, with inconsistent results. 
Whereas neuroscientific approaches to voice-hearing have focused on inner speech 
and verbal self-monitoring, in the realm of psychology research on AVHs has mainly been 
based on different concepts. These span relational aspects of voice-hearing, including social 
cognition, beliefs about voices and the context of the occurrence of AVHs.  
In the present review, we found that neuroscientific, psychological, and clinical-
philosophical approaches to AVHs largely rely on different conceptual spaces. As Aguilar et 
al. (2008) put it crudely ―proponents of these different approaches (neuroimaging vs. 
psychosocial) are not listening to each other‖ (p.437). In the reviewed psychological research, 
we found a shift away from the focus on audibility towards voice-hearing‘s social aspects. It 
has, for example, been argued that AVHs are social phenomena in the sense that they include 
a dialogical moment (Bell, 2013). In the context of these studies voice-experiences are not 
simply conceptualised as auditory experiences without corresponding stimuli, but as 
―constructed as that of relating to an interpersonal other‖ (Hayward, 2003, p.369). Voice-
experiences have been found to be shaped by social patterns occurring in a person‘s life. 
Moreover, voice-hearers seem to employ similar patterns of relating when they relate to their 
voices and significant others in their lives. These ―interpersonal‖ properties of voice-
experiences have widely been neglected in approaches towards VH focused around the 
concepts found to be relevant in neuroscientific research about VH, although it has been 
pointed at the importance of the consideration of these aspects in cognitive models of voice-
hearing (Leudar et al., 1997).  
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Some philosophers refer directly to concepts used in neurocognitive approaches to 
AVHs. In those studies, the usefulness of self-monitoring accounts of AVHs as default model 
has been questioned (Cho & Wu, 2014; Wu, 2012). Gregory (2016) presented arguments for 
the assumption that it is rather imagined instead of inner speech that is faultily monitored in 
AVHs. In phenomenological philosophical approaches to VH still different concepts have 
been used for the description of AVHs. Whereas some of these approaches have focused on 
the conception of schizophrenia as a basic self-disorder, others focused on the conception of 
schizophrenia as a result of impaired passive syntheses. In those approaches AVHs are 
considered as secondary phenomena that are due to a more basic primary disturbance of a 
person‘s structure of experience.  
Besides the many open questions left open by individual approaches that we have 
considered in the respective sections, there are some questions that several of them have not 
answered satisfactorily yet. We will consider them in the following sections. 
7.1.1 Some questions left open by the reviewed studies 
In many of the reviewed approaches to VH, it is assumed that these phenomena can be 
understood within some more basic deficit or alteration that enables the occurrence of AVHs. 
Due to altered predictive processing, self-monitoring, or structures of experience, it is often 
assumed that, for example, inner speech is experienced in the form of AVHs. We then have to 
wonder why voice-hearers do not experience voices constantly? And that is certainly not 
always the case: there is, for example, evidence for the assumption that inner speech of voice-
hearers does not differ from inner speech of individuals without such experiences (Langdon, 
Jones, Connaughton, & Fernyhough, 2008). Put differently, these assumed alterations do not 
seem to be sufficient conditions for AVHs to appear. The reviewed conceptions of AVHs have, 
thus, to be considered as incomplete stories. None of them provides a satisfactory account of 
how exactly AVHs arise. This might also be due to a neglect of the communicational core of 
voice-hearing phenomena. 
 
Also, in many of the reviewed studies, AVHs are conceptualised as involving some 
form of inner speech. However, the concept of inner speech is defined in differing ways in the 
reviewed studies, or not even defined at all. This raises the question: what is inner speech? 
May there be both inner speech (whatever that may be) and imagined speech AVHs?  
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Besides some exceptions (e.g., the proposal of a Vygotskian approach to inner speech 
by Jones and Fernyhough, 2007a) the term is used in an ambiguous or not satisfactorily 
defined way. However, if the concept of inner speech is so central to AVH-research in 
multiple disciplines, it is worth describing and examining in-depth what it is thought to be. 
Another point is that the minority of the reviewed studies refers to the specific content 
of particular voices. However, the voice‘s content itself may provide valuable hints regarding 
its aetiology. 
This illustrates that besides neuroscientific and clinical-philosophical approaches, 
psychological research is crucial for identifying the circumstances in which AVHs arise. The 
assumption of trait-alterations of self-monitoring processes or structures of experience is not 
dynamic enough for allowing to conceptualise intermittent AVHs. 
7.1.2 Some notes on the prevalence of neuroscientific studies in the present review 
In the present work, and in line with a recent review (Upthegrove, Broome, et al., 2016), the 
field of neuroscience has been identified as the dominant one in voice-hearing research, both 
in terms of empirical studies and proposed models. This is mirrored by the fact that a vast 
amount of research funds available for psychiatric research is allocated to projects that are 
based on the implicit or explicit assumption that psychiatric phenomena are symptoms of 
―brain diseases‖ (Zedlick & Thoma, 2017).  
One may speculate that this is due to an implicit assumption that neuronal processes 
are somehow more ―real‖ than the subjective experience. However, as noted before, third-
person observations are also theory-laden (Cytowic, 2003) and empirical hypotheses are often 
prescribed by a researcher‘s natural experience (Naudin & Azorin, 1997). In the current 
chapter of brain research history, which has been proposed to be called ―brainhood‖ (Vidal, 
2009), we find neurosciences as a ―universal frame of reference for addressing human nature‖ 
(Borck, 2012). Applied to voice-hearing, we could say, that in many of the reviewed studies, 
neuroscience seems to be assumed to be the ultimate frame of reference for addressing voice-
hearing‘s nature.  
Why could such a ―neuro-dominated‖ perspective be critical? Although the majority of 
the reviewed studies belong to the realm of neuroscience (which is also true for the studies 
retrieved in the initial database search), it is this area that seems to have the least direct 
practical applicability for voice-hearers. Whereas psychological findings have been applied in 
psychotherapy (e.g., Hayward, Overton, Dorey, & Denney, 2009), it seems more difficult to 
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convert neuroscientific findings into pharmacological innovations as ―no dramatically new 
discoveries in drugs have occurred since the 1950s‖ (Le Moal & Swendsen, 2015, p. 598). 
Moreover, one study found that voice-hearers that assumed that their experience is due to a 
neurochemical imbalance feel powerless regarding their voices (Jones, Guy, & Ormrod, 
2003). Having in mind that feeling powerless regarding one‘s voice seems to be related with 
distress (Birchwood et al., 2004), one may thus hypothesise that it is not advisable for 
clinicians to transmit voice-hearers that their voices result from a ―brain disease‖.  
 
As indicated before, the present reviews results are largely in line with other recent 
reviews of neuroscientific and psychological studies about voice-hearing (Ćurčić-Blake et al., 
2017; Upthegrove, Broome, et al., 2016). However, former reviews of the voice-hearing 
literature have not probed sufficiently basic assumptions that underlie, for example, 
interpretations of results from neuroscientific studies and discussed their impact on how 
AVHs are conceptualised. We will discuss such conceptual issues now. Of note, 
methodological shortcomings of the reviewed studies are often due to or intertwined with 
conceptual issues. 
7.2 Conceptual issues 
It has become clear until this point that the question of what AVHs or voice-hearing is an 
important one, as it has practical consequences30. This is so because the conceptualisation of 
such experiences guides the research approach towards them. Consequently, it is important to 
invest resources into research projects that are based on conceptualisations of AVHs that 
ultimately are relevant for voice-hearers suffering from such experiences. As indicated before, 
―evidence generated by clinical research will depend on who asks the questions, who defines 
the outcome measures, who interprets the findings, and who disseminates the outputs‖ 
(Greenhalgh, Snow, Ryan, Rees, & Salisbury, 2015, p.2).  
 
7.2.1 Where and what is the hallucination in neuroscientific studies? – The standard 
conceptualisation of AVHs 
With the exception of studies focusing on a relational nature of voice-hearing, almost all of 
the reviewed neuroscientific and  cognitive psychological studies rely in a greater or lesser 
                                                 
30 Note that it is also conceptual issues that are at the core of many methodological problems discussed above. 
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extent on the ―standard‖ conceptualisation of AVHs as perceptual experiences without 
corresponding external stimuli or as false perceptions. This ―standard definition‖ of AVHs as 
perceptions without object dates back to Esquirol in the 18
th
 century (González, 2010). It has 
led researchers to search for abnormalities of perceptual processing in voice-hearers and to 
focus on audibility, which is critical as approximately only one half of voice-hearers with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis experience their voices as literally auditory (Jones & Luhrmann, 
2016; Moritz & Larøi, 2008; Nayani & David, 1996; Woods et al., 2015) and only a subgroup 
of those, in turn, experience their voices as ―speaking‖ as loud as other individuals (Moritz & 
Larøi, 2008). This leads us to the suggestion that the ―conceptual core‖ (González, 2010, p. 
195) of the prevailing conceptualisation in voice-hearing research may not coincide with the 
―experiential core‖ of AVHs. That a substantial part of voice-hearers does not experience 
their voices as literally auditory illustrates that audibility is unlikely to be at the core of (at 
least a substantial part of) voice-experiences. Alternatively, we must abandon the momentary 
use of the designation ‗voice-hearing‘ or AVH for a large part of phenomena that up to now 
have been designated as such. A while ago, there was a proposal to introduce a new general 
term
31
 for hallucinatory phenomena (Stevenson, 1983). That such a term has not been 
implemented raises doubts about the practicability of that second option, although it appears 
entirely reasonable. In fact, we can assume that ―auditory verbal hallucination‖ is a misnomer 
for many experiences summarised under this notion. 
The standard definition has recently been criticised in-depth regarding its conceptual 
shortcomings (González, 2010). Such a conceptualisation is, among other things, grounded on 
the mis-conceptualisation of (most) AVHs as being indistinguishable from perceptual 
experiences. Although that is the case for some voice-experiences, most voice-hearers have 
―insight‖ in the sense that they know when they are hallucinating and when they are not 
(Nayani & David, 1996). ―Hallucinatory‖ perceptions, furthermore, are assumed to be ―false‖ 
in the sense that they do not correspond to stimuli accessible in an intersubjective world. 
However, González (2010) rightly notes that the ―experience itself cannot be mistaken and is 
neither true nor false‖ (p.196) and therefore it is misleading to speak of a false perception. 
Hence, it makes no sense to define AVHs as perceptions, as a real-time connection between 
perceiver and extracorporeal world is established through perceptual processes. In that sense, 
perceiving implies an intersubjective existence of the ―something‖ that is perceived 
(González, 2010), which is not the case in voice-hearing, as voice-experiences are private. In 
                                                 
31 He proposed the term ―idiophany‖ as collective term for private (unshared) sensory experiences. 
 103 
 
the same line, it does not make sense to speak of an AVH as being unreal, as the experience of 
a voice is real but private. Instead, we may say that a voice-hearing experience is not public, 
in the sense that other individuals cannot experience the voice from a first-person perspective.  
We have seen that the standard conceptualisation of AVHs rests on questionable 
conceptual foundations. Moreover, we have seen that the use of the ―standard‖ 
conceptualisation of AVHs in AVH-research has practical consequences. However, in the 
reviewed studies there is more to the conceptualisation of voice-hearing than its ―standard‖ 
definition. We will consider such conceptual issues further now. 
 
 Let us now turn to the examination of (implicit) philosophical assumptions as 
exhibited in the language of the reviewed neuroscientific studies. 
7.2.2 Some notes on mixing up epistemic levels in neurocognitive accounts of                    
voice-hearing 
One may get the impression that the proposed models as derived from reviews of the literature 
are often a mere juxtaposition of various individual theoretical components. These models 
often lack a conclusive connection between those components or an epistemological 
framework in order to integrate results from different epistemic levels32. Moreover, in many 
of the reviewed studies we find a conceptual mixing of different epistemic levels: it is often 
not clear which processes are assumed to be subpersonal and which are conscious, which 
processes are attributed to the voice-hearing person and which to his/her (erroneously 
personified) brain. This is reflected in the use of physical and intentional vocabulary likewise 
to describe brain functioning. In the reviewed studies, we find a transfer of ―intentional‖33 
vocabulary into the description of subpersonal, for example, neuronal, processes that are used 
to explain AVHs. AVHs, however, cannot be due to ―intentional‖ subpersonal processes, as we 
will not find such processes on a subpersonal level, but only on the level of a person as a 
whole. Let us consider some examples. 
The author of one of the reviewed studies states that it is a ―fact that auditory 
hallucinations are excitatory phenomena that cause a phenomenological experience of a 
percept of something that does not correspond to a real event‖ (Hugdahl, 2009, p. 557). The 
cited sentence contains more than a conceptually dubious formulation: first, the author states 
                                                 
32 On this, see also Kotchoubey et al. (2016) on neuroscience: ―Any attempt to develop an integrative neuroscience has to 
deal with epistemic compatibility of the various methods. The usual solely additive combination of methods and levels 
may not be sufficient to construct a comprehensive picture of neuropsychological phenomena. Only theoretical efforts 
seem to promise integration by building conceptual bridges‖ (p.5). 
33 ―intentional‖ is used here in the sense of ―being directed towards something‖ or ―being about something‖. 
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that AVHs are ―excitatory phenomena‖. ―Excitatory‖ is an adjective usually used to describe 
neural potentials. Thus, by using this word in this context, the author implicitly suggests that 
AVHs are reducible to neuronal processes, which is arguably not the case. Although voice-
experiences may be enabled by neuronal activation, they are arguably not neuronal events, but 
experiences that are embedded in a person‘s lifeworld and have a subjective side. Second, 
these AVHs are assumed to cause the experience of a percept. However, we have already seen 
that the assumption that AVHs are perceptions rests on faulty conceptual grounds. Of course, 
a voice-hearing experience may nonetheless be a perception-like experience. Third, in that 
quote we find a reification of AVHs, as it is even better demonstrated by a similar but different 
quote of the same author in which he states that ―auditory hallucinations generate activity in 
the speech regions in the left hemisphere much like real auditory input‖ (Hugdahl, 2009, p. 
555). Auditory hallucinations, here, remain mysterious unidentified entities that have causal 
influence on brain activity. Where and what are they? 
Waters et al. (2006) state that their ―model‘s proposal of a failure in the control of 
intentional inhibition explains that patients would find it difficult to suppress irrelevant mental 
events, which would then be experienced as conscious events‖ (p.77). It is, however, not 
plausible that someone could intentionally inhibit unconscious events. For someone to be able 
to inhibit an event, it seems to be a necessary condition that he/she is conscious of this event. 
If the person was not, how would he/she know that there is something he/she could inhibit at 
all? 
7.2.3 The brain – an independent entity producing voices?  
Conceptual shortcomings in the reviewed studies can largely be framed in terms of 
―mereological fallacies‖. In general terms, one speaks of a mereological fallacy when 
psychological attributes applying to an animal as a whole are falsely ascribed to a part of the 
animal (Smit & Hacker, 2014). Ascribing properties to the brain, which in a meaningful way 
can only be ascribed to a person as a whole, represents a case of a mereological fallacy.  
Nevertheless, many times in the reviewed studies we find a (at least at the linguistic level) 
―personification of the brain‖34. However, it is questionable that the brain – as Fuchs (2011) 
puts it – is a ―god-like creator of mental life‖ (p.197) and thus of AVHs. It is not less dubious 
                                                 
34 We are aware, that it might be almost unthinkable to describe brain functioning without the use of metaphors, however, it 
should not be disregarded which practical consequences that has. 
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to ascribe activities to the brain that, meaningfully only can be ascribed to the person or voice-
hearer as a whole. 
In that vein, some of the authors of the reviewed studies write about an ―auditory 
hallucinating brain‖ (Sritharan et al., 2005, p. 191), or ―the hallucinating brain‖ (Allen, Larøi, 
& McGuire, 2008, p. 187). Others state that ―normally, Wernicke can decide whether the 
perception is outer generated […] or inner generated […]‖ (van Der Gaag, 2006, p. 115). 
In the context of predictive processing accounts of voice-hearing, it has been stated 
that ―you (or, perhaps more accurately, your nervous system) roughly think […]‖ (Wilkinson, 
2014, p. 152), a ―brain has certain expectations‖ (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 146) or ―can wrongly 
think‖ (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 147). Others write of cortical hierarchy levels that ―remember[…] 
frequently observed temporal sequences of input patterns and assign[…] meaning […] to 
these sequences‖ (Krishnan, Fivaz, Kraus, & Keefe, 2011, p. 130) and ―higher levels [that] 
predict future input […] and project[…] their future expectations to the lower levels‖ 
(Krishnan et al., 2011, p.130). 
You might wonder: what is wrong with all these statements? The point is that a brain 
does not think, nor remember, nor expect anything, nor ascribe meaning, nor does it 
hallucinate. All those activities can only be ascribed in a meaningful way to a person as a 
whole. To ascribe them to the brain is to commit mereological fallacies. We will not find 
entities in our brains that compare or predict anything. There are ―no homunculi‖ in our brains 
interpreting auditory signals and deciding if they are self-generated or not. A voice-hearer‘s 
brain does not decide about the source of an experience, neither does a neuron or a population 
of neurons as they do not decide anything at all (Fuchs, 2013a). In order to apply such 
vocabulary in a meaningful non-metaphorical way, we need to ―mak[e] the organism (or 
person) the crucial reference point‖ (Frisch, 2014, p. 1). That a brain is embedded in such an 
organism‘s body does not mean that its single cells or cell groups can make decisions. 
This type of metaphors (personification) has been identified as one of three major 
types of metaphors that dominate neuroscientific language (Goschler, 2007). The other two 
types identified in the respective analysis of neuroscientific literature are metaphors of 
spatialisation and technological metaphors. Let us turn to the latter category now. 
7.2.4 Are AVHs due to faulty information processing in the brain? 
Some of those notions, used in the reviewed studies to describe AVHs on a neuronal level, 
originate from vocabulary that is used to describe computational processing. In the history of 
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models explaining the functions of the brain, the functions of the brain have been described in 
analogy with the most recent technical innovations ever since (Borck, 2012). Hence, it is not 
surprising that brain functioning in current models of voice-hearing is largely described in 
terms of such a vocabulary. As the authors of one reviewed study note ―until today, the 
psychological perspective on brain functioning is determined by the concept of information 
processing‖ (Strik & Dierks, 2008, p. 67). However, to speak of neuronal functioning as 
―information processing‖ implies misinterpretations that have an influence on how AVHs are 
conceptualised. 
―To inform someone‖ means to ―make someone known‖ (Merriam-Webster‘s online 
dictionary, 2017b). ―To inform‖ is a transitive verb and, thus, it requires an accusative object, 
that is, a subject that is informed. Put differently, in order for something to be ―information‖ it 
has to be information for someone who possibly understands that information. In that sense, 
Callaos and Callaos (2002) have distinguished between the terms ―data‖ and ―information‖, 
whereby data are ―transformed into information by means of a subject‘s perception and 
interpretation‖ (Callaos & Callaos, 2002, p. 82). Thus, we may conclude that it is misleading 
to speak of ―information processing‖ in the brain or ―neuronal information‖ and alike, as there 
is no subject that could be informed by such neuronal processes. Neurons or neuron 
population are no subjects capable of understanding information and there is arguably no 
homunculus in our brain that could receive and understand information. For that reason, the 
most we can do is to metaphorically speak of information processing in the brain – on closer 
inspection we will be unable to find such. To receive information is something a human being 
is capable of. However, to speak of the brain or its parts, as receiving information constitutes 
a misguided use of the notion of information (Fuchs, 2011; Smit & Hacker, 2014) and a 
mereological fallacy. 
 
There are numerous examples of such fallacies in the reviewed studies. Ćurčić-Blake 
et al. (2013), for example, discuss the role of the Broca‘s area as receiving information as if it 
was an entity capable of the interpretation of information. However, a lack of information of 
the Broca‘s area cannot be at the origin of AVHs as Broca‘s area does not receive 
‗information‘ at all.  
Waters et al. (2012) state that AVHs ―arise through an interaction between information 
arising from neural activations and top-down activity‖ (p.688). They state further that 
―phenomenology-based models are useful in pointing to the evolution and transformation of 
neural information into increasingly differentiated signals that are subject to modification by 
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factors such as emotions‖ (p.625). It remains unclear how information can arise from neural 
activations, and as we have seen there is no neuronal information as such that could be 
transformed. Where would it be and who would transform it? Moreover this statement rests 
on dualist grounds. To speak of neuronal processes as ―bottom-up‖ and emotions as ―top-
down‖ makes only partially sense. By doing so, the authors implicitly suggest that neuronal 
processes and emotions, brain and mind, would be strictly separable. However, emotions are 
arguably always embodied in the sense that they go along with specific neuronal patterns, that 
enable them. 
In the context of self-monitoring accounts of voice-hearing, Heinks-Maldonado et al. 
(2007) claim that ―an efference copy contains not only information about the quality of the 
sounds being produced but also critical information about when the sound should be 
perceived‖ (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007, p. 295). In that vein, the authors of another 
reviewed study write of ―efference copy information‖ (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007b, p. 393) 
that might not reach the comparator. Others write that ―self-generated actions are perceived 
without the distinctive information informing the individual that they are self-generated‖ (Seal 
et al., 2004, p. 65). I don‘t know about you, but in my case nobody ever informed me that my 
actions are self-generated, even less neurons, as their activity is beyond my subjective 
experience. Even if I was informed, what would this information consist of? I am not 
informed that an action is generated by me or not, I experience it as self-generated or not.  
In the context of predictive coding accounts of voice-hearing, the author of one of the 
reviewed studies writes ―by using information from seeing the person‘s lips move, my brain 
has certain expectations […]‖ (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 146). Others write that the ―thalamus […] 
could […] transmit information largely matching the expectation to auditory and prefrontal 
cortices‖ (Nazimek, Hunter, & Woodruff, 2012, p. 808). Again, however, nor does any 
person‘s brain see, nor expect, nor does the thalamus ―transmit information‖, as there is no 
information as such for the brain nor its parts. We could make a similar point for the notion of 
―representation‖, however, for the sake of brevity we will refrain from that. 
7.2.5 Cartesian Dualism in the reviewed neurocognitive models 
Conceptualising voice-hearing as ―brain disease‖ is an incomplete account and remains on the 
grounds of Cartesian mind-body dualism. Although some of the authors of the reviewed 
studies acknowledge that the ―dichotomy mind–brain makes no more sense‖ (Strik & Dierks, 
2004, p.369), in most of the reviewed studies it is assumed that neuronal processes can cause 
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conscious experiences. The authors of the reviewed studies mention ―neural mechanisms that 
produce hallucinations‖ (Horga, Peterson, et al., 2014, p. 8072), frontal brain areas that 
―produce thoughts‖ (Nazimek et al., 2012, p. 803), ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ neuronal 
processes that ―interact to produce these erroneous percepts‖ (Seal et al., 2004, p. 175). AVHs 
in such accounts remain products of the brain. Such interpretations, however, are based on 
dualist grounds.  
Hardly anybody would deny that the brain is crucial for human conscious experience. 
Few would disagree that neuronal processes underlie conscious experiences, in the sense that 
they (amongst other factors) enable individuals to have them, however that they cause them is 
a far stronger and less uncontroversial assumption. Changes at a ―mind level‖ do not cause 
changes at a ―brain level‖, in the sense that they occur in the realm of two different 
―substances‖ influencing each other. We might rather say that they go along with them. If 
neuronal processes underlie conscious experience, then altered neuronal processes will enable 
different conscious experiences, but they do not cause them. As such, it is not surprising that 
we find neuronal changes going along with ―mind changes‖ due to psychotherapy (Brody et 
al., 2001) – we may say they are ―two sides of one medal‖. A strict conceptual distinction 
between ―mind‖ and ―brain‖ processes is misleading, as there arguably is no such thing as a 
―free-floating mind‖ influencing neuronal processes, nor the other way around. Rather, the 
mind is arguably always embodied (and thus ―embrained‖), that is, it is not independent from 
neuronal processes. To put it differently, a ―state of mind‖ has always various sides: subjective 
first-person and neuronal processes, observable from a third-person perspective with the 
adequate technology. At the same time, AVHs are not reducible to neuronal processes, as we 
will not find subjectivity in neuronal processes. Moreover, neuronal activity can only be 
interpreted in a meaningful way taking into account that a brain is always embedded in a 
living body and its world (Frisch, 2014). This embeddedness must be taken into account for a 
meaningful interpretation of the brain‘s activity as a part of a dynamic system consisting of 
the brain as a part of a person embedded in his/her environment. There is no point in 
artificially separating it from its context, in considering it as an independent entity, and 
searching for AVHs in it. Such a search must be in vain.  
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7.2.6 Much ado about nothing? – About the use of metaphors in the conceptualisation 
of AVHs 
Well, one might argue, the language used in neuroscientific and cognitive psychological 
studies is largely metaphorical and cannot be taken literally. The reader might wonder if it is 
worth considering such issues at all. One could argue that the use of metaphors in science is 
trivial or researchers are fully aware of those notions only acting as metaphors in order to 
describe neuronal functioning (Dennett, 2007). If so, the above presented critique, would, 
indeed only be ―much ado about nothing‖. But is that the case?  
It is dubious that neuroscientists have the same ―philosophical awareness‖ about the 
terms they use as Dennett, a philosopher. We may wonder, why the authors do not identify 
metaphors as such, and express themselves as clearly as possible. Here, we might argue that 
the use of metaphors, indeed, may be of great usefulness for developing new models and 
theories of voice-hearing. That is true, and in fact, it has been argued that it is impossible to 
think without metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In a similar line, metaphors have been 
fittingly described as ―important conceptual ―tools‖ in the scientific tool-kit‖ (Reynolds, 2014, 
p. 182). The authors of one of the reviewed studies rightly note that ―current psychiatric 
semiology contains implicit theoretical assumptions‖ (Strik & Dierks, 2008, 66) that have far-
reaching ―consequences for scientific reasoning and for empirical research‖ (Strik & Dierks, 
2008, p.67). If we, now, suppose that metaphors may convey such implicit assumptions and 
that such metaphors ―shape‖ our thinking, then it is not trivial for the investigation and 
understanding of voice-hearing which metaphors scientists choose for discussing voice-
hearing. Consequently, the usefulness of certain metaphors for such purposes should be 
outlined: what benefits do we (and ultimately voice-hearers) have from conceptualising AVHs 
using specific metaphors? That is specifically important, as it has been shown that 
―metaphorical approaches have the potential to mislead and distort our understanding‖ 
(Reynolds, 2014, p. 176). Thus, the use of metaphors in the context of the conceptualisation 
of AVHs, is arguably often no ―merely linguistic problem […] but deeply rooted in scientific 
arguments‖ (Goschler, 2007, p.7). Moreover, when using them we should not forget that 
metaphors are ―only‖ metaphors, as useful as they may be. In this process, it is important to 
consider, for example, which idea of human beings or in our case more specifically which 
idea of voice-hearers, such metaphors convey. We have seen above that how AVHs are 
conceptualised has practical consequences, for example in terms of attribution of research 
resources and for voice-hearers regarding therapeutic strategies. The relevant question for us, 
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then, is if the metaphors used in the voice-hearing literature do have an impact on how they 
are conceptualised? Let us consider that a bit closer. 
We may hypothesise that a decomposition of the ―living whole‖ of the voice-hearer in 
its parts, that is in brain and ―rest‖ has consequences. The (metaphorical) application of 
attributes to the brain that in a meaningful way can only be applied to the person (in our case 
voice-hearer  as a whole living organism) might lead to the focus on the brain in voice-
hearing research. The metaphors above discussed and that are present in conceptualisations of 
voice-hearing imply a focus on the brain (or a shift away from the focus on the voice-hearer 
as a whole) as we, suddenly, find intentionality ―implanted‖ in the brain. To put it in an 
exaggerated way, if the brain is assumed to be able to both produce and experience voices, 
what do we need the voice-hearer as a person for? The use of such metaphors, thus, seems to 
―invite‖ for reductionist conceptualisations of voice-hearing.  
What consequences may reductionist approaches have for a voice-hearer? Reductionist 
approaches to clinical phenomena may ―undermine the patient‘s capacity for self-
understanding, self-efficacy, and autonomy‖ (Fuchs, 2005b, p. 117). 
Now, one may wonder, if the use of such metaphors is misleading, which ones can we use 
instead? What kind of metaphors allows us to ―mak[e] the organism […] the crucial reference 
point‖ (Frisch, 2014, p.1) again? If we assume that voice-hearing research is ultimately to 
serve individuals that suffer from such phenomena, we may ask: which metaphors are 
especially helpful for voice-hearers? Which metaphors suggest mechanisms involved in 
voice-hearing that are useful for developing adequate ways of handling the ―voices‖? To put it 
in a voice-hearer‘s words: ―Anything that allows us explain our voices is important. Similarly, 
any research that takes place should have a fundamental benefit for voice-hearers. The pursuit 
of academic knowledge for its own sake does us no favours‖ (Cockshutt, 2004, p. 11). 
Shortly, an attempt is presented to interpret the reviewed results in light of a different 
metaphor, within a phenomenological-ecological framework, which might prevent such a 
―brainhood‖ and enable us to draw a more holistic conceptualisation of AVHs. Before, let us 
shortly consider some conceptual issues that are raised by reviewed phenomenological 
philosophical accounts of AVHs. 
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7.2.7 Same, but different? – On the fuzzy boundaries of phenomenological concepts 
A range of different concepts has been used in order to describe basic alterations of 
experience as they are postulated to occur in schizophrenia. However, it remains often unclear 
in how far they are related exactly. For example, it remains unclear how exactly the proposed 
basic self-affection and basic self-awareness are related: is the former a condition of the latter 
or a dimension of it? Is the latter a manifestation of the former? Are they overlapping or even 
synonymous terms same thing in the end? We may pose similar questions for the relation 
between lived temporality and basic self-awareness. 
Similarly, we may ask in how far primordial presence and basic self-awareness are 
inseparable according to Henriksen et al. (2015). Are they inseparable in conceptual terms in 
empirical terms? Are they the same things and if not how may we disentangle them? It also 
remains unclear how one can communicate with oneself unconsciously (as proposed by 
Stanghellini & Cutting, 2003). Moreover, it is unclear how thoughts can dialogue in the form 
of inner speech or how and why they acquire quasi-acoustical qualities (as proposed by 
Henriksen et al., 2015). 
7.3 Towards an integration of neuroscientific, psychological and clinical-
philosophical perspectives on voice-hearing 
The concepts identified to be used in the different Cognitive Science disciplines in order to 
conceptualise AVHs do not seem to have much in common at the first sight. How AVHs are 
conceptualised, hence, is mostly discipline-specific with each discipline focusing on specific 
aspects of AVHs.  
Nonetheless, some authors, from a phenomenological standpoint, criticise self-
monitoring accounts for removing voice-experiences from their context (Thomas et al., 2004). 
Others state explicitly that self-monitoring accounts of AVHs is incompatible with their view 
(Stanghellini & Cutting, 2003). In contrast, Fuchs (2005a) proposes that a sense of agency on 
a neurophysiological level is associated with ―mechanisms of forward modelling, efferent 
copy, and action monitoring‖ (p. 96) amongst others. He parallels his approach with recent 
neuropsychological findings in schizophrenia and more generally proposes that there is 
―increasing evidence for a structural homology between the phenomenology and cognitive 
neuroscience of schizophrenia in the emphasis on the temporal order of mental life‖ (Fuchs, 
2013b, p. 88). We will take that as a starting point. 
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7.3.1 Examples of common themes in neurocognitive and clinical-philosophical 
approaches to voice-hearing 
At closer inspection, we can identify common themes between different approaches to AVHs. 
Three examples are the themes of self, temporality, compensation and memory (Figure 15). 
The concepts of predictive coding and passive time synthesis can be seen, for example, as 
referring to the common theme of temporality. The concept of passive synthesis describes the 
connection of the ―flow‖ of consciousness in terms of retention and protention. Similarly, 
predictive coding accounts of AVHs assume that a major accomplishment of the brain is to 
predict incoming stimuli in time. This assumption can be paralleled with the concept of 
protention that is assumed to be a ―vaguely determined expectation or openness towards the 
future‖ (Fuchs, 2013b, p. 85). It should be noted right away that the authors of these different 
assumptions most likely rely on very different metaphysical assumptions. Therefore, it is not 
possible to simply equal, for example, the concepts of prediction and protention. However, 
both conceptions assume that the disruption some predictive processes in voice-hearers may 
be associated with experiences mental events as ―voices‖. 
The theme of memory has been considered in both neurocognitive and 
phenomenological philosophical approaches to AVHs. It has been proposed that AVHs may be 
constituted by intrusive memories (Waters et al., 2006). On the other hand, it has been 
proposed that AVHs can be described as ―quasi-present‖ voices, that is, the experience of the 
voice of someone who is absent, but whose presence is incorporated so deeply in the structure 
of the experience of a voice-hearer, that he/she continues to ―hear‖ that person even when 
he/she is not present. Whereas the former authors refer to individual cognitive impairments in 
voice-hearers, the authors of the latter stress the embodied and embedded nature of human 
experience.  
Regarding compensation, it has been proposed that AVHs may be associated with 
compensatory mechanisms for altered brain function on a neuronal level (Sperling et al., 
2009). Rojcewicz and Rojcewicz (1997) have proposed on a clinical-philosophical level that 
voices may be the manifestation of an attempt to re-establish relations with the social world 
that has been formerly rejected by the voice-hearer. Irrespective of the validity of these 
approaches per se, they do not seem in principle incompatible. However, it is also not clear at 
first sight how exactly they could be compatible. We notice, thus, that without taking into 
consideration a broader framework regarding, for example, neuronal processes and 
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experience, it seems an unrewarding endeavour to integrate perspectives from different 
epistemic levels.  
 
 
  Figure 15 Common themes in reviewed studies from different Cognitive Science disciplines and their 
speculative relevance for proposed subtypes of AVHs. The themes of self, temporality, compensation and 
memory have been addressed by different disciplines included in the review. The green arrows refer to concepts 
proposed in neurocognitive approaches to voice-hearing, whereas the blue arrows refer to concepts proposed in 
clinical-philosophical approaches. 
 
7.3.2 How to combine results from different levels of analysis? 
Consequently, at the end of this work, we find ourselves in the situation of having to consider 
the relationship first, between ―phenomenal‖ data and ―physiological‖ data, and second, 
between different levels of, for example, brain activity (e.g., neurotransmitter level, brain 
oscillations). There have been several attempts to integrate results from various epistemic 
levels regarding AVHs, a part of those studies being subject of the present review. However, 
they are unsatisfactory regarding several points. They often remain on (more or less explicit) 
reductionist assumptions. Moreover, they often combine results from different levels of 
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analysis in a simplistic or unclear manner. In one of the reviewed studies, for example, it is 
proposed that ―the concept of massive modularity very much approximates the idea of a 
possible translation between the psychological and neurobiological level of observation‖ 
(Strik & Dierks, 2008, p. 68). In this example, it remains unclear how the authors arrive at this 
conclusion. However, most of the reviewed studies do not take into account such 
considerations at all, although it has been proposed by researchers of voice-hearing that it may 
be fruitful to take into account general theories of consciousness when conceptualising such 
phenomena (McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, et al., 2014). If we want to connect neuroscientific, 
psychological and clinical-philosophical results we have to consider (at least) shortly the 
relation between data regarding neuronal processes and data obtained by means of first-person 
reports. That does not mean that we have to solve the so called ―hard problem of 
consciousness‖ (Chalmers, 1995) (i.e., the problem of how it is possible that creatures 
consisting of flesh and blood can have subjective experiences). It should be noted beforehand 
that a simple addition of the reviewed approaches into one holistic approach is not possible.  
This is, besides other reasons, also due to differing basic assumptions about human 
experience and mind-body relationship of different disciplines included in the review. In the 
following, however, we attempt to deduce some preliminary exemplary hypotheses about 
structural homologies between different standpoints assumed in the reviewed studies that may 
be further developed. For this purpose, it is proposed that for a conceptualisation of AVHs in a 
Cognitive Science context that aims to integrate results from different levels the concepts of 
aspect duality and circular causality (as proposed, e.g., by Fuchs, 2013a) might prove 
valuable. 
7.3.3 First-person and third-person approaches as referring to different aspects of 
voice-hearing 
Following these ideas, AVHs or voice-hearing are proposed to be conceptualised as ―life 
processes‖ of which we can examine subjective aspects and, for example, neurophysiological 
aspects (Figure 16). Moreover, it is proposed that alterations of a voice-hearer‘s brain‘s 
structure and functions are shaped by his/her environment and are only understandable taking 
them into account. 
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Figure 16 Voice-hearing from a dual aspect perspective. Following Fuchs (2011, 2013a), we can conceptualise 
VH/AVHs as living processes taking place in a specific voice-hearer. Towards that living process we may now 
adopt different perspectives: it is expressed both in a specific subjective experience as well as specific 
physiological processes, whereby both aspects are assumed to be two sides of the same process that are not 
transferable into one another and that do not exert efficient causality onto one another (figure adapted from 
Fuchs, 2011, p.200). For the description of neuronal processes associated with AVHs the metaphor of resonance 
might provide an alternative to the ones of information and representation. 
 
What implications does such a conceptualisation have? First, it offers an alternative to 
the (implicit) interactionist assumptions pervading neuroscientific approaches to AVHs – that 
processes in one sphere, for example, neuronal processes, can produce subjective phenomena, 
for example, a voice-experience. Instead of focusing on a voice-hearer‘s brain, we then 
consider the voice-hearer as a living organism as primary entity in which we can observe both 
integral life processes (such as experiencing a voice), as well as physiological processes (such 
as neuronal processes related with voice-hearing) at different levels of detail35. Following 
Fuchs (2012a), we may thus describe AVHs ―on the one hand as a complex concatenation of 
physiological mechanisms, on the other hand as a biographically understandable reaction 
[…]‖ (p.216f.). 
These two aspects of the living organism as ontological unity, according to Fuchs 
(2011, 2013a) are to be seen as two epistemologically complementary aspects that are not 
                                                 
35 Similarly, Kotchoubey et al. (2016) propose for an integrative neuroscience that ―a double perspective should be defended 
that goes beyond the opposition between a fundamental anti-naturalism, on the one hand, and a reductive naturalism, on 
the other hand‖ (p.13). 
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transferable into each other36. Importantly, and in contrast to the implicit assumptions of many 
reviewed neuroscientific studies, there are no efficient causal relationships assumed between 
biological and experiential aspects (Fuchs, 2012a), but rather ―concordant changes within 
both aspects‖ (p.339)37. 
As alternative to the criticised prevailing metaphors of information and representation 
in neuroscientific conceptions of AVHs, it is proposed that the metaphor of resonance (e.g 
Fuchs, 2011, 2013a) might be a candidate for the description of neuronal processes associated 
with AVHs that comes without the problematic metaphysical assumptions of the former. 
What does that concretely mean for the reviewed studies? Let us examine how these 
concepts (aspect duality, resonance) can be used for re-interpreting reviewed studies in order 
to reach an integrative conceptualisation of voice-hearing phenomena.  
We can state, that there may well be certain neuronal excitation patterns and 
dispositions for neuronal excitations that, besides a voice-hearer‘s subjective experience are 
one aspect of an AVH. Regarding predictive coding accounts of AVHs, we may for example 
suppose that specific expectations (or the subjective state of being disposed to experience 
something as surprising or not) may go along with specific neuronal ―excitation dispositions‖.  
However, this is different from stating that these neuronal excitation patterns do cause 
those expectations. Rather they have to be considered the ―other side of the medal‖ of a voice-
hearer‘s state of expecting or not a specific voice. We, thus do not need to assume that a 
voice-hearer‘s brain predicts (or fails to predict), for example, a mental event.  
Neuronal excitability changes might also be associated with self-monitoring. Take the 
reviewed neurophysiological evidence for impaired verbal self-monitoring in voice-hearers 
with schizophrenia diagnosis as an example. It has been proposed that the N1-component of 
the auditory ERP is dampened in response to self-produced speech as compared to speech of 
others in healthy individuals, but not in voice-hearers (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007).  
Instead of interpreting such results in terms of a comparator mechanism, we might 
propose that healthy person differ in their resonance-disposition towards their own versus the 
speech of others. The observed N1-dampening may thus indicate a reduced resonance-
disposition (or excitability) regarding self-produced stimuli (as expressed at a neuronal level).  
                                                 
36 How exactly the physiological and mental processes are intertwined in the living organism remains an open question 
(Fuchs, 2011).  
37 ―there is no causation involved between ‗the mental‘ and ‗the physical‘, as if they were separated entities; rather, the person 
as a living being embodies and encompasses both aspects‖ (Fuchs, 2011, p. 217). 
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In voice-hearers, we may then hypothesise, we find an (abnormally) increased 
resonance-disposition towards (some) self-produced stimuli as expressed through a lack of 
N1-dampening in association with self-produced speech. Further, this might be related with an 
increased resonance between speech production and speech perception brain regions, or put 
differently with an abnormally heightened self-resonance. This would be in line with 
Stanghellini and Cutting‘s (2003) proposal that in the case of AVHs aspects of the self that 
usually are integrated in one‘s experience become explicated and are experienced as ―quasi-
other‖. Put differently, we might describe voice-hearing-phenomena in terms of an intra-
psychological resonance space, where voice-hearers enter in resonance with (alienated) parts 
of their selves as if they were another. In clinical-philosophical terms this may also tentatively 
be described in terms of a kind of hyper-reflexivity. Certainly, such a description may only be 
applicable to a subgroup of AVHs. 
Note that a comparator in the sense of a specific brain region that compares predicted 
with incoming input (such as the cerebellum) does not need to be assumed in such a 
conception (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001). We might rather postulate that incoming stimuli 
that are expected ―resonate‖ with specific available neuronal excitation patterns38 and, thus, 
go along with different neuronal responses as if the stimuli would not have been expected. 
These different responses, in turn, might go along with different subjective experiences.  
In a similar line, we may speculatively interpret the aberration in the observed 
aberration in the theta-band before AVH-onset (van Lutterveld et al., 2012) as corresponding 
to micro-gaps in time experience due to impaired passive time synthesis (Fuchs, 2013b).  
 
The reduced gamma-band synchrony in response to auditory stimuli that has been 
reported for voice-hearers as compared to healthy controls (Mulert et al., 2011) is in line with 
the assumption of clinical-philosophical positions that the experience of schizophrenia 
patients is generally altered, in the sense of an altered self- and world experience. We might 
speculate that an altered resonance disposition with regard to the intersubjective world (as 
postulated by Rojcewicz & Rojcewicz, 1997) might correspond to an altered resonance 
disposition regarding external stimuli on a neuronal level in the form of a reduced gamma-
band synchrony with environmental stimuli. Of course auditory stimuli in the form of ―clicks‖ 
are not to be equated with the intersubjective world. In order to test this specific hypothesis, it 
would be more appropriate to conduct social neuroscientific EEG-studies with voice-hearers, 
                                                 
38 Such available neuronal excitation patterns can be described in terms of attractors (Fuchs, 2011). 
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where, for example, is tested if one finds different neural oscillatory patterns in social 
situations in voice-hearers as compared to non-voice-hearers. 
 
Besides the relation between data from first- and third-person levels, in the reviewed 
studies we are further confronted with different levels within, for example, third-person data 
(e.g. genetic, brain structure, brain functioning). Here, it might be useful to distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical relations. The notions of vertical and horizontal circular 
causality (as proposed e.g., by Fuchs, 2013a) might provide a framework for the integration of 
results from different levels of analysis. According to the author, the notion of vertical circular 
causality refers to the circular relation between the whole and the parts of a living organism. 
This includes downward and upward causal effects between different levels of hierarchy. 
Further, Fuchs (e.g., 2013a) proposes that in the sense of vertical circular causality, mental 
processes might exhibit a formative causal role on physiological processes.  
In this sense, beliefs about voices or cognitive biases might act as top-down 
constraints onto possible experiences. Returning to the resonance-metaphor, in the case of 
hypervigilance hallucinations, a hypervigilance bias might be expressed by a heightened 
(neuronal) resonance-disposition towards specific stimuli. This is in line with the results of 
one reviewed study that found heightened perceptual sensitivity in schizophrenia patients with 
as compared to without AVHs (Vercammen et al., 2008). This influence, of course, is only 
possible, as they are embodied in the sense that they are enabled by neuronal processes 
(Fuchs, 2012a). Structural brain alterations reported for voice-hearers may also serve as an 
example of top-down formative vertical causality in constraining neuronal functioning.  
As an example of bottom-up vertical circular causality, we might consider abnormally 
constrained neurotransmitter activity, as proposed to play a role in AVHs by Aguilar et al. 
(2008)
39
. Although these authors focus on other neurotransmitters, the neurotransmitter 
GABA (gamma-aminobutyric acid) might be relevant in the context of the reviewed 
neuroscientific studies. This neurotransmitter has been related with gamma-band oscillations, 
as well as theta-band oscillations (Wulff et al., 2009). Moreover, a recent study provided 
evidence for the role of GABA as biological aspect of the inhibition of intrusive thoughts 
(Schmitz, Correia, Ferreira, Prescot, & Anderson, 2017). Impairments in neuronal inhibition 
due to abnormal GABA functioning in schizophrenia may be associated with the reported 
                                                 
39 Of course, the expression of genes is to be considered as constrained both in terms of vertical and in terms of horizontal 
circular causality. 
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decrease in theta-band power that was found in the right hippocampus during AVH-onset. 
Such mechanisms may be particularly appropriate for the further investigation of memory-
AVHs. 
Horizontal circular causality, in turn, is used in order to refer, first, to feedback cycles 
on the same hierarchical level within the organism and, second, to relationships between the 
living organism and his/her environment (Fuchs, 2013a).  
We might consider a proposal of Birchwood et al. (2000) in the light of the concept of 
horizontal circular causality. The authors propose that a vulnerability for voice-hearing might 
also include certain social schemata acquired in former interpersonal relations (e.g., with 
critical caregivers). Thus, on a horizontal level, interpersonal relationships may influence, for 
example, the content of experienced voices. As an example, let us consider someone who 
was/is used to hearing a critical comment in specific situations. The experience of receiving 
critical comments in those situations may be so incisive that it may become a part of the 
structure of one‘s experience of such situations. This, in turn, may lead to a heightened 
disposition to experience critically commenting voices in such situations. We could describe 
―quasi-present‖ voices in the same sense. To use the resonance-metaphor, we might describe 
such voices in terms of ―continued resonance‖. 
Such a circular conception of causality provides us with an alternative of simple one-
way causation40 (e.g., brain – experience). Accordingly, we can view AVHs not as ―brain 
diseases‖ but as circular events, which enables considering them in their context (Figure 17). 
Summarising, Fuchs (2012a) proposes that mental illness can be regarded a ―complex 
interplay of circular processes both at the vertical, organismic level and at the horizontal, 
interpersonal level‖ (p.338) where the brain acts as a mediating or transforming organ.  
Importantly, this framework allows for the dynamic conceptualisation of voice-
hearing: as different types of voice-hearing may be traced back to dis-functions at different 
sites of the cycle. That means that for example, the relevance of biological or psychosocial 
aspects for AVHs may depend both on individual cases and the temporal course of a specific 
case (Fuchs, 2012a). Before considering limitations and future directions we can derive from 
the present work, let us shortly consider some advantages of the proposed application of a 
phenomenological-ecological framework to voice-hearing. 
                                                 
40 At this point, it is important to note that different types of causality can be differentiated. Causality may, for example, be 
efficient or formative. Whereas the former refers to classical physical causation (e.g., A causes B), the latter refers to 
causality in the sense of, for example, structurally limiting the possible efficient causalities in a system (Mühling, 2014). 
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Figure 17 Different levels of analysis as framed within hypothetical relations of circular causality. Voice-hearers, Aguilar et al. (2008) propose, might be genetically disposed 
to AVHs. If a specific gene is expressed, however, as we see in the schema, might be ultimately influenced by a person‘s social environment. On the level of neurotransmitter 
functioning, it has been proposed that Glutamate (Hugdahl, 2009) and dopamine (Whitford et al., 2012) might play a role in voice-hearing. Altered neurotransmitter 
functioning might further influence functional and structural brain connectivity. On the other hand cognitive biases or beliefs about voices might be effective in terms of 
formal causality, that is, in influencing what kind of neuronal processes take place at all. We might describe different subtypes of AVHs on the horizontal level in terms of 
resonance. Hypervigilance AVHs, for example, might go along with an increased resonance disposition towards (specific) environmental stimuli. On the other hand social 
deafferentation AVHs (e.g., in situations of withdrawal from social life) might go along with a decreased resonance disposition regarding environmental stimuli, but an 
increased resonance disposition towards own activity.  
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7.3.4 Advantages of this conceptualisation 
A clear advantage of a conceptualisation of AVHs in phenomenological-ecological terms is 
that such an approach does not reduce voice-hearers‘ experiences to ―meaningless‖ 
symptoms, that result from an ill brain. It allows for regarding neuronal processes that are 
specific to voice-hearers within their wider ecological context and a re-focussing from the 
brain to voice-hearing as integral life-process. Including the voice-hearers environment in the 
conceptualisation of voice-hearing might, furthermore, prove helpful to examine why some 
voices are not constant: ―neuronal dispositions‖ specific of certain situations might enable the 
experience of voices in some situations but not in others. The concept of circular causality 
also allows for a conception of AVHs as dynamic phenomena as continuous reciprocal 
influences are assumed in this conception. Moreover, this phenomenological-ecological 
approach is sufficiently broad for the integration of results from different epistemic levels. 
Although this statement may be exaggerated, it has been proposed that an advantage of an 
approach to AVHs that allows for the integration of results from different epistemic levels 
―fosters interdisciplinarity and collaboration across traditional borders, facilitating a real 
breakthrough in future research‖ (Hugdahl & Sommer, 2017, p. 1). 
7.4 Limitations 
One limitation of the present work is the restriction to works in the English language. It 
cannot be excluded that through the inclusion of other languages a different picture about the 
research landscape of AVHs would have emerged.   
One could further object that certain perspectives towards AVHs, such as a 
psychological, are underrepresented in the present work. Similarly, it could be argued that the 
search of references of the included studies would have yielded further relevant results. Given 
the vast body of literature about AVHs, as well as the present work‘s space limits, it was 
certainly not possible to consider every possible perspective onto AVHs. However, the present 
work‘s aim was to consider perspectives towards AVHs in the actual debate about such 
phenomena with no claim to completeness. Unlike a meta-analysis the present work‘s aim 
was not to include all available data, but rather to provide a big picture of how the phenomena 
of AVHs are approached by different Cognitive Science disciplines. Given that a recent 
review provided similar results regarding the neuroscientific ―landscape‖ of AVHs 
(Upthegrove, Broome, et al., 2016) it seems unlikely that the present work presents a distorted 
picture. 
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Regarding the uneven ratio of reviewed studies for each discipline, we might respond, 
for example, that due to the more holistic nature of clinical phenomenological approaches to 
AVHs in the context of schizophrenia as compared to the great diversity of neurocognitive 
approaches towards AVHs, less works are needed to be considered for providing an overview 
of such perspectives. Also, clinical-philosophical works are often more extensive. 
 One could also question the focus on a single ―phenomenon‖ (AVHs) as artificial, as 
schizophrenia is associated with a range of other symptoms. However, AVHs are one of the 
defining symptoms of schizophrenia according to the prevailing diagnostic manuals. 
Moreover, in the reviewed studies, AVHs have been partly considered in their context of, for 
example, altered structures of experience (clinical-phenomenological approaches). That AVHs 
are trans-diagnostic phenomena (e.g., McCarthy-Jones & Longden, 2015) also justifies their 
consideration in apparent isolation. Lastly, a better understanding of AVHs also implies a 
better understanding of the human mind‘s complexity and possibilities (Hugdahl & Sommer, 
2017). 
One might further criticise the proposal of the utility of the resonance-metaphor for 
combining results regarding AVHs from different disciplines and associated levels of analysis 
as being vague. It is certainly true, that there is a long way to go until a sound theory of AVHs 
(and e.g., associated brain functioning) in terms of resonance. However, this metaphor seems 
to be a promising alternative to information- and representation metaphors, whose 
appropriateness has to be questioned and is certainly not less speculative. Moreover, relatively 
vague concepts, such as the one of ―resonance‖ come with the advantage of possible 
circulation ―between different domains of research‖ (Morange, 2010, p. 180) which may be 
useful in overcoming the limits of a single discipline or approach (Kotchoubey et al., 2016). If 
these metaphors are useful for the treatment of distressing voices, and thus, for voice-hearers 
remains open for empirical inquiry. Given that there is evidence that voice-hearers who 
assume that their experience is due to a neurochemical imbalance feel powerless regarding 
their voices (Jones, Guy, & Ormrod, 2003) an aspect-dualist view on AVHs, where the voice-
hearer and not neuronal processes are put in the center, seems to be a promising alternative to 
reductionist approaches. 
Given the initial research question (what are AVHs?) one might also wonder why no 
clear definition of such phenomena was provided. As a beginning, a shift away from 
audibility towards the communicational character of voice-experiences for a re-
conceptualisation of AVHs was proposed. Also, as noted in the beginning the re-
conceptualisation of AVHs has to be regarded a process, to which the present work hopefully 
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contributes. Moreover, given the vast diversity of voices, there might be several possible 
definitions for different types of voices. The present work in that sense is to be seen as a point 
of departure rather than of arrival. 
7.5 Future directions 
From the present work, various implications for future AVH-research can be drawn. Various 
recommendations result from the fact that AVHs are heterogeneous and individual 
experiences, even reported within a context of schizophrenia-spectrum diagnoses. In future 
studies, consideration of phenomenological features of voice-hearing is crucial, if one does 
not want to take the risk of developing models of voice-hearing and carrying out studies that 
are of little use for an understanding of AVHs that is relevant for voice-hearers. The 
consideration of voice-content is likely to be important in order to disentangle different AVH-
subtypes and develop adequate treatment options. 
In order to obtain more consistent empirical results, this heterogeneity has to be taken 
into account in future studies about AVHs. In order to capture this heterogeneity, the 
measures used in the reviewed studies are not sufficiently fine-grained. A first step into the 
direction of more fine-grained measures seems to conduct large-scale qualitative studies. It 
has been repeatedly reported that patients appreciated to talk in detail about their voice-
experiences (e.g., Rosen et al., 2015; Stephane, Thuras, Nasrallah, & Georgopoulos, 2003). 
Therefore, a readiness to participate in such studies should be expected. 
Neuroimaging studies, for example may be designed in order to investigate possible 
differences between biological aspects of AVHs that differ in phenomenology. It may, for 
example, be hypothesised that different neural substrates are engaged in second-person and 
third-person AVHs: second-person AVHs may be associated with a greater activation of brain 
regions involved in social cognition, whereas third-person AVHs might be associated to a 
greater extent with brain areas involved in rumination. As voice-experiences and a voice-
hearer‘s relation to his/her voices may change over time, moreover, it should be recorded 
when AVHs were first experienced in order to make the inclusion of time as a co-variable 
possible.  
The involvement of voice-hearers‘ perspectives may also be of value for the 
discussion of theoretical models of VH that aim at explaining their experiences. Concretely, it 
might be, for example, examined in qualitative studies in how far voice-hearers think that 
their experience of the power of a voice corresponds to a belief about that voice. Such 
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preliminary studies might prevent the investment of time and money into research projects 
that are possibly flawed from the beginning. 
Together, neuroscientific, psychological and philosophical approaches to AVHs would 
benefit from increasing the ―conceptual clearness‖ in their accounts. This would both render 
them more intelligible and make them more easily empirically accessible. It should, for 
example, be taken into account that certain concepts used in neuroscientific approaches to 
AVHs, only serve for metaphorical descriptions of brain functioning. Phenomenological 
philosophical theorists might investigate further how different proposed concepts relate to 
each other and can be delineated. Further, it could be considered in interdisciplinary 
discussions in how far homologies or overlapping between concepts proposed by different 
Cognitive Science disciplines can be established. Importantly, researchers from different 
disciplines are trained in different technical jargons and may understand specific technical 
terms differently, that is, in accordance with their discipline‘s jargon. In this context, it is 
relevant to take (differing) basic assumption of different disciplines into account. This would 
help to prevent the hampering of interdisciplinary teamwork regarding AVHs by implicit 
differing basic assumptions. Fruitful interdisciplinary work about AVHs would certainly be 
beneficial for voice-hearers, as it allows for drawing a more complete picture of AVHs. 
According to recently proposed guidelines regarding the design of experiments 
(Garcia-Marques & Ferreira, 2011) it might make sense to try to develop experiments that are 
―only weakly theory dependent‖ (p.197) and test very specific hypotheses in order to provide 
results that are helpful in different competing conceptions of AVHs (on this point see also 
Cho & Wu, 2013; Ćurčić-Blake et al., 2017). 
Lastly, if we are right that a considerable part of AVHs have an experiential core of 
being communicated to or about, taking into account pragmatic/linguist perspectives will 
prove valuable to complement neuroscientific, psychological and clinical-philosophical 
accounts of AVHs.  
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8 Conclusion 
In the present work literature regarding AVHs from different fields of Cognitive Science (i.e., 
neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy) was systematically reviewed with the aim of 
identifying which concepts are used in different approaches to conceptualise such phenomena.  
In contrast to former literature reviews, such approaches were examined regarding implicit 
and explicit metaphysical assumptions in order to regard their standpoints in a wider 
Cognitive Science context.  
Regarding the reviewed empirical results, the designs of the studies do not allow to 
draw final conclusions. Moreover, methodological diversity makes it hard to compare 
different studies directly, even when for example the same neuroimaging method was applied. 
Existing neuroscientific conceptions of AVHs largely overlook core experiential 
features of VH as well as the great heterogeneity of such phenomena. Instead we find an 
emphasis on such features that seem to be relevant only for a subgroup of such phenomena, 
such as audibility. Voice-hearing is best conceived as a group of phenomena. It is unclear if 
there is one essential feature characteristic that applies to all phenomena that are designated as 
―auditory verbal hallucination‖ or ―voice-hearing‖ in the clinical context. We have proposed 
that some experience of communication (e.g., being communicated to or about) may be a 
candidate for such a feature.  
The reviewed psychological conceptions of AVHs focus on voice-hearers‘ relations to 
their voices as well as their role as reaction to stressful life-events. Clinical-philosophical 
conceptions, then again, propose that schizophrenia is manifested in an altered structure of 
experience, against which background AVHs arise. 
In existing neuroscientific and cognitive psychological literature, AVHs are largely 
conceptualised (implicitly) following the philosophical position of ―interactionist dualism‖. 
That is, neuronal processes are assumed to efficiently cause (immaterial) mental phenomena, 
such as thoughts and beliefs and the other way round. Clinical-phenomenological approaches 
to voice-hearing on the other hand rely partly on concepts that have been criticised to be 
vague (Mishara, 2010). 
A range of different, largely non-overlapping, concepts has been used in order to 
conceptualise AVHs in the Cognitive Science disciplines considered in this work. These 
concepts range from supposed neuronal processes (e.g., corollary discharge) over 
psychological constructs (e.g., belief) to phenomenological concepts (e.g., ipseity). Although 
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some common themes of these approaches can be identified (self, temporality, compensation, 
memory), these themes themselves are approached rather differently by, for example, 
neuroscience and clinical philosophy. Therefore, no simple parallels can be drawn between 
these disciplines in terms of structural homology. Nonetheless, the concepts of aspect duality 
and circular causality (as, for example, proposed by Fuchs, e.g., 2013a) have been proposed 
as a first step towards an integration of results regarding AVHs from different epistemic 
levels. The consideration of such frameworks, we think, constitutes a necessary basis for 
fruitful interdisciplinary integration of AVH-research. Such considerations are valuable for 
reflecting one‘s disciplines implicit basic assumptions regarding human existence and 
experience that possibly prevent an adequate conceptualisation of AVHs. An adequate 
conceptualisation of AVHs, however, is indispensable both for research into such phenomena 
and will ultimately be to the benefit of those who suffer from such experiences. On the way to 
a clearer understanding of AVHs, it is crucial to hear what voice-hearers have to say about 
their experiences. 
Hopefully, the present work will contribute to the interdisciplinary discussion of 
methodological and conceptual limits of existing approaches to AVHs and provide input 
regarding the integration of different perspectives that takes into account such limits. This 
step, we propose, is indispensable for an interdisciplinary (re-)conceptualisation of these 
intriguing phenomena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
 
Appendix 
Complete list of the studies included in the systematic literature review. 
 1.Aguilar, E. J., Sanjuán, J., García-Martí, G., Lull, J. J., Robles, M., Jes, E., & Jos, J. (2008). 
MR and genetics in schizophrenia: Focus on auditory hallucinations. European Journal 
of Radiology, 67(3), 434–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejrad.2008.02.046 
2. Alba-Ferrara, L. M., Fernyhough, C., Weis, S., Mitchell, R. L. C., & Hausmann, M. (2012). 
Contributions of emotional prosody comprehension deficits to the formation of auditory 
verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia. Clinical Psychology Review, 32(4), 244–250. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2012.02.003 
3. Allen, P. P., Larøi, F., & Mcguire, P. K. (2008). The hallucinating brain : A review of 
structural and functional neuroimaging studies of hallucinations. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 32, 175–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007.07.012 
4. Andrew, E. M., Gray, N. S., & Snowden, R. J. (2008). The relationship between trauma and 
beliefs about hearing voices: a study of psychiatric and non-psychiatric voice hearers. 
Psychological Medicine, 38(10), 1409–1417. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329170700253X 
5. Badcock, J. C. (2010). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Auditory Hallucinations: A 
Parallel Auditory Pathways Framework. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36(3), 576–584. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn128 
6. Behrendt, R.-P., & Whittingham, M. (2005). Vocalisation in verbal hallucinations: Case 
report and theoretical model. Psychopathology, 39, 38–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1159/000089662 
7. Bell, V. (2013). A Community of One : Social Cognition and Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations. PLOS Biology, 11(12), 1–4. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001723 
8. Birchwood, M., Gilbert, P., Gilbert, J., Trower, P., Meaden, A., Hay, J., … Miles, J. N. V. 
(2004). Interpersonal and role-related schema influence the relationship with the 
dominant ―voice‖ in schizophrenia: a comparison of three models. Psychological 
 128 
 
Medicine, 34(8), 1571–1580. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291704002636 
9. Birchwood, M., Meaden, A., Trower, P., Gilbert, P., & Plaistow, J. (2000). The power and 
omnipotence of voices : subordination and entrapment by voices and significant others. 
Psychological Medicine, 30, 337–344. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799001828 
10. Brébion, G., Bressan, R. A., Ohlsen, R. I., & David, A. S. (2013). A model of memory 
impairment in schizophrenia: Cognitive and clinical factors associated with memory 
efficiency and memory errors. Schizophrenia Research, 151(1–3), 70–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2013.09.009 
11. Brébion, G., Gorman, J. M., Malaspina, D., & Amador, X. (2005). A model of verbal 
memory impairments in schizophrenia: two systems and their associations with 
underlying cognitive processes and clinical symptoms. Psychological Medicine, 35, 133–
142. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291704002879 
12. Catani, M., Craig, M. C., Forkel, S. J., Kanaan, R., Picchioni, M., Toulopoulou, T., … 
Mcguire, P. K. (2011). Altered integrity of perisylvian language pathways in 
schizophrenia: Relationship to auditory hallucinations. Biological Psychiatry, 70(12), 
1143–1150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.06.013 
13. Chhabra, S., Badcock, J. C., & Maybery, M. T. (2013). Memory binding in clinical and 
non-clinical psychotic experiences: how does the continuum model fare? Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 18(4), 304–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2012.709183 
14. Cho, R., & Wu, W. (2013). Mechanisms of auditory verbal hallucination in schizophrenia. 
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00155 
15. Cho, R., & Wu, W. (2014). Is inner speech the basis of auditory verbal hallucination in 
schizophrenia? Frontiers in Psychiatry, 5, 1–3. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00075 
16. Ćurčić-Blake, B., Liemburg, E., Vercammen, A., Swart, M., Knegtering, H., Bruggeman, 
R., & Aleman, A. (2013). When Broca goes uninformed: Reduced information flow to 
Broca‘s area in schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 39(5), 1087–1095. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs107 
17. Daalman, K., Verkooijen, S., Derks, E. M., Aleman, A., & Sommer, I. E. C. (2012). The 
influence of semantic top-down processing in auditory verbal hallucinations. 
 129 
 
Schizophrenia Research, 139(1–3), 82–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2012.06.005 
18. Dodgson, G., & Gordon, S. (2009). Avoiding false negatives: are some auditory 
hallucinations an evolved design flaw? Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 37(3), 
325–334. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465809005244 
19. Escartí, M. J., de la Iglesia-Vayá, M., Martí-Bonmatí, L., Robles, M., Carbonell, J., Lull, 
J. J., … Sanjuán, J. (2010). Increased amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus activation in 
schizophrenic patients with auditory hallucinations: An fMRI study using independent 
component analysis. Schizophrenia Research, 117(1), 31–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2009.12.028 
20. Evans, C. L., Mcguire, P. K., & David, A. S. (2000). Is auditory imagery defective in 
patients with auditory hallucinations? Psychological Medicine, 30(1), 137–148. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799001555 
21. Ford, J. M., Ph, D., Roach, B. J., Faustman, W. O., & Mathalon, D. H. (2007). Synch 
Before You Speak : Auditory Hallucinations Synch Before You Speak : Auditory 
Hallucinations in Schizophrenia, (November 2016). 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.164.3.458 
22. Fuchs, T. (2005). Corporealized and Disembodied Minds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
Psychology, 12, 95–107. 
23. Fuchs, T. (2013). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences, 12(1), 75–104. 
24. Gregory, D. (2016). Inner Speech, Imagined Speech, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(3), 653–673. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-
015-0274-z 
25. Hayward, M. (2003). Interpersonal relating and voice hearing: to what extent does relating 
to the voice reflect social relating? Psychology and Psychotherapy, 76, 369–383. 
https://doi.org/10.1348/147608303770584737 
26. Heinks-Maldonado, T. H., Mathalon, D. H., Houde, J. F., Gray, M., Faustman, W. O., & 
Ford, J. M. (2007). Relationship of imprecise corollary discharge in schizophrenia to 
auditory hallucinations. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64, 286–296. 
 130 
 
https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.64.3.286 
27. Henriksen, M. G., Raballo, A., & Parnas, J. (2015). The Pathogenesis of Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations in Schizophrenia: A Clinical–Phenomenological Account. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, & Psychology, 22(3), 165–181. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2015.0041 
28. Horga, G., Fernández-Egea, E., Mané, A., Font, M., Schatz, K. C., Falcon, C., … 
Parellada, E. (2014). Brain metabolism during hallucination-like auditory stimulation in 
schizophrenia. PLoS ONE, 9(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0084987 
29. Horga, G., Peterson, B., Horga, G., Schatz, K. C., Abi-dargham, A., & Peterson, B. S. 
(2014). Deficits in Predictive Coding Underlie Hallucinations in Schizophrenia Deficits 
in Predictive Coding Underlie Hallucinations in Schizophrenia, 34, 8072–8082. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0200-14.2014 
30. Hubl, D., Koenig, T., Strik, W., Federspiel, A., Kreis, R., Boesch, C., … Dierks, T. 
(2004). Pathways That Make Voices. Arch Gen Psychiatry, 61(July 2004), 658–668. 
31. Hugdahl, K. (2009). ―hearing voices‖: Auditory hallucinations as failure of top-down 
control of bottom-up perceptual processes. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 50(6), 
553–560. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9450.2009.00775.x 
32. Ilankovic, M. L., Allen, P. P., Engel, R., Kambeitz, J., Riedel, M., Müller, N., & Hennig-
Fast, K. (2011). Attentional modulation of external speech attribution in patients with 
hallucinations and delusions. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 805–812. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.01.016 
33. Johns, L. C., Rossell, S., Frith, C., Ahmad, F., Hemsley, D., Kuipers, E., & McGuire, P. 
K. (2001). Verbal self-monitoring and auditory verbal hallucinations in patients with 
schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 31, 705–715. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291701003774 
34. Jones, S. R., & Fernyhough, C. (2007a). Neural correlates of inner speech and auditory 
verbal hallucinations: A critical review and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 27(2), 140–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2006.10.001 
35. Jones, S. R., & Fernyhough, C. (2007b). Thought as action: Inner speech, self-monitoring, 
and auditory verbal hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition, 16(2), 391–399. 
 131 
 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.12.003 
36. Krishnan, R. R., Fivaz, M., Kraus, M. S., & Keefe, R. S. E. (2011). Hierarchical temporal 
processing deficit model of reality distortion and psychoses. Molecular Psychiatry, 
16(2), 129–144. https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2011.54 
37. Lee, S., Wynn, J. K., Green, M. F., Kim, H., Lee, K.-J., Nam, M., … Chung, Y.-C. 
(2006). Quantitative EEG and low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) 
imaging of patients with persistent auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 83, 
111–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2005.11.025 
38. Looijestijn, J., Diederen, K. M. J., Goekoop, R., Sommer, I. E. C., Daalman, K., Kahn, R. 
S., … Blom, J. D. (2013). The auditory dorsal stream plays a crucial role in projecting 
hallucinated voices into external space. Schizophrenia Research, 146(1–3), 314–319. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2013.02.004 
39. Moritz, S., & Larøi, F. (2008). Differences and similarities in the sensory and cognitive 
signatures of voice-hearing, intrusions and thoughts. Schizophrenia Research, 102(1–3), 
96–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2008.04.007 
40. Mulert, C., Kirsch, V., Pascual-Marqui, R., McCarley, R. W., & Spencer, K. M. (2011). 
Long-range synchrony of gamma oscillations and auditory hallucination symptoms in 
schizophrenia. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 79(1), 55–63. 
41. Naudin, J., & Azorin, J.-M. (1997). The Hallucinatory Epoché. Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, 28(2), 171–195. 
42. Nazimek, J. M., Hunter, M. D., & Woodruff, P. W. R. (2012). Auditory hallucinations: 
Expectation – perception model. Medical Hypothesis, 78, 802–810. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2012.03.014 
43. Rojcewicz, S. J., & Rojcewicz, R. (1997). The ―Human‖ Voices In Hallucinations. 
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 28(1), 1–41. 
44. Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(3), 427–444. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 
45. Seal, M. L., Aleman, A., & McGuire, P. K. (2004). Compelling imagery, unanticipated 
 132 
 
speech and deceptive memory: Neurocognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations 
in schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1–2), 43–72. Retrieved from 
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=15459874 
46. Sperling, W., Bleich, S., Maihöfner, C., & Reulbach, U. (2009). Auditory hallucinations 
in schizophrenia - Outcry of a diseased brain? Medical Hypotheses, 72(2), 213–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2008.09.005 
47. Sritharan, A., Line, P., Sergejew, A., Silberstein, R., Egan, G., & Copolov, D. (2005). 
EEG coherence measures during auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Psychiatry 
Research, 136(2–3), 189–200. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2005.05.010 
48. Stanghellini, G., & Cutting, J. (2003). Auditory verbal hallucinations - Breaking the 
silence of inner dialogue. Psychopathology, 36(3), 120–128. 
https://doi.org/10.1159/000071256 
49. Strik, W., & Dierks, T. (2004). How modern neurophysiology can help to understand 
schizophrenia. Schweizer Archiv Für Neurologie Und Psychiatrie, 155(8), 368–374. 
50. Strik, W., & Dierks, T. (2008). Neurophysiological mechanisms of psychotic symptoms. 
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 258, 66–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00406-008-5016-0 
51. Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Leudar, I. (2004). Hearing voices: A phenomenological-
hermeneutic approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1–2), 13–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800344000138 
52. van de Ven, V. G., Formisano, E., Röder, C. H., Prvulovic, D., Bittner, R. A., Dietz, M. 
G., … Linden, D. E. J. (2005). The spatiotemporal pattern of auditory cortical responses 
during verbal hallucinations. NeuroImage, 27(3), 644–655. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.04.041 
53. van der Gaag, M. (2006). A neuropsychiatric model of biological and psychological 
processes in the remission of delusions and auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 32, 113–122. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbl027 
54. van Lutterveld, R., Hillebrand, A., Diederen, K. M. J., Daalman, K., Kahn, R. S., Stam, C. 
J., & Sommer, I. E. C. (2012). Oscillatory cortical network involved in auditory verbal 
 133 
 
hallucinations in Schizophrenia. PLoS ONE, 7(7), 1–7. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0041149 
55. van Tol, M. J., van Der Meer, L., Bruggeman, R., Modinos, G., Knegtering, H., & 
Aleman, A. (2014). Voxel-based gray and white matter morphometry correlates of 
hallucinations in schizophrenia: The superior temporal gyrus does not stand alone. 
NeuroImage: Clinical, 4, 249–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2013.12.008 
56. Vercammen, A., de Haan, E. H. F., & Aleman, A. (2008). Hearing a voice in the noise: 
auditory hallucinations and speech perception. Psychological Medicine, 38(8), 1177–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291707002437 
57. Waters, F., Allen, P. P., Aleman, A., Fernyhough, C., Woodward, T. S., Badcock, J. C., … 
Larøi, F. (2012). Auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia and nonschizophrenia 
populations: A review and integrated model of cognitive mechanisms. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 38(4), 683–692. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs045 
58. Waters, F., Badcock, J. C., Michie, P., & Maybery, M. (2006). Auditory hallucinations in 
schizophrenia : Intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 
11(1), 65–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800444000191 
59. Whitford, T. J., Ford, J. M., Mathalon, D. H., Kubicki, M., & Shenton, M. E. (2012). 
Schizophrenia, myelination, and delayed corollary discharges: A hypothesis. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38(3), 486–494. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbq105 
60. Wiggins, O. P., & Schwartz, M. A. (2007). Schizophrenia: a phenomenological-
anthropological approach. In M. C. Chung, B. Fulford, & G. Graham (Eds.), 
Reconceiving Schizophrenia (pp. 113–129). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.515655 
61. Wilkinson, S. (2014). Accounting for the phenomenology and varieties of auditory verbal 
hallucination within a predictive processing framework. Consciousness and Cognition, 
30, 142–155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.09.002 
62. Wu, W. (2012). Explaining Schizophrenia : Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self- 
Monitoring. Mind and Language, 27(1), 86–107. 
 
 134 
 
References 
Aggernaes, A. (1967). The experienced reality of hallucinations and other psychological 
phenomena. An empirical analysis. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 48(3), 220–238. 
Aguilar, E. J., Sanjuán, J., García-Martí, G., Lull, J. J., Robles, M., Jes, E., & Jos, J. (2008). 
MR and genetics in schizophrenia: Focus on auditory hallucinations. European Journal 
of Radiology, 67(3), 434–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejrad.2008.02.046 
Alba-Ferrara, L. M., Fernyhough, C., Weis, S., Mitchell, R. L. C., & Hausmann, M. (2012). 
Contributions of emotional prosody comprehension deficits to the formation of auditory 
verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia. Clinical Psychology Review, 32(4), 244–250. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2012.02.003 
Alexander, A. L., Lee, J. E., Lazar, M., & Field, A. S. (2007). Diffusion Tensor Imaging of 
the Brain. Neurotherapeutics, 4(3), 316–329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nurt.2007.05.011 
Allen, P. P., Larøi, F., & Mcguire, P. K. (2008). The hallucinating brain : A review of 
structural and functional neuroimaging studies of hallucinations. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 32, 175–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007.07.012 
American Psychiatric Association. (2016). Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic 
Disorders: DSM-5® Selections. Arlington: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders . (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Andreasen, N. C. (1984). The Scale for the assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS). In The 
University of Iowa. Iowa. 
Andrew, C., & Fein, G. (2010). Event-Related Oscillations Versus Event-Related Potentials in 
a P300 Task as Biomarkers for Alcoholism. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental 
Research., 34(4), 669–680. 
Andrew, E. M., Gray, N. S., & Snowden, R. J. (2008). The relationship between trauma and 
beliefs about hearing voices: a study of psychiatric and non-psychiatric voice hearers. 
Psychological Medicine, 38(10), 1409–1417. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329170700253X 
 135 
 
Arnal, L. H., Wyart, V., & Giraud, A.-L. (2011). Transitions in neural oscillations reflect 
prediction errors generated in audiovisual speech. Nature Neuroscience, 14(6), 797–801. 
Asendorpf, J. B., Conner, M., De Fruyt, F., De Houwer, J., Denissen, J. J. A., Fiedler, K., … 
Wicherts, J. M. (2012). Recommendations for increasing replicability in psychology. 
European Journal of Personality, 27, 108–119. https://doi.org/10.1002/per 
Aung, W. Y., Mar, S., & Benzinger, T. L. (2013). Diffusion tensor MRI as a biomarker in 
axonal and myelin damage. Imaging in Medicine, 5(5), 427–440. 
https://doi.org/10.2217/iim.13.49 
Badcock, J. C. (2010). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Auditory Hallucinations: A 
Parallel Auditory Pathways Framework. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36(3), 576–584. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn128 
Bailer-Jones, D. (2009). Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Başar, E., Başar-Eroglu, C., Karakaş, S., & Schürmann, M. (2000). Gamma, alpha, delta, and 
theta oscillations govern cognitive processes. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 
39(2–3), 241–248. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(00)00145-8 
Bastiaansen, M., Mazaheri, A., & Jensen, O. (2012). Beyond ERPs: oscillatory neuronal 
dynamics. In The Oxford handbook of event-related potential components. (pp. 31–50). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beavan, V. (2011). Towards a definition of ―hearing voices‖: A phenomenological approach. 
Psychosis, 3(1), 63–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/17522431003615622 
Behrendt, R.-P., & Whittingham, M. (2005). Vocalisation in verbal hallucinations: Case 
report and theoretical model. Psychopathology, 39, 38–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1159/000089662 
Belin, P., Zatorre, R., & Pike, B. G. (2000). Voice-selective areas in human auditory cortex in 
human auditory cortex. Nature, 403, 309–312. https://doi.org/10.1038/35002078 
Bell, V. (2013). A Community of One : Social Cognition and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. 
PLOS Biology, 11(12), 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001723 
 136 
 
Bentall, R. P., Jackson, H. F., & Pilgrim, D. (1988). Abandoning the concept of 
‗schizophrenia‗: Some implications of validity arguments for psychological research into 
psychotic phenomena. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27, 303–324. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1988.tb00795.x 
Berger, A. (2002). How does it work? Magnetic resonance imaging. BMJ: British Medical 
Journal, 324(7328), 35. 
Birchwood, M., Gilbert, P., Gilbert, J., Trower, P., Meaden, A., Hay, J., … Miles, J. N. V. 
(2004). Interpersonal and role-related schema influence the relationship with the 
dominant ―voice‖ in schizophrenia: a comparison of three models. Psychological 
Medicine, 34(8), 1571–1580. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291704002636 
Birchwood, M., Meaden, A., Trower, P., Gilbert, P., & Plaistow, J. (2000). The power and 
omnipotence of voices : subordination and entrapment by voices and significant others. 
Psychological Medicine, 30, 337–344. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799001828 
Blakemore, S.-J., Smith, J., Steel, R., Johnstone, E. C., & Frith, C. D. (2000). The perception 
of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity 
experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psychological Medicine, 30, 
1131–1139. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799002676 
Borck, C. (2012). Toys are Us: Models and Metaphors in Brain Research. In S. Choudhury & 
J. Slaby (Eds.), Critical Neuroscience. A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts 
of Neuroscience (pp. 113–135). New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Bowyer, S. M. (2016). Coherence a measure of the brain networks: past and present. 
Neuropsychiatric Electrophysiology, 2(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40810-015-0015-7 
Brébion, G., Bressan, R. A., Ohlsen, R. I., & David, A. S. (2013). A model of memory 
impairment in schizophrenia: Cognitive and clinical factors associated with memory 
efficiency and memory errors. Schizophrenia Research, 151(1–3), 70–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2013.09.009 
Brody, A. L., Saxena, S., Stoessel, P., Gillies, L. A., Fairbanks, L. A., Alborzian, S., Phelps, 
M. E., … Baxter, L. R. (2001). Regional Brain Metabolic Changes in Patients With 
Major Depression Treated With Either Paroxetine or Interpersonal Therapy. Arch Gen 
Psychiatry, 58, 631–640. 
 137 
 
Brutian, G. A., & Wilson, T. A. (1979). On Philosophical Argumentation. Philosophy and 
Rhetoric, 12(2), 77–90. 
Buckner, R. L., & Petersen, S. E. (1996). What does neuroimaging tell us about the role of 
prefrontal cortex in memory retrieval? Seminars in Neuroscience, 8, 47–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/smns.1996.0007 
Callaos, N., & Callaos, B. (2002). Toward a Systemic Notion of Information: Practical 
Consequences. Informing Science, 5(1), 1–99. 
Carp, J. (2012a). On the plurality of (methodological) worlds: estimating the analytic 
flexibility of FMRI experiments. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6, 1–13. 
Carp, J. (2012b). The secret lives of experiments : Methods reporting in the fMRI literature. 
NeuroImage, 63(1), 289–300. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.07.004 
Catani, M., Craig, M. C., Forkel, S. J., Kanaan, R., Picchioni, M., Toulopoulou, T., … 
Mcguire, P. K. (2011). Altered integrity of perisylvian language pathways in 
schizophrenia: Relationship to auditory hallucinations. Biological Psychiatry, 70(12), 
1143–1150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.06.013 
Cermolacce, M., Naudin, J., & Parnas, J. (2007). The ―minimal self‖ in psychopathology: Re-
examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 16(3), 703–714. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.013 
Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 2(3), 200–219. 
Chaudhury, S. (2010). Hallucinations: Clinical aspects and management. Industrial 
Psychiatry Journal, 19(1), 5–12. 
Chhabra, S., Badcock, J. C., & Maybery, M. T. (2013). Memory binding in clinical and non-
clinical psychotic experiences: how does the continuum model fare? Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 18(4), 304–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2012.709183 
Cho, R., & Wu, W. (2013). Mechanisms of auditory verbal hallucination in schizophrenia. 
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00155 
Cho, R., & Wu, W. (2014). Is inner speech the basis of auditory verbal hallucination in 
 138 
 
schizophrenia? Frontiers in Psychiatry, 5, 1–3. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00075 
Choi, B., & Pak, A. (2006). Multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinarity in 
health research, services, education and policy: 1. Defintions, objectives, and evidence of 
effectiveness. Clin Invest Med, 29(6), 351–364. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2010.08.010 
Chong, H. Y., Teoh, S. L., Wu, D. B.-C., Kotirum, S., Chiou, C.-F., & Chaiyakunapruk, N. 
(2016). Global economic burden of schizophrenia: a systematic review. Neuropsychiatric 
Disease and Treatment, 12, 357–73. https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S96649 
Cockshutt, G. (2004). Choices for voices: a voice hearer‘s perspective on hearing voices. 
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1–2), 9–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800344000129 
Cohen, M. X. (2017). Where Does EEG Come From and What Does It Mean? Trends in 
Neurosciences, 40(4), 208–218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2017.02.004 
Colombo, A., Bendelow, G., Fulford, B., & Williams, S. (2002). Evaluating the influence of 
implicit models of mental disorder on process of shared decision making within 
community-based multi-disciplinary teams. Social Science and Medicine, 56, 1557–
1570. 
Copolov, D., Trauer, T., & Mackinnon, A. (2004). On the non-significance of internal versus 
external auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 69(1), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-9964(03)00092-6 
Corstens, D., & Longden, E. (2013). The origins of voices : links between life history and 
voice hearing in a survey of 100 cases. Psychosis, 5(3), 270–285. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17522439.2013.816337 
Corstens, D., Longden, E., McCarthy-Jones, S., Waddingham, R., & Thomas, N. (2014). 
Emerging Perspectives From the Hearing Voices Movement : Implications for Research 
and Practice. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40(suppl. no. 4), 285–294. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu007 
Ćurčić-Blake, B., Ford, J. M., Hubl, D., Orlov, N. D., Sommer, I. E. C., Waters, F., … 
Aleman, A. (2017). Interaction of language, auditory and memory brain networks in 
auditory verbal hallucinations. Progress in Neurobiology, 148, 1–20. 
 139 
 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2016.11.002 
Ćurčić-Blake, B., Liemburg, E., Vercammen, A., Swart, M., Knegtering, H., Bruggeman, R., 
& Aleman, A. (2013). When Broca goes uninformed: Reduced information flow to 
Broca‘s area in schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 39(5), 1087–1095. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs107 
Cytowic, R. (2003). The Clinician‘s Paradox: Believing Those You Must Not Trust. Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 157–166. 
Daalman, K., Verkooijen, S., Derks, E. M., Aleman, A., & Sommer, I. E. C. (2012). The 
influence of semantic top-down processing in auditory verbal hallucinations. 
Schizophrenia Research, 139(1–3), 82–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2012.06.005 
Dahlberg, K. (2006). The essence of essences - The search for meaning structures in 
phenomenological analysis of lifeworld phenomena. International Journal of Qualitative 
Studies on Health and Well-Being, 1(1), 11–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17482620500478405 
Damoiseaux, J. S., & Greicius, M. D. (2009). Greater than the sum of its parts: a review of 
studies combining structural connectivity and resting-state functional connectivity. Brain 
Structure and Function, 213(6), 525–533. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-009-0208-6 
David, A. S. (2004). The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations : An 
overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 107–123. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800344000183 
Davies, P., Thomas, P., & Leudar, I. (1999). Dialogical engagement with voices: a single case 
study. The British Journal of Medical Psychology, 72, 179–87. 
https://doi.org/10.1348/000711299159934 
de Boer, J. N., Heringa, S. M., van Dellen, E., Wijnen, F. N. K., & Sommer, I. E. C. (2016). A 
linguistic comparison between auditory verbal hallucinations in patients with a psychotic 
disorder and in nonpsychotic individuals: Not just what the voices say, but how they say 
it. Brain and Language, 162, 10–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2016.07.011 
de Haan, L., & Bakker, J. M. (2004). Overview of Neuropathological Theories of 
Schizophrenia : From Degeneration to Progressive Developmental Disorder. 
 140 
 
Psychopathology, 37, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1159/000077013 
de Leede-Smith, S., & Barkus, E. (2013). A comprehensive review of auditory verbal 
hallucinations: lifetime prevalence, correlates and mechanisms in healthy and clinical 
individuals. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(367), 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00367 
Decker, S. L., Fillmore, P. T., & Roberts, A. M. (2017). Coherence: The Measurement and 
Application of Brain Connectivity. NeuroRegulation, 4(1), 3–13. 
https://doi.org/10.15540/nr.4.1.3 
Demjen, Z., & Semino, E. (2015). Henry‘s voices: the representation of auditory verbal 
hallucinations in an autobiographical narrative. Medical Humanities, 41, 57–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/medhum-2014-010617 
Dennett, D. (2007). Philosophy as naive anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker. In 
M. R. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. Hacker, J. Searle, & D. Robinson (Eds.), Neuroscience 
and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. (pp. 73–96). New York, Chichester, West 
Sussex: Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00251.x 
Dodgson, G., & Gordon, S. (2009). Avoiding false negatives: are some auditory 
hallucinations an evolved design flaw? Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 37(3), 
325–334. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465809005244 
Dorsch, F. (2010). The unity of hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 
9(2), 171–191. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9165-z 
Egner, T., Monti, J. M., & Summerfield, C. (2010). Expectation and surprise determine neural 
population responses in the ventral visual stream. The Journal of Neuroscience : The 
Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 30(49), 16601–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2770-10.2010 
Engel, A. K., & Fries, P. (2010). Beta-band oscillations — signalling the status quo? Current 
Opinion in Neurobiology, 20, 156–165. 
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., & Singer, W. (2001). Dynamic predictions: Oscillations and 
synchrony in top–down processing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2(10), 704–716. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/35094565 
 141 
 
Escartí, M. J., de la Iglesia-Vayá, M., Martí-Bonmatí, L., Robles, M., Carbonell, J., Lull, J. J., 
… Sanjuán, J. (2010). Increased amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus activation in 
schizophrenic patients with auditory hallucinations: An fMRI study using independent 
component analysis. Schizophrenia Research, 117(1), 31–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2009.12.028 
Evans, C. L., Mcguire, P. K., & David, A. S. (2000). Is auditory imagery defective in patients 
with auditory hallucinations? Psychological Medicine, 30(1), 137–148. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799001555 
Feinberg, I. (1978). Efference copy and corollary discharge: implications for thinking and its 
disorders. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 4(4), 636–640. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/4.4.636 
Fenekou, V., & Georgaca, E. (2010). Exploring the experience of hearing voices: A 
qualitative study. Psychosis, 2(2), 134–143. https://doi.org/10.1080/17522430903191783 
Ford, J. M., & Mathalon, D. H. (2005). Corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia: Can 
it explain auditory hallucinations? International Journal of Psychophysiology, 58(2–3), 
179–189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.01.014 
Ford, J. M., Roach, B. J., Faustman, W. O., & Mathalon, D. H. (2007). Synch before you 
speak: Auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
164(3), 458–466. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.164.3.458 
Frisch, S. (2014). How cognitive neuroscience could be more biological — and what it might 
learn from clinical neuropsychology. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00541 
Friston, K. J. (2002). Dysfunctional connectivity in schizophrenia. World Psychiatry, 1(2), 
66–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2009.05.038 
Friston, K. J., Frith, C. D., Liddle, P. F., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1993). Functional 
Connectivity: The Principal-Component Analysis of Large (PET) Data Sets. Journal of 
Cerebral Blood Flow & Metabolism, 13(1), 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1038/jcbfm.1993.4 
Frith, C. D., & Done, D. J. (1988). Towards a neuropsychology of schizophrenia. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 437–443. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.153.4.437 
Fuchs, T. (2005a). Corporealized and Disembodied Minds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
 142 
 
Psychology, 12, 95–107. 
Fuchs, T. (2005b). Overcoming Dualism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 12(2), 115–
117. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2005.0041 
Fuchs, T. (2007). Psychotherapy of the Lived Space: Phenomenological and Ecological 
concept. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 61(4), 423–439. 
Fuchs, T. (2011). The Brain - A Mediating Organ. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(7–8), 
196–221. 
Fuchs, T. (2012a). Are Mental Illnesses Diseases of the Brain? In S. Choudhury & J. Slaby 
(Eds.), Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of 
Neuroscience (pp. 331–344). Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444343359.ch16 
Fuchs, T. (2012b). Selbst und Schizophrenie. Deutsche Zeitschrift Für Philosophie, 60(6), 
887–901. https://doi.org/10.1524/dzph.2012.0067 
Fuchs, T. (2013a). Das Gehirn - ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische 
Konzeption (4th ed.). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Fuchs, T. (2013b). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences, 12(1), 75–104. 
Fujii, D., & Ahmed, I. (Eds.). (2007). The spectrum of psychotic disorders: Neurobiology, 
Etiology & Pathogenesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fujita, J., Takahashi, Y., Nishida, A., Okumura, Y., Ando, S., Kawano, M., … Arai, T. 
(2015). Auditory verbal hallucinations increase the risk for suicide attempts in 
adolescents with suicidal ideation. Schizophrenia Research, 168(1–2), 209–212. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2015.07.028 
Gallagher, S. (2012). Phenomenology. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The phenomenological mind. An Introduction to 
Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. New York: Routledge. 
Garcia-Marques, L., & Ferreira, M. B. (2011). Friends and Foes of Theory Construction in 
Psychological Science: Vague Dichotomies, Unified Theories of Cognition, and the New 
Experimentalism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(2), 192–201. 
 143 
 
Garwood, L., Dodgson, G., Bruce, V., & McCarthy-Jones, S. (2015). A Preliminary 
Investigation into the Existence of a Hypervigilance Subtype of Auditory Hallucination 
in People with Psychosis. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 43(1), 52–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465813000714 
Gilbert, P., Birchwood, M., Gilbert, J., Trower, P., Hay, J., Murray, B., … Miles, J. N. V. 
(2001). An exploration of evolved mental mechanisms for dominant and subordinate 
behaviour in relation to auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia and critical thoughts in 
depression. Psychological Medicine, 31, 1117–1127. 
Giorgi, A. (2005). The Phenomenological Movement and Research. Nursing Science 
Quarterly, 18(1), 75–82. 
González, J. C. (2010). On pink elephants, floating daggers, and other philosophical myths. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 193–211. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9164-0 
Goschler, J. (2007). Metaphors in cognitive and neurosciences: Which impact have metaphors 
on scientific theories and models. Metaphorik, 12, 7–20. 
Greenhalgh, T., Snow, R., Ryan, S., Rees, S., & Salisbury, H. (2015). Six ―biases‖ against 
patients and carers in evidence-based medicine. BMC Medicine, 13, 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-015-0437-x 
Gregory, D. (2016). Inner Speech, Imagined Speech, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(3), 653–673. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-
015-0274-z 
Groenewegen, H. J. (2003). The Basal Ganglia and Motor Control. Neural Plasticity, 10(1–2), 
107–120. 
Grunwald, T., Kurthen, M., & Elger, C. E. (2008). Panic Attacks in a Woman with Frontal 
Lobe Epilepsy. In D. Schmidt & S. C. Schachter (Eds.), Puzzling Cases of Epilepsy (2nd 
ed., pp. 20–23). New York, Burlington, San Diego, London, Amsterdam: Academic 
Press. 
Guloksuz, S., & van Os, J. (2017). The slow death of the concept of schizophrenia and the 
painful birth of the psychosis spectrum. Psychological Medicine, 1–16. 
 144 
 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291717001775 
Gutting, G. (2001). French philosophy in the twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Haddock, G., McCarron, J., Tarrier, N., & Faragher, E. B. (1999). Scales to measure 
dimensions of hallucinations and delusions: the psychotic symptom rating scales 
(PSYRATS). Psychological Medicine, 29(4), 879–889. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799008661 
Hayward, M. (2003). Interpersonal relating and voice hearing: to what extent does relating to 
the voice reflect social relating? Psychology and Psychotherapy, 76, 369–383. 
https://doi.org/10.1348/147608303770584737 
Hayward, M., Overton, J., Dorey, T., & Denney, J. (2009). Relating therapy for people who 
hear voices: A case series. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 16(3), 216–227. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/cpp.615 
Heeger, D. J., & Ress, D. (2002). What does fMRI tell us about neuronal activity? Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 3, 142–151. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn730 
Heinks-Maldonado, T. H., Mathalon, D. H., Houde, J. F., Gray, M., Faustman, W. O., & 
Ford, J. M. (2007). Relationship of imprecise corollary discharge in schizophrenia to 
auditory hallucinations. Archives of General Psychiatry, 64, 286–296. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.64.3.286 
Henriksen, M. G., Raballo, A., & Parnas, J. (2015). The Pathogenesis of Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations in Schizophrenia: A Clinical–Phenomenological Account. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, & Psychology, 22(3), 165–181. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2015.0041 
Hinzen, W., & Rossello, J. (2015). The linguistics of schizophrenia: thought disturbance as 
language pathology across positive symptoms. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1–17. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00971 
Hitchcock, D. (2007). Informal logic and the concept of argument. In J. Dale (Ed.), 
Philosophy of Logic. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science (Volume 5) (pp. 101–129). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Hofer, S., & Frahm, J. (2006). Topography of the human corpus callosum revisited-
 145 
 
Comprehensive fiber tractography using diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging. 
NeuroImage, 32(3), 989–994. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.05.044 
Hoffman, R. E., Oates, E., Hafner, R. J., Hustig, H. H., & McGlashan, T. H. (1994). Semantic 
organization of hallucinated ―voices‖ in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
151(8), 1229–1230. 
Hoffman, R. E., Varanko, M., Gilmore, J., & Mishara, A. L. (2008). Experiential features 
used by patients with schizophrenia to differentiate ―voices‖ from ordinary verbal 
thought. Psychological Medicine, 38(8), 1167–1176. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291707002395 
Holt, L., & Tickle, A. (2014). Exploring the experience of hearing voices from a first person 
perspective: A meta-ethnographic synthesis. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research and Practice, 87, 278–297. 
Honey, C. J., Sporns, O., Cammoun, L., Gigandet, X., Thiran, J. P., Meuli, R., & Hagmann, P. 
(2009). Predicting human resting-state functional connectivity from structural 
connectivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 106(6), 2035–40. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0811168106 
Horga, G., Fernández-Egea, E., Mané, A., Font, M., Schatz, K. C., Falcon, C., … Parellada, 
E. (2014). Brain metabolism during hallucination-like auditory stimulation in 
schizophrenia. PLoS ONE, 9(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0084987 
Horga, G., Peterson, B., Horga, G., Schatz, K. C., Abi-dargham, A., & Peterson, B. S. (2014). 
Deficits in Predictive Coding Underlie Hallucinations in Schizophrenia Deficits in 
Predictive Coding Underlie Hallucinations in Schizophrenia, 34, 8072–8082. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0200-14.2014 
Hox, J. J. (1997). From theoretical concept to survey question. In L. Lars, B. Paul, C. Martin, 
D. L. Edith, D. Cathryn, S. Norbert, & T. Dennis. (Eds.), Survey measurement and 
process quality. NJ:Hoboken: Wiley-Interscience. 
Hubl, D., Koenig, T., Strik, W., Federspiel, A., Kreis, R., Boesch, C., … Dierks, T. (2004). 
Pathways That Make Voices. Arch Gen Psychiatry, 61(July 2004), 658–668. 
Hugdahl, K. (2009). ―hearing voices‖: Auditory hallucinations as failure of top-down control 
 146 
 
of bottom-up perceptual processes. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 50(6), 553–
560. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9450.2009.00775.x 
Hugdahl, K., & Sommer, I. E. C. (2017). Auditory Verbal Hallucinations in Schizophrenia 
from a Levels of Explanation Perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbx142 
Humpston, C. S., & Broome, M. R. (2016). The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible 
Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought 
Insertion. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(3), 611–629. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0232-9 
Ilankovic, M. L., Allen, P. P., Engel, R., Kambeitz, J., Riedel, M., Müller, N., & Hennig-Fast, 
K. (2011). Attentional modulation of external speech attribution in patients with 
hallucinations and delusions. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 805–812. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.01.016 
Johns, L. C., Rossell, S., Frith, C., Ahmad, F., Hemsley, D., Kuipers, E., & McGuire, P. K. 
(2001). Verbal self-monitoring and auditory verbal hallucinations in patients with 
schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 31, 705–715. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291701003774 
Johns, L. C., & van Os, J. (2001). The Continuity of Psychotic Experiences in the General 
Population. Clinical Psychology Review, 21(8), 1125–1141. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7358(01)00103-9 
Jones, N., & Luhrmann, T. M. (2016). Beyond the sensory : Findings from an in-depth 
analysis of the phenomenology of ―auditory hallucinations‖ in schizophrenia. Psychosis, 
8(3), 191–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/17522439.2015.1100670 
Jones, N., & Shattell, M. (2016). Not What the Textbooks Describe: Challenging Clinical 
Conventions About Psychosis. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 1–4. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01612840.2016.1180725 
Jones, S. R., & Fernyhough, C. (2007a). Neural correlates of inner speech and auditory verbal 
hallucinations: A critical review and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 
27(2), 140–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2006.10.001 
 147 
 
Jones, S. R., & Fernyhough, C. (2007b). Thought as action: Inner speech, self-monitoring, 
and auditory verbal hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition, 16(2), 391–399. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.12.003 
Jones, S. R., Guy, A., & Ormrod, J. A. (2003). A Q-methodological study of hearing voices : 
A preliminary exploration of voice hearers‘ understanding of their experiences. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 76, 189–209. 
Karlsson, L.-B. (2008). ―More real than reality‖: a study of voice hearing. International 
Journal of Social Welfare, 17, 365–373. 
Kay, S. R., Opler, L. A., & Fiszbein, A. (1987). Positive and negative syndrome scale 
(PANSS) rating manual. San Rafael, CA: Social and Behavioral Sciences Documents. 
Kelleher, I., Corcoran, P., Keeley, H., Wigman, J. T. W., Devlin, N., Ramsay, H., … Cannon, 
M. (2013). Psychotic Symptoms and Population Risk for Suicide Attempt A Prospective 
Cohort Study. JAMA Psychiatry, 70(9), 940–948. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2013.140 
Kelleher, I., Devlin, N., Wigman, J. T. W., Kehoe, A., Murtagh, A., & Fitzpatrick, C. (2014). 
Psychotic experiences in a mental health clinic sample : implications for suicidality , 
multimorbidity and functioning. Psychological Medicine, 44, 1615–1624. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291713002122 
Kerlinger, F. N. (1986). Foundations of behavioral research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Klimesch, W. (2012). Alpha-band oscillations, attention, and controlled access to stored 
information. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(12), 606–617. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.007 
Kotchoubey, B., Tretter, F., Braun, H. A., Buchheim, T., Draguhn, A., Fuchs, T., … 
Tschacher, W. (2016). Methodological Problems on the Way to Integrative Human 
Neuroscience. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 10, 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2016.00041 
Kraus, A. (2007). Schizophrenic delusion and hallucination as the expression and 
consequence of an alteration of the existential a prioris. In M. C. Chung, B. Fulford, & 
 148 
 
G. Graham (Eds.), Reconceiving Schizophrenia (pp. 97–112). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Krishnan, R. R., Fivaz, M., Kraus, M. S., & Keefe, R. S. E. (2011). Hierarchical temporal 
processing deficit model of reality distortion and psychoses. Molecular Psychiatry, 
16(2), 129–144. https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2011.54 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Conceptual Metaphor in everyday Language. The Journal 
of Philosophy, 77(8), 453–486. 
Langdon, R., Jones, S. R., Connaughton, E., & Fernyhough, C. (2008). The phenomenology 
of inner speech: comparison of schizophrenia patients with auditory verbal hallucinations 
and healthy controls. Psychological Medicine, 39, 655–663. 
Larkin, A. R. (1979). The Form and Content of Schizophrenic Hallucinations. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 136(7), 940–943. 
Larøi, F. (2006). The phenomenological diversity of hallucinations: some theoretical and 
clinical implications. Psychologica Belgica, 46(1/2), 163–183. 
Larøi, F. (2012). How do auditory verbal hallucinations in patients differ from those in non-
patients? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 25. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00025 
Larøi, F., & Woodward, T. S. (2007). Hallucinations from a cognitive perspective. Harvard 
Review of Psychiatry, 15(3), 109–117. 
Le Moal, M., & Swendsen, J. (2015). Sciences of the brain: The long road to scientific 
maturity and to present-day reductionism. Comptes Rendus Biologies, 338(8–9), 593–
601. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crvi.2015.06.014 
Lee, S.-H., Wynn, J. K., Green, M. F., Kim, H., Lee, K.-J., Nam, M., … Chung, Y.-C. (2006). 
Quantitative EEG and low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) imaging 
of patients with persistent auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 83(2–3), 
111–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2005.11.025 
Leudar, I., Thomas, P., McNally, D., & Glinski, A. (1997). What voices can do with words: 
pragmatics of verbal hallucinations. Psychological Medicine, 27, 885–898. 
 149 
 
Liberati, A., Altman, D. G., Tetzlaff, J., Mulrow, C., G??tzsche, P. C., Ioannidis, J. P. A., … 
Moher, D. (2009). The PRISMA statement for reporting systematic reviews and meta-
analyses of studies that evaluate health care interventions: Explanation and elaboration. 
PLoS Medicine, 6(7). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000100 
Liberman, R. P., & Corrigan, P. W. (1992). Is Schizoprenia Neurological disorder? Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry, 4(2), 119–124. 
Lim, A., Hoek, H. W., Deen, M. L., Blom, J. D., Bruggeman, R., Cahn, W., … Wiersma, D. 
(2016). Prevalence and classification of hallucinations in multiple sensory modalities in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Schizophrenia Research, 176(2–3), 493–499. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2016.06.010 
Linden, D. E. J., Thornton, K., Kuswanto, C. N., Johnston, S. J., van de Ven, V. G., & 
Jackson, M. C. (2011). The Brain‘s voices: Comparing nonclinical auditory 
hallucinations and imagery. Cerebral Cortex, 21(2), 330–337. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhq097 
Lodish, H., Berk, A., Zipursky, S. L., Matsudaira, P., Baltimore, D., & Darnell, J. (2000). 
Molecular Cell Biology (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman. 
Logothetis, N. K. (2008). What we can do and what we cannot do with fMRI. Nature, 
453(7197), 869–78. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature06976 
Looijestijn, J., Diederen, K. M. J., Goekoop, R., Sommer, I. E. C., Daalman, K., Kahn, R. S., 
… Blom, J. D. (2013). The auditory dorsal stream plays a crucial role in projecting 
hallucinated voices into external space. Schizophrenia Research, 146(1–3), 314–319. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2013.02.004 
Lu, M., Doñamayor, N., Münte, T. F., & Bahlmann, J. (2017). Event-related potentials and 
neural oscillations dissociate levels of cognitive control. Behavioural Brain Research, 
320, 154–164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2016.12.012 
Mané, A., Falcon, C., Mateos, J. J., Fernandez-Egea, E., Horga, G., Lomeña, F., … Parellada, 
E. (2009). Progressive gray matter changes in first episode schizophrenia: A 4-year 
longitudinal magnetic resonance study using VBM. Schizophrenia Research, 114(1–3), 
136–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2009.07.014 
 150 
 
Markus, K. A. (2008). Constructs, Concepts and the Worlds of Possibility: Connecting the 
Measurement, Manipulation, and Meaning of Variables. Measurement: Interdisciplinary 
Research & Perspective, 6(1–2), 54–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/15366360802035513 
McCarthy-Jones, S. (2011). Voices from the storm: A critical review of quantitative studies of 
auditory verbal hallucinations and childhood sexual abuse. Clinical Psychology Review, 
31(6), 983–992. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.05.004 
McCarthy-Jones, S. (2012). Hearing voices: The histories, causes and meanings of auditory 
verbal hallucinations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Krueger, J., Larøi, F., Broome, M. R., & Fernyhough, C. (2013). Stop, 
look, listen: the need for philosophical phenomenological perspectives on auditory verbal 
hallucinations. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 1–7. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00127 
McCarthy-Jones, S., & Longden, E. (2015). Auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia 
and post-traumatic stress disorder : common phenomenology , common cause , common 
interventions? Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1–12. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01071 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Smailes, D., Corvin, A., Gill, M., Morris, D. W., Dinan, T. G., … 
Dudley, R. (2017). Occurrence and co-occurrence of hallucinations by modality in 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Psychiatry Research, 252, 154–160. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2017.01.102 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Thomas, N., Strauss, C., Dodgson, G., Jones, N., Woods, A., … 
Sommer, I. E. C. (2014). Better than mermaids and stray dogs? subtyping auditory verbal 
hallucinations and its implications for research and practice. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40, 
275–284. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu018 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Trauer, T., MacKinnon, A., Sims, E., Thomas, N., & Copolov, D. L. 
(2014). A new phenomenological survey of auditory hallucinations: Evidence for 
subtypes and implications for theory and practice. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40(1), 225–
235. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs156 
Merriam-Webster‘s online dictionary. (2017a). Definition. Retrieved November 6, 2017, from 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/definition 
 151 
 
Merriam-Webster‘s online dictionary. (2017b). Information. Retrieved September 19, 2017, 
from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inform 
Mishara, A. L. (2007). Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: why we still 
are not there yet. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 20(6), 559–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/YCO.0b013e3282f128b8 
Mishara, A. L. (2010). Kafka, paranoic doubles and the brain: hypnagogic vs. hyper-reflexive 
models of disrupted self in neuropsychiatric disorders and anomalous conscious states. 
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine: PEHM, 5(13), 1–37. 
Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., & Altman, D. G. (2009). Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. Annulas of Internal Medicine, 151(4), 264–269. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed1000097 
Morange, M. (2010). What history tells us XXI. Apoptosis and programmed cell death: When 
biological categories are blurred. Journal of Biosciences, 35(2), 177–181. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12038-010-0021-7 
Moritz, S., & Larøi, F. (2008). Differences and similarities in the sensory and cognitive 
signatures of voice-hearing, intrusions and thoughts. Schizophrenia Research, 102(1–3), 
96–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2008.04.007 
Mühling, M. (2014). Resonances: Neurobiology, evolution and theology: Evolutionary niche 
construction, the ecological Brain and Relational-Narrative theology. Göttingen, Bristol: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Mulert, C., Kirsch, V., Pascual-Marqui, R., McCarley, R. W., & Spencer, K. M. (2011). 
Long-range synchrony of gamma oscillations and auditory hallucination symptoms in 
schizophrenia. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 79(1), 55–63. 
Naudin, J., & Azorin, J.-M. (1997). The Hallucinatory Epoché. Journal of Phenomenological 
Psychology, 28(2), 171–195. 
Nayani, T. H., & David,  a S. (1996). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological survey. 
Psychological Medicine, 26(1), 177–189. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329170003381X 
Nazimek, J. M., Hunter, M. D., & Woodruff, P. W. R. (2012). Auditory hallucinations: 
Expectation – perception model. Medical Hypothesis, 78, 802–810. 
 152 
 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2012.03.014 
Neuper, C., & Pfurtscheller, G. (2001). Event-related dynamics of cortical rhythms: 
Frequency-specific features and functional correlates. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 43(1), 41–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(01)00178-7 
Northoff, G., & Stanghellini, G. (2016). How to Link Brain and Experience? Spatiotemporal 
Psychopathology of the Lived Body. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 10, 1–15. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00172 
Norton, J. W., & Corbett, J. J. (2000). Visual Perceptual Abnormalities: Hallucinations and 
Illusions. Seminars in Neurology, 20(1), 111–122. https://doi.org/10.1055/s-2000-6837 
Parnas, J., Bovet, P., & Zahavi, D. (2002). Schizophrenic autism : clinical phenomenology 
and pathogenetic implications. World Psychiatry, 1(3), 131–136. 
Parnas, J., & Henriksen, M. G. (2014). Disordered Self in the Schizophrenia Spectrum. 
Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 22(5), 251–265. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/HRP.0000000000000040 
Parnas, J., Møller, P., Kircher, T., & Al, E. (2005). EASE: Examination of anomalous self- 
experience. Psychopathology, 38, 236–258. 
Penfield, W., & Perot, P. (1963). The brain‘s record of auditory and visual experience. A final 
summary and discussion. Brain, 86(4), 595–696. 
Pérez-Álvarez, M., García-Montes, J. M., Perona-Garcelán, S., & Vallina-Fernández, O. 
(2008). Changing relationship with voices: New therapeutic perspectives for treating 
hallucinations. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 15(2), 75–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/cpp.563 
Ratcliffe, M., & Wilkinson, S. (2016). How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 39, 48–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.009 
Rauss, K., & Pourtois, G. (2013). What is bottom-up and what is top-down in predictive 
coding. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00276 
Reynolds, A. S. (2014). The deaths of a cell: how language and metaphor influence the 
science of cell death Andrew Reynolds Cape Breton University. Studies in History and 
 153 
 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science, 48, 175–84. 
Rilling, J. K., Glasser, M. F., Preuss, T. M., Ma, X., Zhao, T., Hu, X., & Behrens, T. E. 
(2008). The evolution of the arcuate fasciculus revealed with comparative DTI.pdf. Nat 
Neurosci, 426–428. 
Rodriguez, E., George, N., Lachaux, J. P., Martinerie, J., Renault, B., & Varela, F. J. (1999). 
Perception‘s shadow: long-distance synchronization of human brain activity. Nature, 
397, 430–433. 
Rojcewicz, R., & Lutgens, B. (1996). A genetic (psychological) phenomenology of 
perception. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 27(2), 117–145. 
Rojcewicz, S. J., & Rojcewicz, R. (1997). The ―Human‖ Voices In Hallucinations. Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, 28(1), 1–41. 
Romdenh-Romluc, K. (2007). Merleau-Ponty‘s account of hallucination. European Journal of 
Philosophy, 17(1), 76–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00277.x 
Rosen, C., Chase, K. A., Jones, N., Grossman, L. S., Gin, H., & Sharma, R. P. (2016). 
Listening to Schneiderian Voices: A Novel Phenomenological Analysis. 
Psychopathology, 49(3). https://doi.org/10.1159/000446546 
Rosen, C., Jones, N., Chase, K. A., Grossman, L. S., Gin, H., & Sharma, R. P. (2015). Self, 
Voices and Embodiment: A Phenomenological Analysis. Journal of Schizophrenia 
Research, 2(1), 1–6. 
Sapara, A., ffytche, D. H., Cooke, M. A., Williams, S. C. R., & Kumari, V. (2015). Is it me? 
Verbal self-monitoring neural network and clinical insight in schizophrenia. Psychiatry 
Research - Neuroimaging, 234(3), 328–335. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscychresns.2015.10.007 
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 29(3), 427–444. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 
Schlimme, J. E., Bonnemann, C., & Mishara, A. L. (2010). No departure to ―Pandora‖? Using 
critical phenomenology to differentiate ―naive‖ from ―reflective‖ experience in 
psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine (a comment on Schwartz and Wiggins, 2010). 
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine : PEHM, 5(1), 15. 
 154 
 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-5-15 
Schmitz, T. W., Correia, M. M., Ferreira, C. S., Prescot, A. P., & Anderson, M. C. (2017). 
Hippocampal GABA enables inhibitory control over unwanted thoughts. Nature 
Communications, 8, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-00956-z 
Seal, M. L., Aleman, A., & McGuire, P. K. (2004). Compelling imagery, unanticipated speech 
and deceptive memory: Neurocognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations in 
schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1–2), 43–72. Retrieved from 
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=15459874 
Sefcsik, T., Nemeth, D., Janacsek, K., Hoffmann, I., Scialabba, J., Klivenyi, P., … Vecsei, L. 
(2009). The role of the putamen in cognitive functions — A case study. Learning and 
Perception., 1(2), 215–227. https://doi.org/10.1556/LP.1.2009.2.4 
Shallice, T., Burgess, P. W., & Frith, C. D. (1991). Can the neuropsychological case-study 
approach be applied to schizophrenia? Psychological Medicine, 21(3), 661–673. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291700022303 
Shanon, B. (2003). Hallucinations. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(2), 3–31. 
Shapleske, J., Rossell, S. L., Simmons, A., David, A. S., & Woodruff, P. W. R. (2001). Are 
Auditory hallucinations the consequence of abnormal cerebral lateralization? A 
morphometric MRI study of the Sylvian fissure and planum temporale. Biological 
Psychiatry, 49(8), 685–693. 
Shergill, S. S., Murray, R. M., & McGuire, P. K. (1998). Auditory hallucinations: A review of 
psychological treatments. Schizophrenia Research, 32(3), 137–150. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-9964(98)00052-8 
Simeone, J. C., Ward, A. J., Rotella, P., Collins, J., & Windisch, R. (2015). An evaluation of 
variation in published estimates of schizophrenia prevalence from 1990─2013: a 
systematic literature review. BMC Psychiatry, 15(1), 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-015-0578-7 
Škodlar, B., Henriksen, M. G., Sass, L. A., Nelson, B., & Parnas, J. (2013). Cognitive-
behavioral therapy for schizophrenia: A critical evaluation of its theoretical framework 
from a clinical-phenomenological perspective. Psychopathology, 46(4), 249–265. 
 155 
 
https://doi.org/10.1159/000342536 
Smit, H., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2014). Seven misconceptions about the mereological fallacy: A 
compilation for the perplexed. Erkenntnis, 79(5), 1077–1097. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9594-5 
Smith, S. M., & Albaum, G. S. (2005). Fundamentals of marketing research. Thousand Oaks, 
London, New Delhi: Sage. 
Sperling, W., Bleich, S., Maihöfner, C., & Reulbach, U. (2009). Auditory hallucinations in 
schizophrenia - Outcry of a diseased brain? Medical Hypotheses, 72(2), 213–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2008.09.005 
Sritharan, A., Line, P., Sergejew, A., Silberstein, R., Egan, G., & Copolov, D. (2005). EEG 
coherence measures during auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Psychiatry 
Research, 136(2–3), 189–200. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2005.05.010 
Stanghellini, G., & Cutting, J. (2003). Auditory verbal hallucinations - Breaking the silence of 
inner dialogue. Psychopathology, 36(3), 120–128. https://doi.org/10.1159/000071256 
Stanghellini, G., Langer, Á. I., Ambrosini, A., & Cangas, A. J. (2012). Quality of 
hallucinatory experiences: differences between a clinical and non-clinical sample. World 
Psychiatry, 11, 110–113. 
Stephane, M., Thuras, P., Nasrallah, H., & Georgopoulos, A. P. (2003). The internal structure 
of the phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 61(2–
3), 185–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-9964(03)00013-6 
Stevenson, I. (1983). Do we need a new word to supplement ―hallucination‖? American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 140(12), 1609–1611. 
Strik, W., & Dierks, T. (2004). How modern neurophysiology can help to understand 
schizophrenia. Schweizer Archiv Für Neurologie Und Psychiatrie, 155(8), 368–374. 
Strik, W., & Dierks, T. (2008). Neurophysiological mechanisms of psychotic symptoms. 
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 258, 66–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00406-008-5016-0 
Sur, S., & Sinha, V. K. (2009). Event-related potential: An overview. Industrial Psychiatry 
 156 
 
Journal, 18(1), 70–73. https://doi.org/10,4103/0972-6748,57865 
Telles-Correia, D., Moreira, A. L., & Gonçalves, J. S. (2015). Hallucinations and related 
concepts — their conceptual background. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00991 
Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Leudar, I. (2004). Hearing voices: A phenomenological-
hermeneutic approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1–2), 13–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800344000138 
Upthegrove, R., Broome, M. R., Caldwell, K., Ives, J., Oyebode, F., & Wood, S. J. (2016). 
Understanding auditory verbal hallucinations: A systematic review of current evidence. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 133(5), 352–367. https://doi.org/10.1111/acps.12531 
Upthegrove, R., Ives, J., Broome, M. R., Caldwell, K., Wood, S. J., & Oyebode, F. (2016). 
Auditory verbal hallucinations in first-episode psychosis: a phenomenological 
investigation. BJPsych Open, 2(1), 88–95. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjpo.bp.115.002303 
van de Ven, V. G., Formisano, E., Röder, C. H., Prvulovic, D., Bittner, R. A., Dietz, M. G., … 
Linden, D. E. J. (2005). The spatiotemporal pattern of auditory cortical responses during 
verbal hallucinations. NeuroImage, 27(3), 644–655. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.04.041 
van der Gaag, M. (2006). A neuropsychiatric model of biological and psychological processes 
in the remission of delusions and auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, 
113–122. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbl027 
van Lutterveld, R., Hillebrand, A., Diederen, K. M. J., Daalman, K., Kahn, R. S., Stam, C. J., 
& Sommer, I. E. C. (2012). Oscillatory cortical network involved in auditory verbal 
hallucinations in Schizophrenia. PLoS ONE, 7(7), 1–7. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0041149 
van Tol, M. J., van Der Meer, L., Bruggeman, R., Modinos, G., Knegtering, H., & Aleman, A. 
(2014). Voxel-based gray and white matter morphometry correlates of hallucinations in 
schizophrenia: The superior temporal gyrus does not stand alone. NeuroImage: Clinical, 
4, 249–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2013.12.008 
Vercammen, A., de Haan, E. H. F., & Aleman, A. (2008). Hearing a voice in the noise: 
 157 
 
auditory hallucinations and speech perception. Psychological Medicine, 38(8), 1177–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291707002437 
Vidal, F. (2009). Brainhood: Anthropological figure of modernity. History of the Human 
Sciences, 22(1), 6–35. 
Viñas-Guasch, N., & Wu, Y. J. (2017). The role of the putamen in language: a meta-analytic 
connectivity modeling study. Brain Structure and Function, 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-017-1450-y 
Waddingham, R. (2012). Communicating With Voices: Part One. Retrieved October 18, 
2017, from https://www.hearing-voices.org/personal-experiences/communicating-with-
voices/ 
Walton, K. L. (1990). Mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the representational 
arts. Harvard University Press. 
Waters, F., Allen, P. P., Aleman, A., Fernyhough, C., Woodward, T. S., Badcock, J. C., … 
Larøi, F. (2012). Auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia and nonschizophrenia 
populations: A review and integrated model of cognitive mechanisms. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 38(4), 683–692. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs045 
Waters, F., Badcock, J. C., Michie, P., & Maybery, M. (2006). Auditory hallucinations in 
schizophrenia : Intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 
11(1), 65–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800444000191 
Waters, F., & Fernyhough, C. (2017). Hallucinations: A Systematic Review of Points of 
Similarity and Difference Across Diagnostic Classes. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 43(1), 32–
43. 
Watt, J. H., & van den Berg, S. (1995). Research Methods For Communication Science. 
Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Whitford, T. J., Ford, J. M., Mathalon, D. H., Kubicki, M., & Shenton, M. E. (2012). 
Schizophrenia, myelination, and delayed corollary discharges: A hypothesis. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38(3), 486–494. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbq105 
Wiggins, O. P., & Schwartz, M. A. (2007). Schizophrenia: a phenomenological-
anthropological approach. In M. C. Chung, B. Fulford, & G. Graham (Eds.), 
 158 
 
Reconceiving Schizophrenia (pp. 113–129). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.515655 
Wilkinson, S. (2014). Accounting for the phenomenology and varieties of auditory verbal 
hallucination within a predictive processing framework. Consciousness and Cognition, 
30, 142–155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.09.002 
Wilkinson, S., & Bell, V. (2016). The Representation of Agents in Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations. Mind and Language, 31(1), 104–126. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12096 
Wilson, S. M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., & Iacoboni, M. (2008). Beyond superior temporal cortex: 
Intersubject correlations in narrative speech comprehension. Cerebral Cortex, 18(1), 
230–242. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhm049 
Woods, A. (2013). The Voice-Hearer. J Ment Health, 22(3), 941–949. 
https://doi.org/10.3109/09638237.2013.799267.The 
Woods, A., Jones, N., Alderson-Day, B., Callard, F., & Fernyhough, C. (2015). Experiences 
of hearing voices: analysis of a novel phenomenological survey. The Lancet, 2(4), 323–
331. Retrieved from 
http://ovidsp.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&PAGE=reference&D=psyc11&NEWS=N&A
N=2015-57512-033 
Woods, A., Jones, N., Bernini, M., Callard, F., Alderson-Day, B., Badcock, J. C., … 
Fernyhough, C. (2014). Interdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenology of auditory 
verbal hallucinations. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40, 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu003 
World Health Organization (WHO). (1992). The ICD- 10 classification of mental and 
behavioral disorders: clinical description and diagnostic guidelines. Geneva: WHO. 
Wu, W. (2012). Explaining Schizophrenia : Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self- 
Monitoring. Mind and Language, 27(1), 86–107. 
Wulff, P., Ponomarenko, A. A. Bartos, M., Korotkova, T. M., Fuchs, E. C., Bähner, F., 
Bähnerc, F., … Monyer, H. (2009). Hippocampal theta rhythm and its coupling with 
gamma oscillations require fast inhibition onto parvalbumin-positive interneurons. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
 159 
 
106(9), 3561–3566. 
Yao, B., Belin, P., & Scheepers, C. (2011). Silent Reading of Direct versus Indirect Speech 
Activates Voice-selective Areas in the Auditory Cortex. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 23(10), 3146–3152. 
Zedlick, D., & Thoma, S. (2017). Where the money goes - Kritische Reflexionen zur 
gegenwärtigen Forschungsförderung in der Psychiatrie. Sozialpsychiatrische 
Informationen, 47(2), 15–17. 
 
